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RE-INVENTING CANADA:

THE NORTH AND NATIONAL POLICY

— Revised 3rd Edition —
(Previously titled *The North and National Policy*)

BY PETER JULL

This paper on future federal policy in Northern Canada reflects only the view of the author, and does not attempt to represent the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples or the Government of Canada.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
**RE-INVENTING CANADA:
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Indigenous peoples in Northern Canada have faced many hardships and dislocations. In the Territorial North, however, Canada has made great progress since World War II. Comparison with Australia highlights key elements of Canada's Northern achievement (pp 3-10).

This paper reflects on the course and conflicts of the post-war North in Canada. It describes a synthesis which has been arrived at by trial and error in public policy and the angry reactions of indigenous peoples to policies made by others.

Changes in the North are a series of transitions.

In the 1950s the Northern Territories began to be incorporated into the physical culture of Canada through large-scale material change and the re-organising of hunter-gatherer camps into settled central communities.

In the 1960s the Territories acquired the institutional trappings of Canadian society and national culture, e.g., a full provincial-like NWT administration in a new Northern capital.

In the 1970s the collision between indigenous and non-indigenous agendas within the North, and indigenous and outsiders' agendas, took place, with the growing realisation that a dual economy and dual society existed in the region.

In the 1980s the accommodation of peoples and development philosophies began to be realised through negotiated processes such as land claims and through national and Northern constitutional forums.

Now, for the 1990s, the transition is from these eras of fundamental change and dispute to the establishment and consolidation of civil society — a society fundamentally different from that of the settled areas of Southern Canada.

These transitions are more telescoped in the provincial North — and less well advanced in some Provinces.

Since the early 1980s two external influences have re-shaped Northern Canada. First came the political renaissance of indigenous peoples and then internationalisation.

There have been two main policy views of the North:

- an empty vastness to be settled and re-shaped by determined non-indigenous settlers and planner-strategists, ignoring existing human realities; and
- the real North made up of the daily lives of indigenous peoples and a small number of long-term non-indigenous residents.

The North is 75% of Canada's land area — i.e., the non-farm regions North of main European settlement zones. The failure by federal and provincial governments to incorporate the North into Canadian society except as cold storage for presumed wealth has left social and economic disparities, North-South, of a type long rejected as un-Canadian, East-West.

Northern Canada is seeing a re-run of Canada's European settlement era: relations with previous inhabitants, adjustment to alien eco-systems, equitable and just development and use of resources, and building a peaceful and stable social order. If Canadians cannot learn from experience 500 years after Cartier's first voyage, we may not survive as a nation.

Northern Canada faces a range of immediate remedial tasks — obtaining and ensuring acceptable living conditions for indigenous peoples, healing race relations, developing or accommodating governance systems which meet local/regional needs and which are culturally appropriate, replacing boom-and-bust economies with ecologically sustainable development, restoring and properly managing eco-systems, and securing policies at federal and provincial government levels which meet the needs of Northerners and their emerging political institutions.

Northern Canada, once a national backyard, is now a front door opening onto the world's Circumpolar community. All Circumpolar lands have similar histories, including the Russian North. Northern Canada's membership in the Circumpolar world requires new concepts about "the North" and frameworks and policies which flow from and equip us for that membership.

In the North are three main tasks of the modern world: accommodating racial and cultural diversity justly and peaceably; managing resources and the environment sustainably; and making technology solve, not create, human problems.

The core of Canadian identity is the North. Modern Canadian history and culture have been a nibbling around the edges by Europeans of a critical mass of forbidding images

constituting the North — winter, distance, space, vast areas impossible to farm or graze, the lack of accustomed social forms, and indigenous cultures with alien values and unknowable intentions (see Appendix A, page 45). Meanwhile, the North and what happens there are *indigenous* in several ways. Even the political will and ideas for meeting Northern needs are, with the exception of some environmental expertise, coming from Northerners, especially indigenous peoples.

Northern needs today are information-, research- and knowledge-intensive.

Indigenous peoples of the North and governments may have reached the limits of public and government tolerance of reform unless they provide more explanation and understandable goals. Leadership is needed, and definitions of social purpose, no less than urgent work to consolidate recent achievements.

The permanent inhabitants of the North are indigenous peoples who have been re-negotiating virtually all areas of their lives in processes dealing with land claims, the Canadian constitution, Northern Territory constitutions (e.g., Nunavut), local self-management, aboriginal government, and new quasi-governmental development entities such as aboriginal claims corporations. The extent of that re-writing of North-South relations in Canada and of indigenous-federal relations within the North, by indigenous people themselves, means that those processes must be respected as the principal forum from which new Northern policy "statements" emerge.

The results of all these negotiations and processes will take years to implement and consolidate. The post-war North has already suffered much social change and dislocation. We must be restrained in making recommendations for more change.

The boundary of the North is often thought the Southern limit of the Yukon and NWT. This makes little sense. Northern regions of seven provinces share climate zones and eco-systems with the Territories, but often include regions and indigenous peoples who have neither the social conditions nor opportunities of the Territories, nor the benefits taken for granted by residents farther South in their provinces. Provincial governments have claimed sovereignty over lands, waters, and resources of indigenous peoples, but have not always recognised an obligation to the well-being or aspirations of those peoples. Only when crises or collisions of federal and provincial jurisdiction occur have better approaches been attempted. Functional arrangements should be urgently negotiated between federal and provincial governments and local indigenous representatives to deal with indigenous hinterland disadvantage and living conditions. Canadians could learn from Norway how personal and public services and conditions can be equalised in even the most remote places on the Arctic coast.

The idealism and practical activism of Northern indigenous peoples in struggling with the habits and structures of Canadian governance have been yielding new answers. These changes are not a temporary flurry accompanying national constitutional processes, but

part of steady political and constitutional development occurring in the North since the mid-1960s.

The future of Canada is being revealed today in the North. The challenges of relations with non-European society and of a new environmental order are central political facts. The reworking of tired and often inappropriate political and administrative solutions is being done by British-descended Canadians as much as by Slavey or Iglulingmiut Canadians. The land claims negotiating table is the real constitutional table.

However, the old colonial-style politico-administrative system remains, even where Territorial governments have renewed its contents. Alongside is the shiny new and locally created claims superstructure with the same breadth of interests — and even wider ones than the old Territorial governments had in the case of lands, resources and environment — with more legitimacy in the eyes of the permanent resident majority, the indigenous people. Claims are a direct result of the failure of Territorial governance, and claims policy contents are meant to make up for the failure of that system. Yet Territory governments remain the sole legitimate Northern authority.

The proposed move to sovereign independence by Quebec following the 1994 provincial election has focussed indigenous concerns. Two questions have become critical:

- the Northern boundary of Quebec; and
- the status of Inuit, Cree, and other indigenous territories if they remain within Quebec.

There is a practical no less than constitutional and moral role for Ottawa here in respect of Quebec's indigenous peoples. (See Quebec, pp 31-36.)

Boundaries drawn by outsiders in Indian territory and neglect by governments of indigenous attachment to specific territory were major sources of conflict and shooting wars in the earlier European history of what is now Canada and the Northern USA. Any failure by governments in Quebec City and Ottawa to deal justly with the rights and aspirations of Inuit, Crees, and other peoples affected by constitutional renewal or the secession of Quebec (or any other part of Canada) would become a significant international issue.

Accommodation by nation-states of indigenous peoples on their borders have precedents. The Lappecodicilen of 1751 is a boundary treaty arrived at in a spirit of respect for indigenous inhabitants, i.e., in the interior of Sweden and Norway. The Torres Strait Treaty of 1978 puts the rights, needs, and traditions of indigenous peoples and the protection of the environment at the centre of a maritime boundary agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea.

Most of the changes needed in Canada's Northern policy are changes of attitude among Southern Canadians and their governments. The North today does not need grand new national constitutional reforms so much as consolidation and recognition of the new regional societies coming into being through indigenous initiative. Cultural activity and output are also an important part of this.

The North is a patchwork of new societies based on old indigenous ethno-regions; it can no longer be seen as an empty land where the arbitrary political boundaries of settlers meet, as on the map. Among these are scattered some mostly non-indigenous boomtowns, the latter linked more to the South than to surrounding territory.

The Northern claims settlement or *regional agreement* is replacing dysfunctional provincial and territorial government structures (or lack of them) as the basic social, cultural, and political unit in the hearts and minds of Northerners. Such units, e.g., through claims settlements, provide all Canadians with closer and better management of national territory. Whether or not Provincial and Territorial boundaries are changed, Northern policy and administration should be re-organised and re-focussed with indigenous regional homelands as the basic organisational units.

The main outlines of recent federal policy in the Territorial North have been both correct and successful. That is,

- the securing of indigenous rights through negotiation;
- the brokering of cross-cultural equality, accompanied by social, legal, and politico-administrative measures; and
- the support for *de facto* or *de jure* local and regional self-governing authority

have been proven to be not only the right policies for the times, but have attracted interest and admiration abroad. These policies were not created all at once; they often sprang from division, confrontation, and try-and-try-again policy-making cycles. They have been arrived at jointly, in effect, if not always cooperatively, by indigenous peoples and the federal and territorial governments. Of course, there have been many practical problems, but these have been in implementation rather than in the spirit and direction of overall policy principles. (See conclusions, pp 37-45.)

In the Provincial North, Canada as a country has failed. Indigenous conditions are often wretched.

Federal policy and presence in the North need fundamental review in the specific context of Canada's unity, future, and national priorities. This has never been done, as far as is known, except under the rubric of geo-strategic notions which all but ignored the social,

cultural, and political realities and imperatives of the domestic North. It would be useful for a policy planning exercise to put aside the operating principles and evolved intentions of recent Northern policy for a moment and start with a clean sheet of paper. The starting-point for consideration should be that the Northern 75% of Canada is largely politically unorganised and administratively unmanaged, except in parts of the Territories; that the permanent residents are non-European peoples whose social and economic conditions are often unacceptable by national standards; that some such miserable areas in the Provincial North send many ill-prepared people to Southern cities desperate for a better life, contributing mightily thereby to already critical indigenous urban problems; that the region and its residents' livelihoods suffer the downstream effects of industrial development but few benefits; that where the indigenous peoples have been organised and empowered conditions have dramatically improved; and that most of the socio-political hope found in the region results from some general and some quite local efforts, both voluntary and involuntary, of federal-indigenous partnership. The conjunction of federal power and resources with indigenous will, purpose, and creative energy has produced remarkable things.

Starting from such a basis, one might well arrive at a new policy framework. The several national crises which have befallen Canada in recent years and which loom for it today require us to venture such fresh thinking. The North is a field where Ottawa has almost unlimited scope for good, and where size and scale are such that modest amounts of financial input may yield very large benefits.

It would be unwise for Ottawa to accept too literally the shrieks about exclusivity of jurisdiction by provincial governments. It is time for Ottawa to look beyond ritual constitutional denials and seek policies which will achieve social justice and political hope for the peoples of the Provincial North. The provinces *should* be partners; the indigenous peoples *must* be partners.

It is fine to admire the transcendent patterns of politics and policy in the new North, but the dynamic has been the disadvantage of its indigenous inhabitants. Poverty, discrimination, and despair has been the driving force. There remains a fundamental need for social and infrastructure spending.

Canada needs big ideas today. The contemporary North gives it three "big ideas".

1. ***A Civil Reconciliation*** of peoples, cultures, ideologies, development philosophies, and laws is producing civil harmony and a renewed respect for shared public purposes.
2. ***The Indigenous North*** has resurfaced after a period of layering-over by the "garrison mentality" and vain hopes of a Victorian mode of mechanical progress, and is now providing both indigneous and

non-indigenous Canadians with a workable, flourishing, "made in Canada" model for the greater part of the national territory.

3. ***The International North*** has been newly discovered by the White Man thanks to the urging of indigenous Northerners around the Polar Basin, a coalition of largely powerless peoples striving against old Superpower and diplomatic pretensions to establish a human and humane agenda for a region critical for the world's political and environmental health and to establish a new model of a peaceful international order.

Helping Northerners rebuild the North in the way they have now begun is an important national enterprise and an investment in the identity and future of all Canadians.

PREFACE to the 3rd edition

This paper reflects on the course and conflicts of the post-war North in Canada. It describes a synthesis which has been arrived at by trial and error in public policy and the angry reactions of indigenous peoples to policies made by others. The new political *ethos* and the world of new indigenous societies I describe was unforeseen by the policy-makers. None of which is to deny that matters are turning out for the best.

There are those uncomfortable with such an approach, something which surprises me a generation and a half after the heyday of Marshall McLuhan who, from his seat at the University of Toronto, would amiably tell such critics, "You're still thinking lineally." However, for a thorough account I can recommend some of the more general References already listed at the end of the paper, notably Aird 1988; Berger 1977; Bone 1992; CARC 1984; CARC 1988; Coates & Morrison 1988; Coates 1991; Dacks 1990; Dahl 1993; Damas 1984; DIAND 1988; Dickerson 1992; Fenge 1994; Griffiths 1987; ICC 1992; Jull & Roberts 1991; Jull 1984; Jull 1986; Jull 1991a; Jull 1991b; Jull 1992; Jull 1994b; Kleivan 1966; Merritt *et al.* 1989; MRG 1994; Osherenko & Young 1989; Page 1986; Rea 1976; Richardson *et al.* 1994a; Robertson *et al.* 1988; Roots *et al.* 1987; and Tester & Kulchyski 1994. (For a short list I would suggest Bone 1992 for an overview, Coates 1991 for the Yukon, Dickerson 1992 for the NWT, Jull 1991b for the NWT and an overview, and MRG 1994 for the Circumpolar view.)

One or two readers of an earlier draft complained that I had made literary and historical references which might be unknown to Northerners. That is a problem inherent in any paper written in English rather than Inuktitut, of course. However, if we accept that non-indigenous Anglophones have something to offer, I do not apologise for writing a traditional essay here within the traditional forms of my own culture. As I wrote in a recent review of a new book on Australian Aborigines (*Aboriginal Autonomy: Issues and Strategies* by HC Coombs),

he shows that the starkly different Aboriginal cultures which confront European-descended policy-makers are amenable and accessible to the classic English essay and the central cultural values of the English-speaking peoples. Not just a subject for rarefied cultural and linguistic studies, or petitions penned by angry young men doing a tour in the boondocks before settling into Sydney or Melbourne law firms, Aboriginal political and cultural needs are here stated as plainly as an ANZAC Day address. If White Australians are not listening, the problem is not the exotic complexity of indigenous society.

In writing this essay, both first and second editions, I have faced practical problems. For one, I now live in Australia. Nonetheless, I maintain close touch with the Canadian North through many friends, as well as books, newsletters, subscriptions (e.g., to *Arctic Circle* and *Nunatsiaq News*), conferences, and occasional visits such as the July 1993 Inuit self-government conference in Pangnirtung, NWT. Also, I have continued to work

for Inuit on a variety of projects. The contents of this particular paper are of the "macro" variety and may benefit from distance.

A second problem is that I was an adviser on Northern policy, and variously a cabinet and cabinet committee secretary for many years (1966-80) in the First Minister's suite of territory, provincial, and federal governments in Canada, and from early 1980 an adviser to Inuit on policy and political issues. This brought me into continual contact with the high policy and political levels of federal, provincial, and territory governments, of course. The confidential nature and content of much such work makes it illegal or impossible, or both, to cite or source observations and speakers. However, it is my hope that such background will be seen as an asset rather than a failure of footnoting punctilio.

In Part II, especially, the "theme and variations" style of the writing in this paper may wear thin for some readers. I was tempted to break out the material from this section, and parts of others sections, into a point-form style which I do when presenting such materially orally. However, the single most important point of this paper is that in the North today, the whole is much greater than the sum of the parts, and that there are many inter-connections among apparently disparate elements. The sort of specialisation which has occurred in Southern policy-making and research is not yet evident in the North. So, after reflection, I chose to stay with the liquid and discursive style of the early draft. I apologise to those readers who would prefer that I had not done so.

The views and analysis expressed here are based on 35 years of involvement in the Territorial North in Canada, on personal contacts and friendships with innumerable Métis, Dene, Inuit, and Northern settlers in that time — including trappers, bush pilots, fellow survey and road workers, cabinet ministers, and students — and on visits and travels in all parts of the NWT over that time period. In the early 1960s I worked in the NWT bush with local indigenous people. Following graduation from university I was fortunate to participate in the creation of the NWT territorial government, and have had continuing contact with officials, politicians, and experts of all kinds ever since. The Provincial North has also been part of my experience. Since the mid-1970s I have also been doing comparative studies of the policies and politics of the Canadian North in relation to Greenland, Alaska, the Faroe Islands, Scandinavia, and Australia, sponsored variously by governments, indigenous organisations, and universities.

I have tried with some success to make the Canadian North a subject of comparative interest in Australia. This has involved programs which bring indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians to Australia; books and monographs published by the Australian National University; and radio, TV, lecture, and conference appearances. My Australian home has an ever-growing collection of useful books, reports, papers, etc. pertaining to the Canadian North, a resource I have shared with indigenous and academic researchers, journalists, and Territory, State and Commonwealth (federal) government bodies.

The move away from interventionist or dirigiste state policy to an era of down-sizing, combined with the devolution of powers and budgets to Northern Territory governments and indigenous claims bodies, has sometimes resulted in a mix of diffidence and dismissiveness in some corners of the national capital. "If we can't run everything, then we won't do anything!" has been an implicit refrain. At other times, the operational logic of administrators of diverse programs is elevated into *de facto* policy — a public policy problem in the "first world" today not only for Canadians or Northern policy!

The national interest in the North remains strong. Its nature has changed in recent decades because of changing values and outlooks in Canadian society as well as of the transformation of the North itself. In policy this has been much more than a move from Modernist grand designs to Postmodernist self-doubt, although one should not under-estimate such factors. Today Canadians as a society must respond to the remarkable changes and opportunities wrought by Northerners themselves, and respond as a whole society to the new world order implicit in those changes — a grass-roots world order, it should be noted, not one decreed by the United Nations or enforced by American military power. Within Canada the autistic re-running of dead-end constitutional debates in Southern Canada seems proof enough that we need new ways of doing things.

PETER JULL, *Brisbane, January 1995.*

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PROLOGUE

ON TREES AND TORIES

The subject of this paper is federal policy in Northern Canada. This is a broad, not to say vast, subject. Furthermore, the heated debates about Northern policy over the last 30 years may have made us lose perspective. One way to measure Canada's progress in the North is to compare it with a similar policy and political context elsewhere. The Northern Territory of Australia provides such a comparison.

While Canadians speak of the Terri-*tories*, Darwin residents speak of "the Terri-*tree*. Like Canada's Territorial North,¹ the Northern Territory (NT) lives from federal spending, despite protestations to the contrary and a determined, non-stop, anti-federal groundfire from the NT cabinet. These cries sometimes seem to vary with the dependency of the region on Canberra — the more dependent, the more resentful. As in Canada, the Territorial North in Australia is by no means the whole national North. Far from it. But the NT compares favourably in indigenous public services, infrastructure, and social conditions with the adjacent Northlands of the States (Australia's "Provinces"). Like Canada's Territories in times not long past, leaders of the non-indigenous settlers argue vociferously for immediate statehood in a system which they would expect to control. They insist on the right to control the region's natural resources, believe the aboriginal people to be unproductive layabouts cluttering up the place and blocking development (despite studies which show the significant Aboriginal role in the regional economy and even in the regional White Man's economy! [Crough 1993]), and they wrap themselves in national political traditions piously to reject aboriginal rights or claims to indigenous autonomy and self-government as "racial discrimination" or *apartheid*. It is the sort of approach which produced the Red River Rebellion and the resulting Province of Manitoba in 1869-70, the Northwest Rebellion of 1885, and the often angry ethno-politics of Canada's Provincial and Territorial North since World War II.

¹ — Territorial North = Yukon and Northwest Territories, including the Nunavut Territory now being created from the NWT. Provincial North = Northern regions of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec, as well as Labrador, the mainland Northern region which is part of the island Province of Newfoundland.

The two regions, Northern Canada and North Australia, have much else in common — apart from such obvious extremes as January temperatures of -40 and +40 respectively. Both regions are remote from national political and economic power centres. The movers and shakers of each believe that major new transportation spending would miraculously transform the Territories into booming economies. The religion of business boosterism is rampant in the towns on the archetypal pattern of the opening of the West described by Boorstin, a story not of "Cowboys and Indians" but of getting a hotel and university started in one's town before the next town can do so, and promoting visions of a million of population in a glorious future (Boorstin 1965). Trying to find one's way out of Development House, a territorial government office building in Darwin, one comes upon a scene from *The Thousand and One Nights* or *Book of Revelation*: a room which is a map of the NT in relation to Asia, with light-up cities (Bangkok, Beijing) and other wonders of electronic circuitry. In full whirr and whizz and beeping, its blinking lights and the effects of several obligatory flutes of champagne must make visiting skull-cracking generals and technocrat vice-premiers weak at the knees.

Whereas the Northwest Territories (NWT) adopted the polar bear as its exotic-dangerous tourist symbol, the NT has done the same with the crocodile (which, nevertheless, poses much greater danger to life and limb in well-travelled areas than do polar bears in the NWT). The reputedly ferocious tropical summer, like the long Arctic winter, shuts tourism down, allowing the locals more opportunities to take advantage of the fine empty hotels and wilderness areas at low prices. The Northern capitals of Darwin, Whitehorse, and Yellowknife, legends of the frontier past, and supposed in national folk-lore to be hardship posts, are all in fact convenient, sophisticated, and comfortable modern centres, although Darwin, being larger, is much the most well-favoured, not least in its array of good eating in restaurants and open-air Asian markets. It is easier to be elegant in a light film of cotton than in layers of parka and wool, and Darwin can be *very* elegant. NT politicians often enjoy their national reputation as ratbags, even while they tend to suffer inferiority feelings — not always deserved — in national conclaves. Their latest common ground with Canada has been a not altogether graceful entrance into the world of constitutional reform. In fact, Canadian Territorial experience has turned up as an irritant. On July 27, 1992, the NT Chief Minister or "premier" issued a rambling statement denouncing those interested in Canada's type of Territorial constitutional development and calling for all-party resistance to foreign ideas like Nunavut (Perron 1992).

What, then, are the Australian-Canadian differences which are the point of this story?

1. Australia is and always has been a country of a few great cities which each dominates its state-wide hinterland — politically, economically, and socially. The Canadian respect for regionalism and de-centralisation is missing. This lack of a regard for regional distinctiveness, a perspective long vested in Australia's fading National (formerly Country) Party, an eccentric cousin of which governs the Northern Territory, may account for the remarkable fact that Australia has no Northern policy or concept of

"the North" in the way that Canada does. A classic example of this was the creation of a federal Office of Northern Development in late 1991, initially in the Prime Minister's portfolio, to study ways in which obstacles and inefficiencies to national programs could be smoothed. This, of course, is the wrong end of the issue. The real question is not, What is wrong with the North that it is failing to do our Southern bidding smoothly? It is, or should be, What are the regional needs and imperatives of the North for which we must design policies?

In 1994 the Office of Northern Development released a major policy study which may be the closest Australia has come to a Northern Policy (OND 1994; Jull forthcoming). Despite grandiose vocabulary, the document completely fails to come to grips with Northern society and its people as requiring regionally distinct and culturally appropriate constitutional or politico-administrative structures. It is, instead, an attempt to smooth existing service delivery.

2. Apart from tourism, in which uniqueness is seen to be an asset, NT politics — which are dominated by whites and from which most blacks feel excluded — are aimed at equality with the states rather than special status. In fact, however, federal granting agencies recognise the special factors of dispersed population, large indigenous population, and distance in calculating various funding arrangements. Unique needs despite small populations, especially the large aboriginal population proportion, have long given Canada's Territories special access to Ottawa's funds and at least some favours. The Australian compulsion to uniformity is the more strange in that three inhabited Australian island Territories — Norfolk, Christmas (in the Indian Ocean, not the Pacific atoll), and Cocos-Keeling — each have distinct societies and tailor-made local constitutions.

This question of the Northern Territory and the States using their federal Aboriginal funds and equalisation for purposes other than those intended has become a national scandal in 1994. Indeed, rectifying it has been the angriest and most widely agreed demand in hearings of the special group of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander leaders established by the Prime Minister to propose a national "social justice package" (in effect a national policy framework for indigenous affairs). Lurid anecdotes of State and Territory abuse of federal funding have fuelled calls for active federal paramountcy in indigenous affairs, a potential power granted to Canberra by the 1967 constitutional referendum on indigenous peoples (in which 90.77% were in favour in compulsory voting).

3. The Australian government has backed away from such a paramount role, however, despite that referendum. This means that aboriginal rights, land, and policies are constantly up for grabs across Australia. The NT government's apparent view is that the best thing for blacks and whites is to take away all rights of blacks and to allow them the bracing wind of free competition with whites for jobs, land, etc. In bitter clashes the

NTG indulges in race rhetoric which is probably tolerated nowhere else in the "first world". For the moment the federal government maintains the NT aboriginal land rights legislation, but the Opposition has promised to turn it over to the NTG. Such a handover of black lands and lives to a government they distrust would violate enough international norms and values that one may anticipate a major international campaign forcing Australia to choose international pariah status or a climb-down.

The current Prime Minister, Paul Keating, has made a strong commitment to the betterment of indigenous peoples. From April to December 1993 he led a Cabinet team in unprecedented direct negotiations with Aboriginal leaders on the contents of the federal Native Title Act which now provides a tribunal process to register and broker unextinguished claims around Australia. This followed the June 1992 decision in *Mabo* by the High Court recognising unextinguished native title. The States, especially Western Australia and Queensland, and the Northern Territory, have strongly resisted him, especially on native title, and WA has mounted a major constitutional court challenge. State and Territory capitals, like their Provincial counterparts in Canada, tend to view federal support for indigenous peoples and the environment as unwelcome meddling with traditional prejudices and practices, rather than as a reflection that global standards and inter-dependence have made false innocence in such matters unacceptable in today's world.

4. Whereas the NWT government was essentially a federal indigenous service agency capped off with an elected legislature to form a complete political entity, the NTG is elected by and devotes itself to the whites of Darwin, Alice Springs, various cattle properties, and resource towns. Aborigines complain that they are under-served and have supporting studies to show that the NTG does not share the funds it receives on their account fully with them. The NTG reinforces its racist image by finding an Aboriginal issue before each federal or Territory election to use to whip up white xenophobia and anxiety to the detriment of Labor candidates. In the 1994 NT election this practice attracted sufficient national comment for the NT government to become loudly defensive, but because they trounced their opponents in the vote, for whatever reason, the critics became quiet.

5. Avoiding aboriginal self-government, which some NT politicians affect to regard as a threatening term, Australia has introduced something it calls "self-determination", having first emptied the word of its internationally accepted meaning. In its latest guise this involves allowing Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders to vote for advisory councils in each of numerous regions around Australia. These councils advise the local office of the federal aboriginal affairs department (now renamed a commission). Not surprisingly the Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the NT and the rest of Northern Australia are often more interested in Nunavut and other models of actual indigenous governance.

That interest has welled up dramatically since 1992. Several conferences helped generate momentum. At the first, *Surviving Columbus*, at the end of September 1992, Nunavut leader John Amagoalik was the prime guest speaker, while former Nunavut claims and self-government staff also played roles (proceedings published as Jull *et al.* 1994, including Amagoalik 1994 & Fenge 1994).

The first clear signs of Australian policy change occurred nearly a year later. In the first week of June 1993 Prime Minister Keating released a "green paper" on indigenous policy reform. Most of the document dealt with the need to respond positively and coherently to the *Mabo* decision. However, the document also noted that indigenous leaders had raised other issues in their recent meetings with him and his ministers:

The range of issues identified as needing resolution in this process included...Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people's self-government.

To explain this we were told:

Issues such as self-determination (including greater autonomy and cultural integrity) are not well understood in the wider community, although they are key tenets of the modern approach to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs. Some issues, such as self-government and new constitutional arrangements, are not yet defined and would require further development before being given detailed consideration, although the experience of Canada and New Zealand on these issues is instructive. The respective roles and responsibilities of Commonwealth, State and Territory governments need to be recognised. (Australia 1993, 95-96)

This was a breakthrough in policy and political discourse in Australia. It was the first time that "self-government" had been officially introduced at the federal level. Indeed, some federal ministers and MPs known as friends of indigenous peoples had, for some time previously, scolded indigenous groups who were using the word: it was not to be used, it was beyond the bounds, they insisted. (Some of us wondered what it was they thought that "self-government" meant, what terrible things it conjured up for them.) But, as the passage quoted said, Canadian experience was "instructive". The only Canadian experience which had been widely publicised in Australia at that time was the Northwest Territories, especially Nunavut, interestingly.

Since then the Aborigines of the Northern Territory and several other regions of North Australia in Queensland and Western Australia have been busy with new political concepts. National constitutional specialists made a contribution with a June 1993 conference which brought Canadian, American, and New Zealand experience to bear on indigenous needs (CAR-CCF 1993a; 1993b). Then a major Aboriginal constitutional conference was held at Tennant Creek in the Northern Territory in August 1993 and drew on Canadian Northern experience; its conclusions were then fed into a mixed conference

of experts and indigenous leaders which had been already scheduled, proceedings which were a landmark in Australian indigenous political development (Fletcher 1994; Brown & Pearce 1994).

In 1994 a new focus became Regional Agreements, a term which Australian scholars and indigenous groups are applying to the Canadian Northern claims settlements (Richardson, Craig & Boer 1994a; 1994b; Jull 1994c). This has become a significant political agenda in Torres Strait, North Queensland, Northern Western Australia, and especially in the Northern Territory. The Australians have surveyed the Canadian agreements with the benefit of detachment, and are now developing concepts of their own which build on the best bits of that long-fought, hard-won Canadian experience.

6. To date no political party in Australia, North or South, has endorsed creation of aboriginal Territories or federal guarantees or underwriting of aboriginal rights in a future NT constitution as has occurred in Canada. Australian governments would regard Canada's latest official Northern policy statements as utterly radical (DIAND 1988; DIAND 1995). On the other hand, in response to determined politicking by the Torres Strait Islanders of Far North Queensland, that ethno-region has taken significant steps forward towards regional self-government (Lui 1994; TSRA 1994a; 1994b). The Islanders have said repeatedly that they want some sort of autonomous Territory structure, and have been visiting various South Pacific island nation-states and autonomous island regions to look over the existing models.

7. NT aboriginal land claims are not negotiated and deliver nothing except some land unclaimed by whites. Federally-funded land councils submit claims to pieces of land, and then, following a sifting of much historical and social evidence, a judge determines whether to hand the land back to the Aborigines. The NT government, which claims not to oppose indigenous rights, has spent millions of dollars in fighting these claims. Canada's comprehensive claims and associated measures, e.g., Nunavut — *regional agreements* in Australian parlance — are virtual regional constitutions nesting within the federal system (and take constitutional priority over some enactments of senior governments as provided in the Constitution Act, 1982).

8. Despite some minimal possibilities for sea rights under the federal NT land rights legislation, the NT government gives Aborigines and environmentalists grey hairs with its approach to marine resources. A major marine-based claim has now been made (Ginjirrang Mala & ADVYZ 1994), one which sounds like early Nishga or Inuit claims statements, and which is apparently well supported by marine research and local discussion (personal communication, 1994). The Inuit-federal relationship which now includes co-management of living land and marine resources and their habitats in

Nunavut, and the NWT government commitment to the indigenous renewable resource economy, are unknown concepts and currently improbable in the NT.

9. In the NT there is an active and able environment department, the Conservation Commission of NT. However, there is no equivalent to the work of the Renewable Resources departments of the NWT and Yukon governments, or the federal back-up provided by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), Environment Canada, or Fisheries and Oceans, all of which provide elements of a *de facto* department of aboriginal economy. However, promising recent developments have been the Ocean Rescue 2000 program of the Australian federal government, now being used for work on the Northern Territory Aboriginal coast and in Torres Strait (Mulrennan & Hanssen 1994), and the work of the Australian Nature Conservation Agency (ANCA, formerly ANPWS). Australia's federal Resource Assessment Commission conducted a major coastal zone inquiry in 1991-1993 and drew on both Arctic and Pacific indigenous-government experience in Canada when making its most innovative proposals, i.e., in respect of indigenous peoples (Jull 1993; RAC 1993).

The degradation and transformation of eco-systems in the NT brought by feral animals, notably the pastoral industry, has no equivalent in Northern Canada. The primacy of indigenous eco-system use in Northern Canada has always been enforced, but this is unknown in Australia where the indigenous people argue against governments who often regard them simply as one more interest group competing for rich recreational resources. Nor have NT land claims been like Northern Canadian ones which deal largely with issues of resource management and the creation of statutory decision-making bodies to perform the task.

The results of the policy mix and policy vacuum in the Northern Territory are some social statistics which are equivalent to the worst in the "third world" in parts of the NT, outback Queensland, and outback Western Australia, according to visiting international expert teams. Indeed, such health and hygiene figures are so regularly recited that they have ceased to shock. Race relations are often bitter. Successive prime ministers have committed themselves to noble policies, but despite their genuine commitments they have generally been unable to summon the energy to bring their governments along with them. In 1993, Paul Keating won his first election since becoming Prime Minister in a party-room ballot 15 months earlier, and in a show of determination he promptly took the aboriginal affairs portfolio himself with the help of two ministers. He has made a promising start and has won wide admiration in the indigenous community. The task facing him or any other prime minister is enormous. In mid-1994 Aboriginal issues tripped up a socially open Opposition leader during a visit to the Alice Springs, NT, region. He began a descent in the polls thereby, from which he never recovered. In January 1995 he was replaced by a more socially conservative leader who, during his

previous stint as leader in the 1980s, had talked of "tearing up" proposed treaties with Aborigines.

To an outside observer it seems that Australia's mixture of isolation and xenophobia have had two grievous results in respect of the indigenous North:

- there has been a lack of awareness of social policy standards and trends in respect of indigenous peoples in other "first world" countries; and
- a feeling had developed among both blacks and whites that they are too isolated from such standards and standard-setters to change the Australian *status quo*.

This may only now begin to change with the appointment of an Aboriginal barrister, Mick Dodson, as the first national Aboriginal Social Justice Commissioner with the commitment and staff to address these issues. Two other elements have also provided positive stimulus: the 1992 decision of the High Court in *Mabo* recognising the existence of "native title" for the first time in Australia, and a growing internationalisation of indigenous policy discussion, not least the flow of information and persons from Canada into Australia bringing news of positive developments in a comparable policy setting and political context (e.g., Jull 1994b; 1994e). Internationalisation has also been facilitated by Australia's interest in precedents for constitutional amendment and for the settlement of indigenous claims.

The most alarming development, however, is the coalescing of substantial political and other élite opinion in the Northern Territory, Western Australia, and Queensland into a sort of Backlash Bloc of opposition to Aboriginal and Islander rights, to environmental protection, and to international law and multi-lateral agreements as core elements of a new States Rights rhetoric. With the mature regions and élites of Australia dragging the country into a position of well-deserved international relations respect and with a progressive internationalisation *vis-à-vis* the Asia-Pacific region which a Canadian can only envy, this Northern and Western "Anti-Australia" is digging in for a fight on indigenous rights and policy, national constitutional reform, and the renovating and liberalising of national institutions. Those have all promised to be major items of national renewal to accompany the Sydney Olympics in 2000 AD² and the centenary of the Australian Constitution in 2001. The North and West are now pitting themselves against the national destiny, in effect, rather like one fears the Right parties in Western Canada may do in the event of Quebec secession — i.e., negotiate a constitution for a sort

² — Canadian readers may find this far-fetched, but the feeling of excitement and national purpose evoked by the Olympics in Australia is very great. Unlike the situation in Canada, Australian sport is not only aided by a mild climate, but sporting achievement plays an important role in Australian identity of a kind which only Canadian hockey has ever enjoyed. Canadians might benefit from copying Australia's civil wars of the sports stadium such as Queensland-New South Wales rugby league "State of Origin" clashes and inter-State cricket competitions which, unlike Canada's unending constitutional civil wars, arouse overwhelming public interest and do not render the country ungovernable.

of new Canada conceived in backlash, impotent rage, and despair, a Canada many of us might rather die fighting against than die fighting for.

In Australia, however, instead of responsible politicians distancing themselves from such nonsense, national as well as State notables actually make their way to Darwin to sit at the feet of NT politicians and their advisers. They seek to know "the Truth" about land rights and indigenous politics. It is disturbing that politicians who are relaxed about multi-culturalism in Sydney or Adelaide go North to imbibe redneck values in relation to Aborigines. For those of us in Darwin hearing otherwise intelligent and progressive persons from the South reveal such regard for some of Darwin's local loudmouths requires more than a willing suspension of disbelief. It is like the sophisticated fairy-queen Titania, love-struck for Bottom with his Ass's head:

*Thou art as wise as thou art beautiful.*³

Sadly, however, many Australians have convinced themselves that treating their black fellow citizens with respect and decency is a radical Left agenda and therefore suspect. In this Medieval mindscape, the real radical or loony fringe of Outback whites can apparently seem responsible and respectable. Such remarkable goings-on make one fear that Australia's rapid progress in recent years on indigenous matters may be only a brief "Indian summer".⁴

Those indigenous and non-indigenous persons who have attempted to reform government policy in the Canadian North through recent decades may be dissatisfied with their achievements. Nevertheless, there have been real achievements — significant achievements, world-class achievements — as is evidenced by the interest and even excitement they provoke in other countries. When viewed in relation to the usual pace and substance of social and political reform in the world the progress of the Yukon and Northwest Territories has been stunning (Jull 1994b; 1994e).

In the Northern Territory, and North Australia more generally, a new surge of indigenous political confidence is now evident. The experience of Canadian Northern peoples, shared during the visits of indigenous leaders such as Rosemarie Kuptana and John Amagoalik who visited the Northern Territory in recent years, has had an impact in this context. Chief Ovide Mercredi also attracted national media coverage during his 1993 visit, and his many useful comments on the nature and pre-requisites of effective political change were listened to. Northern Canada and Northern Australia now have more in

³ — *Titania, A Midsummer Night's Dream*, III, i, 142 (*The Arden Shakespeare*).

⁴ — The Gage Canadian Dictionary (1983) defines *Indian summer*: "a time of mild, dry, hazy weather that sometimes occurs in October or early November, after the first frosts". The American Heritage (1st ed) offers: "a period of mild weather, occurring in late autumn or early winter", and the figurative sense, "a pleasant, tranquil, or flourishing period occurring during the end of a condition or period." One assumes that the term owes something to the preference of Dene, Northern Algonquians, and Inuit for such a time free of insect pests to high summer. At any rate, Indian summer is a favourite season of North Americans, a last reprieve before the onset of full winter, a time for many last hopes and longings (see my work-in-progress, *Guide to Winter*)

common than they ever did before, and could usefully share their political experience. Indigenous peoples and Northern hinterlands may face tough times ahead in the political and constitutional debates in both countries. They could lend each other valuable support.

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PART I — THE RECENT PAST

INTRODUCTION

Northern policy in the past half-century has usually been addressed to one of two quite different Norths in Canada. First is the great empty North beloved of "big thinkers", a vast expanse for the human imagination to fill with futuristic visions of war and weaponry, cities under glass, unheard of new transportation modes, and all the science fiction fantasies of Southern minds. This North has much resonance with Southern Canadians who feel the romance of the region. It has also attracted some outstanding talents who, once acclimatised, have often made more practical contributions.

The other North, or what we may be tempted to call the *real* North, is the North of human beings. Here government program development and delivery have been largely directed to the indigenous majority beset by problems related to rapid social change. That change has often been imposed by government, and for indigenous Northerners it has represented an alien European value system. Non-indigenous residents, being both highly mobile and high income earners, have had relatively fewer needs and have often enjoyed substantial personal and social benefits provided by employers, especially in the first post-war decades.

These amount to two irreconcilable Norths. The first is largely fictitious, but when its airy visions have occasionally touched down on earth, as in the Northern pipelines and Arctic shipping concepts, some fine discussions of Northern public policy have often resulted (notably Dosman 1975, Berger 1977, Page 1986 and Griffiths 1987). The first North has almost no basis in regional realities other than in the extremes which so impress the European imagination — extremes of temperature, distance, winter dark, summer light, absence of vegetation, prevalence of ice. This first North has reflected national aspirations and culture — indeed, European-Canadian culture has virtually created it. It is not less interesting for that, but it has little relevance for national policy because the resident population majority of the region are indigenous non-Europeans.

There is a third view of the North which emerges and disappears from time to time, a sort of Cheshire Cat grin — too episodic to be a policy determinant except briefly in the early post-war era, yet capable of leaving powerful impressions in public culture. This is the view of the North as outlet for a purposeful new human spirit. Here scientific knowledge and total planning would triumph over impulsive and messy Southern give-and-take politics; ideal race relations could be created in a new era free of the prejudices of earlier times; wise national policies could be implemented rather than narrow provincial ones in matters like resource management and development; or a new pioneer innocence generated by "opening" this Last Frontier. None of these hopes has done very well in practice, with tawdry realities North and South intervening. Partaking

somewhat of the first North, the North of fantasy, this third view is at least closer to the North of human needs — even if it imagines a model human being too good to be true.

Nevertheless, Canada's North has had mythic power from the beginning. From Voltaire's "quelques arpents de neige" to Vigneault's "mon pays, c'est l'hiver" the myth has been real to us. (See Appendix A, "The North as Myth".) There is nothing wrong with myths. They are essential to our daily lives. A useful comment is found in one of the best of the 1492-1992 books:

The word MYTH sometimes has a debased meaning nowadays — as a synonym for lies or fairy stories — but this is not the definition I intend. Most history, when it has been digested by a people, becomes myth. Myth is an arrangement of the past, whether real or imagined, in patterns that resonate with a culture's deepest values and aspirations. Myths create and reinforce archetypes so taken for granted, so seemingly axiomatic, that they go unchallenged. Myths are so fraught with meaning that we live and die by them. They are the maps by which cultures navigate through time. Those vanquished by our civilization see that its myth of discovery has transformed historical crimes into glittering icons. Yet from the West's vantage point, the discovery myth is true. (Wright 1992, 5)

The trouble is that while Canadians have been looking for The Great Myth, expecting it to announce itself with business card and doffed hat, P.T. Barnum-style, we live in a land already full of myths. The wendigo spirits of the Algonquian peoples inhabit our forests, and farther North is *takannakapsaaluk*, "the terrible one down there" — that is, the sea goddess angry and capricious in the Inuit ocean. Europeans, too, once had elemental mythic figures, but these were all lost in a spirit of "higher" religion, rationality, and improvement, so that as powerful forces they may lie hidden or encoded in our imaginations. TS Eliot put the matter neatly in reference to the Mississippi and its periodic rampaging floods at his native St. Louis:

*I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river
Is a strong brown god — sullen, untamed and intractable,
Patient to some degree, at first recognised as a frontier;
Useful, untrustworthy, as a conveyor of commerce;
Then only a problem confronting the builder of bridges.
The problem once solved, the brown god is almost forgotten
By the dwellers in cities — ever, however, implacable,
Keeping his seasons and rages, destroyer, reminder
Of what men choose to forget. Unhonoured, unpropitiated
By worshippers of the machine, but waiting, watching and waiting.
(Eliot 1963)*

But many ideas, including ones useful in recent times to First Nations, Inuit, and Métis, such as the desire of Canadians to believe themselves to be socially tolerant and

generous, abound as myths among us. Our need is not to slash and burn a forest of symbols, but to abandon dysfunctional myths — such as "the empty North", "the smiling Eskimo", "the national treasure-house of the North" — and regain an identity which works in the world around us. If our old myths of the North do not work, we can learn from the indigenous people. To take an example, Western European culture has painted the raven a bird of ill omen, but the Pacific coast and Northern peoples of Canada who live among ravens have a much different image. For them the raven is quick, clever — sometimes *too* clever — playful, curious, and busy. Their stories of Raven as a Promethean creator figure or trickster ring truer than the Old World version, as any resident of Yellowknife well knows.

IN SEARCH OF THE MAINSTREAM

A pathetically eager ritual has been played out for two generations by some of us across Canada. It is the hope that attends each new or re-elected federal government, and each change of minister or leader: *now* may be the moment when the North gains the attention it needs and deserves in federal decision-making. There have been some happy moments, as when big city mayor David Crombie proved an apt and sympathetic friend of the North in the first Mulroney cabinet, or when John Munro put his shoulder to the wheel in the last years of the Trudeau government. The heavy-weight reformers have been Alvin Hamilton in the Diefenbaker government and Jean Chrétien for Trudeau. At other times, however, there has been disappointment. Governments have been pre-occupied with other agendas, or have pleaded financial troubles for all but "mainstream" issues, the mainstream being apparently whatever flows past the front door of any given politician. Even such a "good news" story as Nunavut has had a long struggle to obtain necessary attention, although that has finally come.

The North in Canada has several claims on national attention. In identifying these, however, it may be more useful to approach them as imperatives of the region itself, rather than listing constitutional powers and state roles such as security and defence, managing the economy, etc.

1. The North is by far the largest part of the country, occupying perhaps 75% of Canada's land area, assuming that we mean the non-farm regions lying North of the main areas of European settlement. If Canada is more than "a confederation of shopping plazas", this great region surely matters.
2. The long-time failure by governments, both federal and provincial, to incorporate the region into the civil society of Canada — as other than cold storage for presumed wealth — has left social and economic disparities, North-South, which have long been rejected as un-Canadian when occurring East-West. That horizontal vision is now reflected in the regional disparities clause of the Constitution, despite Prime Minister

Trudeau's attempt to have the provinces agree to North-South equity to assist indigenous Northerners — an idea they rejected brusquely in 1978-79.

3. Northern Canada is staging a replay of the fundamental tasks of Canadian nation-building — relations with the earlier inhabitants, adjustment to difficult new eco-systems, requirements for the management and regulation of get-rich-quick individuals and organisations, equitable and just development and use of resources, and the building of a peaceful and stable social order. The experience in Northern regions of these matters in recent times has not always been reassuring. If Canadians cannot yet learn from the experience of settling North America nearly 500 years after Cartier's first voyage and 1000 after Leif Eriksen, how can we be expected to survive as a nation?

4. Northern Canada today faces a range of immediate *remedial* tasks. These are obtaining and ensuring acceptable living conditions for indigenous peoples, healing race relations, developing or accommodating governance systems which meet local/regional needs and which are culturally appropriate, replacing boom-and-bust economies with ecologically sustainable development, restoring and properly managing eco-systems, and securing policies at federal and provincial government levels which meet the needs of Northerners and their (new or nascent or as yet unconceived) political institutions.

5. Northern Canada, long a national backyard which need not be tidied because it lay beyond the reach of visitors, is now the front yard of the world's newest self-ascribed region, the Circumpolar community. As a backyard it was seen to be an extension of the personality of its owners, even a place where some of their lost projects and failed dreams accumulated to rust out of sight. As a front yard, however, it presents itself to different eyes, and shares in a wider and quite different personality. All the North Circumpolar lands, including Russia, have had similar histories. Northern Canada's charter membership in the Circumpolar world requires new concepts about "the North", and requires frameworks and policies which flow from and equip us for that membership.

6. In the North, Canada is engaged in spite of itself in the three principal tasks of the modern world: accommodating racial and cultural diversity justly and peaceably; managing resources and the environment sustainably; and making technology serve human purposes rather than generate human problems. These may be tests of our future capacity to survive as a society.

7. Finally, the North and the developments which occur there, are truly *indigenous* in several senses of that word. Here is the one part of Canada where everything is unique to place, unlike the urban centres of the South which become more and more like copies of their American and other international prototypes. If one wishes to identify a distinct Canadian core, it is the Northern experience. It crosses the French-English divide, as some of the fine Quebec films have shown, e.g., of the Manicouagan experience, although too often Northern specialists have dwelt in "two solitudes" in this as in so many other areas of culture and thought.

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It is time we banished entirely the older notions of the North as primarily a physical challenge to be mastered by civil engineering and resource extraction, or as a cultural and socio-economic emptiness waiting to be filled by determined outsiders. However, when we look over the seven motives for Northern policy and programs in Canada today, we see that:

- the political will and ideas for meeting Northern needs are, with the exception of some environmental expertise, coming from Northerners, especially the indigenous peoples;
- Canadian public and official opinion has barely grasped the scope or nature of these Northern needs; and
- Northern needs are relatively information-, research- and knowledge-intensive.

There are two notable imbalances or mis-matches here. (1) While the North has few research and knowledge resources, despite a great need for them today, the South, which does have such resources, is focussing these elsewhere *or* on its own alien concept of the North. (2) The North which has needs and visions for its emerging new society lacks the power — or is unorganised for the purposes of acquiring and exercising it — which resides in Southern federal and provincial capitals and seems unavailable to resident Northerners.

We may also see two Norths coming into view through the policy motives listed above. One is a practical exciting North with many immediate needs — the North of the people who live there — and the other is the conceptual and policy North of Canada as a whole. Each one has distinct policy needs. In the first case the institutions to articulate policy and program needs are required in many areas, notably in the provincial Northlands, and support given from outside with back-up systems such as institutions and facilities for research and knowledge. All this is particularly critical for indigenous communities because they generally lack the research and knowledge resources of white interests, whether governments or industry, and they often lack the experience to know how important these could be to their current struggles and future needs.

But in the second case — of concepts for a national appreciation of the North — a whole range of random influences from indigenous popular singers to coffee table books to random news events (like Russian space junk landing on top of the people of Baker Lake) may be significant. Although books have played little other part in Canadian history, Farley Mowat brought the Nunavut region — and hence the whole North — to Canadian attention decisively with his post-war writings on Inuit suffering and inept public policy in the Keewatin. Such stimuli are fortuitous, and have been generally lacking. A national appreciation of the North is important for many reasons — e.g., it has been the

key to political support for indigenous issues in recent decades. Official inquiries such as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples are indispensable substitutes for the policy attentiveness and political commitment so often lacking in Southern capitals.

It is important that both indigenous peoples of the North and governments stop for a moment and look at the big picture. Otherwise there is a real danger that they will merely dot the "I"s and cross the "T"s of recent efforts at policy reform and rights recognition, diluting their successful past efforts in bureaucratic spasms of convergent thinking. They may have also reached the limits of public and government tolerance of reform unless they provide a further infusion of explanation or comprehensible ideals. The real opportunity today is much bigger, and is within their grasp. Leadership continues to be needed no less than clerking skills; definitions of social purpose are needed as well as inevitable work to consolidate recent achievements.

PART II — NEW REALITIES

TRANSITIONS

The North has seen a number of fundamental changes since World War II. It may be useful to view these as a series of transitions.

In the 1950s the Northern Territories began to be incorporated into the physical culture of Canada through large-scale material change and the re-organising of hunter-gatherer camps into settled central communities.

In the 1960s the Territories acquired the institutional trappings of Canadian society and national culture, e.g., a full provincial-like NWT administration in a new Northern capital.

In the 1970s the collision between indigenous and non-indigenous agendas within the North, and indigenous and outsiders' agendas, took place, with the growing realisation that a dual economy and dual society existed in the region.

In the 1980s the accommodation of peoples and development philosophies began to be realised through negotiated processes such as land claims and through national and Northern constitutional forums.

Now, for the 1990s, the transition is from these eras of fundamental change and dispute to the establishment and consolidation of civil society — a society fundamentally different from that of the settled areas of Southern Canada.

These transitions are more telescoped in time in many parts of the provincial North, and are less well advanced in some Provinces.

NORTHERN REALITIES

Since the early 1980s two external influences have reshaped Northern Canada. The first in time was the political renaissance of indigenous peoples, and the second was the internationalisation of the North. It is possible now to see our way through the implications of the first of these, although the second one is in its early stages (see next section).

The permanent inhabitants of Northern Canada — the indigenous peoples — have been re-negotiating virtually all areas of their lives for some years in processes dealing with land claims, the Canadian constitution, Northern Territory constitutions (e.g., Nunavut), local self-management, aboriginal government, and new quasi-governmental development entities such as aboriginal claims corporations. The extent of that re-writing of North-South relations in Canada and of indigenous-federal relations within the North, by indigenous people themselves, means that those processes must be respected as the principal forum from which new "statements" of Northern policy emerge.

Furthermore, it is certain that the results of all the negotiations and similar processes underway will take years to implement and consolidate. The post-war North has already suffered massive social change and dislocation. No indigenous family has escaped some individual tragedy. For these reasons one must be restrained in drawing conclusions or making recommendations for change.

It is timely, nonetheless, to review the basic questions of Canadian Northern policy because the policy of the recent past has often muddled political ideals and mere opportunism to a degree that has left observers confused. For instance, a past of paternalism may have given way to a new neglect all too often glibly rationalised as giving power to the North. Often this has seen Ottawa reinforcing existing Northern institutions at the very moment when indigenous Northerners were negotiating at other tables with Ottawa to shift control away from those institutions. Further, devolution of power to the North has sometimes seemed little more than an excuse for Ottawa to clear some public servants and dollars off its books so as to show Southern voters the extent of government "downsizing". It is time for a renewed consciousness of Northern policy and promulgation of new guidelines.

For many purposes the boundary of the North is accepted as being the Southern limit of the existing Territories — i.e., Yukon and NWT. This makes little sense. The Northern regions of seven of the ten provinces include regions and indigenous people who share

Northern climate zones and eco-systems with the Territories, but often have neither the social well-being nor opportunities of the Territorial North — nor the general benefits of residence familiar to persons living farther South in the same province. Provincial governments have, historically, been quick to claim absolute "sovereignty" over the lands, waters, and resources of indigenous peoples, up to their Northernmost inch of Territory while recognising few obligations in respect of the well-being or aspirations of indigenous persons in those regions. Only where crises or clear collisions of federal and provincial jurisdiction have occurred, as in relocating indigenous villages threatened by flooding from hydro-electric projects, have more comprehensive approaches been attempted. For Canada to make good its claim to be a "first world" country with equal opportunity for all races, functional arrangements should be urgently negotiated between federal and provincial governments and local indigenous representatives to deal with indigenous hinterland disadvantage and living conditions. Such improvements would logically provide a means to introduce indigenous government in areas where it does not already exist. Canadians should also examine the experience of Norway where high quality personal and public services and conditions have been equalised in even the most remote and inconvenient townships of the Arctic Ocean coast.

The principle for Canada's Territorial Northern constitutional and political accommodation has been spelled out by more than one federal minister in the past and has been the unstated policy of successive governments: it is that the major indigenous representative organisations as well as Territorial legislatures must agree on change within their regions, in effect a double veto. The Territorial legislatures alone have not had the standing among the indigenous majority of the permanent Northern population, nor the accessibility because of their procedures or distant location, to represent indigenous people as sole constitutional arbiters. This should change after Northern constitutional reforms are negotiated, as Nunavut's has been, and elections held under new constitutions.

The Northern Territories are and will always be exceptionally high cost regions for public administration. The problems of climate, distance, small and scattered population, limited economic development, and the need to maintain high quality public services interact to create such Northern disparity. A variety of other factors are hardly less temporary: reliance on fiscal transfers from the South, reliance on public sector employment and employment growth, lack of economic diversity, etc. Canadian governments must accept Northern disparity as a cost of Canadian unity and nationhood (Robertson *et al.* 1988, 20-21, 52-53, 56-57). Northern well-being must be provided for without exaggerated hopes of a boom in return, or ideological demands for economic self-sufficiency. Citizens' rights are just that — rights. They are not user-pay services. If Southern Canadians really believe the North is a burden they should hand it over to the major indigenous organisations of the region and renounce all claims so that the permanent inhabitants can make other arrangements for their future. The fact should be obvious to anyone that such a course will not come about because the North's *worth* to Canada involves a great deal more than annual operating deficits.

Northern Canada is not simply a national hinterland but a large chunk of an international region centred on the polar basin. Canadian indigenous people working through organisations like the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and Indigenous Survival International have, in effect, redefined Northern Canada (see Part III below). What seemed to many Canadians an empty zone where brave outsiders could do battle against nature, has now become a treasured environment in which ancient societies are at home and are determined to survive as distinct cultures forming their own political entities. This "new" North has been created by indigenous peoples in partnership with the national government — and sometimes in spite of resistance or outright hostility from Northern settler populations.

The role of knowledge and research is always disproportionately large in the "exotic" hinterland regions where Europeans have strayed from their temperate zone (Roots *et al.* 1987; Jull 1992). In Northern Canada and Northern Australia research does not enjoy the respect and role in policy-making typical of the Nordic North, e.g., Greenland and Northern Scandinavia. In Canada and Australia, the needs are not only very great in the North, but the disparities of access to research and information within the community very serious (Jull 1992). Social and other public policy research remains all too scarce, despite some excellent recent work which has tackled the fundamental issues of governance (Aird 1988; Dacks 1990; Dickerson 1992). There are particularly important lessons to be learned in the environment and resource management fields (e.g., CARC 1984; Fenge & Rees 1987) as periodicals like *Northern Perspectives* and *Alternatives* have demonstrated. For those of us who have been involved in Northern affairs for a long time and who are seeing the realisation today of some of the ideas of our younger days, it is important to recognise that there are now many younger researchers with fresh and important new ideas. The December 1992 conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand showcased new contributions of this type — in literature, anthropology, history, and environmental science, as well as in the older fields of land claims and constitutional development. The new talents must have their opportunities, too. For instance, although many old troupers of Northern studies may disdain Postmodernism as flighty, it is more than a little useful in unravelling that archetypal Modernist fantasy called Northern Development.

Circumpolar and "first world" comparative studies in social and political issues are especially important. A rather undeveloped area, surprisingly, is in Canada-Australia studies, despite the relevance of such work for policy reforms of the type discussed in this paper (Jackson 1992, 16), and the growing awareness of Southern-based scholars in both countries of their shared interests (Alexander & Galligan 1992). Indigenous people themselves have seen the relevance of international comparisons in many fields. Many more policy studies like that of Holmes (1992) are needed. Comparative studies are especially useful in helping us discern the underlying pattern, the "geomorphology", of Northern hinterland politics, society, and development.

If the North in Canada is now entering upon its great phase of socio-cultural development and political importance, a phase brought more by indigenous political activism than by "the liberal development model", the question of Northern studies becomes more important. There are few enough such studies and overviews available. To understand properly what is happening in the North, not only are much more research and information collection needed, but more indigenous researchers and writers must be equipped to take over. There has been a dilemma, appreciated by the best researchers (e.g., the Preface to Dacks 1990), of the relationship between the political culture and assumptions of Canadians from the European tradition and those of indigenous Northerners. In times not long past much scholarship was written from the one view and failed to see that the other was engaged in processes which were by no means wholly within the European or Canadian tradition. Ethno-politics have their own internal dynamics, and it is the frequent mistake of officials and politicians to assume that indigenous peoples can be "managed" as if just another public policy issue. (That has been a crippling problem in modern Australia, for instance.)

Canadians in recent years have agonised about national unity and identity. They have wrestled with various schemes to renew the national political culture and constitutional framework. They have mostly confined themselves to old arguments about old issues. They have not seemed to notice that the Canadian nation-building experience was being replayed in the North — a considerable variation on the old theme of the South played out from the time of Cartier and Columbus. The insistent idealism and practical activism of Northern indigenous peoples in struggling with the habits and structures of Canadian governance have been yielding new answers. In the Territorial North they have been making significant progress. In the provincial North there is much more needed.

These changes are not a temporary flurry accompanying the extraordinary national constitutional processes since the Meech Lake accord, although Australian constitutional policy observers often claim this to be the case (e.g., several speakers during the NT-sponsored constitutional conference of October 1992, papers now published, Gray *et al.* 1994). Rather, they are part of steady political and constitutional development which has been occurring in the North since the mid-1960s and which is not yet complete (e.g., Jull 1984). Of course, the various streams come together and contribute to political values and debates nation-wide (Abele 1991a; Abele 1991b; Hawkes & Devine 1991). The history and issues involved are recorded in a number of recent studies (Coates & Morrison 1988; Merritt *et al.*, 1989; Dacks 1990; Coates 1991; Dickerson 1992). It is useful to look at these issues in international "first world" context and to learn from the comparability of simultaneous developments in a variety of countries (Jull & Roberts 1991; Jull 1991b).

The future of Canada is being revealed today in the North. The challenges of relations with non-European society and of a new environmental order are central political facts. The reworking of tired and often inappropriate political and administrative solutions is being joined by British-descended Canadians as much as by Slavey or Iglulingmiut

Canadians. Nonetheless, the land claims negotiating table is the real constitutional table. Land claims began as virtually *ad hoc*, with a sort of blind-leading-the-blind history within officialdom. Here the failure of the White Man's legal, political, and administrative systems in the New World is revealed: rather than simply discard that system, we get around it by working out a plethora of new arrangements through "land claims".

These claims negotiations deal with virtually every area of public policy in the North. Of course, that may not seem the case to minimalist federal officials trying to protect departmental turf or to convergent thinking advisers on the indigenous side of the table. But it is the implicit reality. The little issues nest under the big issues, and the expansive minds among indigenous leaders are in no doubt. The most successful regional settlements are precisely those like Cree Quebec, Inuit Quebec, Nunavut, Alaska's North Slope and the adjacent North-West Alaska region centred on Kotzebue, and Greenland where opportunistic, big thinking, and confident leaders see that by gaining sufficient powers and funds they can achieve most of what their people seek. It involves hard work, of course, and setbacks along the way. None of those involved think it is easy. Nonetheless, it becomes insurmountable for groups whose wariness, suspicion, timidity, inexperience, and lack of confidence make them unable to grasp for new possibilities. A hang-dog approach to indigenous rights and the future is a recipe for failure. *Of course* indigenous grievance and disadvantage are the usual initial spur to claims or other political settlements, but a claimant group must transcend its own hurt and victim feelings, and take the initiative, in order to succeed.

This regional land claims approach may show Canada's true national all-party Canadian conservatism at its finest: we nod to the old symbols and drone the old tune while turning over the real future to an unnamed, no-profile band of usually faceless negotiators and their advisers. It may not be the way our politics are supposed to function, but it has two great advantages: it works, and it defuses the racial tensions which might well have destroyed Canada's international image and national self-image. (There remain many Canadians today who do not yet understand that the rights-based approach is the key to indigenous progress, however. See Appendix B.)

So, what is the problem? The problem is that in most cases the old colonial-style politico-administrative system remains — derelict on Main Street, perhaps, but still formally empowered by Canada's budgetary and jurisdictional super-structure. Even where Territorial government program and policy contents have been renewed thanks to an influx of ideas and personnel from the indigenous or "native" movement, its control, apparatus, pretensions, are intact. Yet alongside is the shiny new and locally created claims apparatus with more legitimacy in the eyes of the permanent resident majority, the indigenous people, and with the same breadth of interests — in fact, often wider ones than the old Territorial governments had, e.g., in respect of lands, resources and environment. The claims movement emerged from the failure of the Territorial government system in the 1960s and 1970s. The contents of claims packages are meant to make up for the

inadequacy of that system, yet that old failed system remains. Meanwhile, the claims negotiators have been constantly resisted by government when they have tried to make their political and constitutional role explicit. The Territorial government system remains, and in the eyes of the federal-provincial network which is the principal structure in Canada for the transmission of powers and funds for public business, it remains *the* legitimate Northern authority.

Will the survival of this hybrid system — the new and freshly legitimised claims system which was intended to replace the failed Territorial system, the latter still intact — bode well for future governance in the North? Will it polarise into White Man government *vs.* Dene or Inuit government? In Nunavut one hopes not, although the experience of Quebec Inuit with a regional government and a claims structure since 1975 has been instructive. There the Inuit have been working for some years to abolish the present jumble of organisations, all of which are within their control, in order to create a coherent, effective, and efficient Territorial government out of the pieces and with the skilled persons who make them up.

Nonetheless, in a nation-state like Canada obsessed with separatism, the intentions of "new" regions with new names on the map — and as yet unknown political cultures — are certain to generate curiosity.

It is inevitable that Northern Canada will change the way Canadians think about their country. The major changes are likely to be economic, socio-cultural, and political. The advance of ecologically sustainable development (ESD) as an ethic is greatest in the North where it is the principle underlying contemporary constitutional development, *i.e.*, indigenous land claims negotiation, and where it has been central to all indigenous political activity for decades. The impact of such a new ethic spread over 75% of the country cannot help but be significant, most obviously to the resource and energy industries. To those who remark that most Canadian industry lies in the remaining 25% of Canada, we may reply that Southern majorities will therefore be even more keen to support the new ethic because it will not immediately threaten their local industries. The Canadian love affair with the North in public policy has been often demonstrated by events, *e.g.*, Judge Berger's Mackenzie Valley pipeline inquiry. The main economic impact, however, will be less intangible: it will see new actors in national and regional economies as previously marginalised peoples and communities develop new societies, generating new business, jobs in the North and South, and economic networks.

The social culture of Canada is said to be uncertain, although the recent proliferation of new writers and other artists, and of achievement in the performing arts from pop singing to plays, tells its own story. If the North has been a blank for the European imagination, indigenous Northerners in Canada have been filling it in with their own creations, accomplishments, and imaginations. Settlers from the South and from abroad have joined in. It is no longer possible to write or film a simple man-against-the-wilderness, man-against-emptiness epic and be taken seriously. Inuit stone and graphic art was the

advance party of this new North, giving all Canadians pride in unique and uniquely Canadian art-forms. Today we all know that the North is inhabited and has a distinct culture — in fact, a number of distinct cultures.

A NEW NORTH IN A NEW CANADA

The Northern dialogue is far from over. However, the fact that indigenous activists and conservative whites both agree that the old system they have inherited is unworkable is, after all, a sort of consensus. When Canadians look at the most comparable experience abroad, i.e., Australia's Northern Territory and Alaska, in both they find unresolved, polarised race politics and a lack of either those processes or the principled national government sponsorship of accommodation found in Northern Canada during the past generation and a half. In this comparative context we can see that Canada's federal government — through several changes of government and innumerable changes of minister — has followed a better route.

Canada is well begun transferring power to the true Northerners — the indigenous people and those others who have made a long-term commitment to the region. Now it must finish the job. Some indigenous and non-indigenous leaders may already feel exhausted by the administrative and policy reforms of the past 30 years. However, to leave the political landscape littered with the wreckage of the past will only promote confusion and, probably, conflict.

There may also be lessons for Southern Canadians. The Northern constitutional reform process, despite the early bitterness and ethno-cultural divisions which prompted it, has provided a positive outlet for creative energy and the way forward to a stronger, more united society. Rather than symmetry that process has built on regional and cultural variety within a broad unanimity of principle. Rather than denying the rights of peoples different from the Anglo-Canadian majority it has recognised those rights and provided for their exercise in legal and political processes for the future. After years of denying local resource and environment interests, and of seeing conflict and confusion follow, Ottawa has adopted a new system for their management in a conjunction of local indigenous people and national experts through statutory bodies initiated and elaborated in claims negotiations. Furthermore, this system is generally accepted by all actors. Northern political life has not suddenly become namby-pamby or ethereal — on the contrary, it is as vigorous as ever.

The development of Canadian identity in the North is not contrived or the work of media manipulation. It emerges purely and simply from a land, its peoples, their struggles, their livelihoods, their changing way of life, and their recent social and political clashes with the powerful economic, administrative, and constitutional forces of Southern Canada and the wider world. Twenty-five years ago most Canadians would have assumed the North a blank on which they could paint their fantasies of the moment; today it is an

identifiable and strong region which rejects any attempts by outsiders to use or pre-empt or prejudice.

In the national constitutional talks involving indigenous peoples since the early 1980s the Territorial governments have often played useful roles behind the scenes. However, they did not play as strong a role as they should have done, despite being the governments in the room with the most direct experience and best general understanding of indigenous issues. Indigenous leaders from the North, however, played leading roles in those same conferences. The impact of more, and stronger, and more confident Northern regional and Territorial political entities should have a major impact on Canadian social and political culture. One hopes that Northern governments will not always follow the path of some of their leading members to date in preferring merely to fit in to the club of national politics instead of asserting themselves. They, after all, come from a Canada which is building itself confidently, not from the South which has lost heart from failures in the politics of national consensus and reform.

When the Canadian Constitution is re-opened, as it surely will be, consideration should be given to the acknowledgement and accommodation of hinterland ethno-regions in the federal structure of the country. Secure indigenous homelands nested within the federal structure of Canada would greatly strengthen national unity. Whether or not Canadians wish to do this, the negotiation of regional treaties in BC will help remove any fears of such innovations elsewhere, while the future of the Inuit and Cree territories in Northern Quebec may bring the issue forward immediately.

The largest part of new Northern policy is the need to recognise the *faits accomplis* in today's North, accept the implications, and have policies and programs which reflect these. There is irony in the fact that in the most carefully and comprehensively planned areas of Canada, the North, where governments have had the freest rein to indulge rational approaches, today's realities have been determined by unforeseen indigenous forces outside the world of planned and planner. Five things are needed from Canada as a whole to enable the North to fulfill its destiny:

- continued political facilitation from Ottawa in the creation or reform of Northern political institutions at Territorial, regional, and local levels to meet the needs of the permanent Northern population, i.e., the indigenous peoples;
- funding adequate to maintain a strong and growing Northern society as an investment in Canada's future, rather than "pay as you go" policies which, in effect, impoverish the North and blight the lives of more generations of its native-born;
- maintenance of Circumpolar linkages and institutions;

- policy and program support for ecologically sustainable development, including its corollary of maximum control by local and regional communities; and
- the expansion of information, research, and knowledge, and their dissemination, within the North.

The need in the North today is less for more national constitutional innovation than for consolidation of the new regional societies coming into being through indigenous initiative. The reinforcement and development of cultural activity and output should be an important part of this region-building, as in Greenland.

The notion that national unity can be served by ignoring or marginalising the North because of "more important" issues down South must be laid to rest. The North is full of the very sort of constructive new idea that Canadians have been looking for!

The North today is like its people — proud, expressive, sometimes querulous, more pragmatic than ideological in designing its institutions, unafraid of novelty, strengthening the commitment to place (and the rights of place), unflustered by linguistic and cultural diversity, increasingly internationalist, emotionally involved in public affairs, ready to work collectively to solve problems, judging public bodies and politicians by their effectiveness rather than dogma, and determined to maintain both the quality of society and nature. Is this the archetypal new Canada?

PART III — THE CIRCUMPOLAR COMMUNITY

CIRCUMPOLAR AWARENESS

The growth of Circumpolar awareness in public policy follows both in time and importance the growth of indigenous politics as a force which has transformed the North and perceptions of the North. Although it has been understood here and there for some time (e.g., in Rea 1976), one can almost precisely date its appreciation by Canadian élites to the release in June 1986 of the report of the special Parliamentary committee on international relations (Simard & Hockin 1986). With its special Northern chapter and its linking of domestic and foreign policy in the North, that report opened a new debate. At a seminar in Toronto a few months later, old foes and deeply entrenched interests took

the report as their starting point and began to talk to each other and talk in a new language. It was a stirring two days for those present as old conflicts were re-conceptualised into new mutuality (summarised as CARC 1988, 109-159). At that moment, and not before, the two perspectives on the North noted at the beginning of this paper began to be reconciled — to mix and blend in a new unity.

Much of the credit for the shift in thinking is due to indigenous peoples, and it is no accident that the Simard-Hockin report drew heavily on the briefs and testimony of Inuit individuals and organisations. Inuit working through the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) had attracted astonishment and curiosity as much as intelligent understanding when, in 1977, delegations from Greenland, Alaska, and Canada first met in Barrow, Alaska, to form a world body (Brower & Stotts 1984). Intense media coverage of their assemblies every three years during the quiet summer news period has brought home to the public, and to government observers invited to the assemblies, that the Arctic is no longer a quiet backwater (Jull 1981).

A careful observer might have noted that the processes the ICC reflected were not simply protest politics. Most of the time of the assemblies was spent in intense plenary discussion, or workshops with experts assisting, on serious practical problems. The people involved were trying to make things happen, and were prepared to work with governments and others to do so despite their longer-term objective of securing regional governments under Inuit control around the Arctic, i.e., regional governments within existing nation-state borders. One of the most dramatic examples of this was many years work on what was called the Arctic Policy, a compendium of policy guidelines for everything from X-rays to nuclear power, from school curricula to constitutional reform (ICC 1992). Inuit, tired of being on the receiving end of the grand schemes of governments, oil companies, and military planners decided to try to harness or channel outside energies and ideas so that they were beneficial — or at least not harmful — to the Northern people and the eco-systems on which they depended for food and livelihoods.

Inuit had not formed the ICC to fight for distant causes; instead, they had formed it to increase and aggregate their experience and political muscle in dealing with very local problems. Indeed, in 1980 at Nuuk, Mary Simon spoke for the Canadian Inuit to the ICC assembly, explaining that the reason for their reluctance to join activist world bodies was not disagreement with their aims, but the need to focus on more homely problems and the lack of Inuit experience in fighting military or police states of the type afflicting indigenous peoples in parts of the Americas. In the ICC, Inuit were not being "radical", but their work certainly reflected frustration with the failure of government policies.

In the first get-together of indigenous peoples of the Northwest Territories and Yukon with other Circumpolar peoples — in Copenhagen, 1973, at the Arctic Peoples Conference — all present were excited by the discovery of common ground (Kleivan 1992; Jull 1994d). In their various countries and regions all peoples had experienced similar minority problems, inappropriate policies, outside-initiated development

threatening their livelihoods, etc. It has been this decidedly grass roots character of the new Circumpolar internationalism, unlike the earlier geo-strategic conceptualising by national experts, that has given the Circumpolar movement its character.

With indigenous youth stripping the euphemisms off national pretensions in Northern development before international audiences, a very healthy — although remarkable — change has occurred in national capitals. Rather than try to wish away Northern social and cultural conflicts as was done in times past, or bury them under statistics showing how hard government was trying to fix them, governments have become resigned and have accepted that problems persist. A new cooperativeness with Northern peoples groups accompanied this resignation.

Environmental protection and the impact of the animal rights movement have been major preoccupations of Northern indigenous people in Canada, and have provided much of the motivation in Circumpolar indigenous politics. Exchanges of theatre troupes, pop music performers, graphic artists, and many private and study visitors among Northern peoples have opened new networks. To some extent governments have been caught by surprise at this surge of activity and interest, but the Canadian foreign affairs ministry as well as DIAND have played a generally supportive and constructive role. The story of recent internationalisation of the North is extremely interesting and very positive. It is also a policy and program area where government and Northern people have been working effectively together, and where they hope to continue to do so. There is, therefore, no need for further discussion here. The main point is that a region on the weaker end of tenuous South-North centre-to-hinterland relations, of assumed need and backwardness, has found new relationships of equality and reinforcement in another direction, East-West, and some of the very qualities which not long ago were thought unfortunate symptoms of backwardness (e.g., indigenous language and culture) are now sources of celebration.

As a Circumpolar movement of disadvantaged and powerless peoples around the Polar Basin matures into a Circumpolar community of self-governing regions within a number of nation-states, new questions arise. As already noted, there is a promising growth in Circumpolar cooperation. This comes through two-tier processes — a tier of indigenous peoples and a tier of national governments and sub-national governments. As indigenous peoples gain control of — or create — sub-national governments, the situation becomes more complex. Does the Northwest Territories represent Inuit? Most of the time it may do so. On the other hand, nobody doubts that the Nunavut government will represent Inuit.

Perhaps the most intriguing questions begin here. What will be the impact on Canada of mature Northern societies such as Nunavut with their own governments and an internationalist outlook? And what will the Circumpolar world look like with its fast growing East-West links if, as one may hope, the Arctic region's national governments continue to enjoy real peaceful co-existence after the Cold War?

Narrow nationalism is unlikely among Northerners, especially given that the Dene and Inuit, who together make up a majority of permanent Northern residents, are themselves peoples living across nation-state boundaries today. Further, internationalism has been given extra impetus by the fact that Northern residents have found they may be more readily understood and may get a better hearing among similar peoples abroad than in their own national capitals. This is not to suggest that Northerners are less loyal or patriotic than other Canadians. Indeed, reflective persons will have noticed that *loyalty* and *patriotism* are only negative issues in Canada. Some of us think that is one of the best things about being Canadian. As Dr. Johnson noted, when someone is talking about loyalty or patriotism it is usually a scoundrel and the motive is usually scurrilous. In Canada this is certainly so. Loyalty or patriotism are almost never celebrated, perhaps a reaction to a surfeit of American indulgence of these qualities; they are only raised as *dis-loyalty* or *lack* of patriotism, and then only to smear others. They carry no positive charge, whatever.

Canada has long ignored its Northern identity, or at least never taken it past the level of cliché. How many ministerial speeches on Northern and international policy have included a line at the outset that "Canada is an Arctic nation" or that "we are a Northern people", and then left the matter at that? There have been many. The Inuit have now led Canada into the Circumpolar realm through creation of the ICC, and through ICC's 3-yearly assemblies which have been well reported by CBC and others. Other Canadians and especially the federal government have now joined in.⁵

In the far North Canadians can participate in a different sort of political community, one not of great powers in which the overwhelming voice of the USA thunders like Niagara in our ears, but a more human realm. This is a community of smaller states and near-states like Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, with American Alaska and Russian Northern political entities like Chukotka and Yakutia. Their politics are less those of power and rivalry than of environmental and economic cooperation, the building of civil society, the maintenance and enhancement of ancient cultures centred on renewable resource values (even if in some places these are now become more a case of seasonal ceremonies than the staff of life), and the exploration of the new politics of ethno-cultural pluralism and trans-national purposes. This is also a new region for knowledge, research, institutional needs, and self-sufficiency — they all require considerable new effort. If dependence on (or dominance by) metropolitan "others" farther South has been this world region's curse, new-found independence of spirit in a world which celebrates diversity and multi-polar political economy provides unlimited opportunity. If Canadians in the South can think of no greater purpose than slipping South over the free-trade border to shop for cheaper toasters, those in the North are creating a new world.

⁵ — Earlier, an NWT Commissioner. Stuart Hodgson, reached out to the Circumpolar regions, during his 1967-1979 term of office, but this foresight and initiative had little resonance outside the North.

The Government of Canada and Northern Canadians have been playing a constructive role in recent years in respect of Circumpolar cooperation. They have displayed the capacity of NGOs (notably the Inuit Circumpolar Conference) and foreign service, as well as DIAND and the NWT government, to cooperate in expansive new ventures. For Northern peoples a new enthusiasm both for Canada and for cooperative internationalism is not contradiction at all. Indeed, like many other Canadians before them, they may find the finest expression of their national identity in working with the world.

A particular interest in *Greenland* and its move to Home Rule has arisen among indigenous peoples in Canada as well as in Canadian government circles (e.g. Jull 1979b). The parallels with Northern Canada are striking. Until World War II an isolated hunting society, Inuit Greenland was jolted into full awareness of modern times by American occupation during the war. Demands arose afterward for material modernisation and more indigenous political control. The country was virtually re-built to high standards of European urban life and the population concentrated in "growth centres" for the industrial fisheries and more cost-efficient public services, but at high costs in social problems and cultural disorientation. Large Danish transient work-forces were also a disruptive element in a small society.

The Greenlanders are an Inuit-descended people, although only in one or two isolated hunting districts has there not been some admixture of Danish blood. The people proudly retain their Inuit language (which dialect can be understood by Canadian Inuit) and it has official status. The main political parties, all unique to Greenland, have the relationship with Denmark as the major defining factor alongside degrees of commitment to socialism. For reading on contemporary Greenland see especially Hicks 1994; Nuttall 1994; Dahl 1993; Breinholt-Larsen 1992; Rasmussen 1987; Kleivan 1984 (and the other chapters on Greenland in Damas 1984); Jull 1979a; Schuurman 1976.

Greenland and Denmark each has a veto on Greenland resource policy and projects on-shore and off-shore. This means that in practice terms and conditions, both social and environmental, can be negotiated for any project. Off-shore oil exploration and uranium mining in South Greenland have been vetoed, however. The imperatives of real self-sufficiency and tightened Danish budgets have been pushing Greenlanders to take a more open view of resource extraction industries. Nonetheless, the people and its government retain fine credentials in environmental protection as befits an indigenous people who continue to live from the sea like their ancestors.

The Home Rule Act of 1978 and a joint Greenland-Danish commission of elected politicians which produced a blueprint for implementing Home Rule prepared for a near-total shift of powers from Denmark to Greenland. Greenland's cabinet since Home Rule has not had a non-Greenlandic member. Many Danes continue to fill technical and managerial posts, but the burgeoning Greenlandic education system is well begun in providing the country with home-grown professionals.

Elsewhere I have tried to draw the implications for Canadians of the preparation of Home Rule (Jull 1979a; 1979b). After its phasing in period it may now be possible to see further lessons. When I interviewed him in 1981, Premier Jonathan Motzfeldt said that although there had been a minority who feared Greenland self-government before its inauguration in 1979, that mood had all but evaporated. Of course, it has not solved all problems. Nevertheless, Greenlanders have had the confidence and verve to work through such large and divisive issues as withdrawal from the EU (which was accomplished after a referendum in the 1980s); approval of on-shore oil exploration in East Greenland; adoption of a distinctive flag; the role of and relations with the American military base at Thule; the takeover and management of the state economy (which is far and away the country's largest commercial and production sector); and a variety of small scandals and large setbacks. The cultural community — theatre, graphic arts, writers, pop musicians — have played a large role in strengthening the society by maintaining pride and identity, and by helping project a clear image of Greenland in the world. International work, both by Greenland itself and Greenland as a member of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, has also been very important for identity at home and abroad.

The most important feature of the recent Greenland experience is that a hunter-gatherer people have been able to remain a strong traditional culture while at the same time living in and directing a modern society and state economy, operating as a *de facto* autonomous country in the world. It is little wonder that Greenland has been an inspiration to other indigenous peoples all over the world. The Greenland example should also reassure those Canadians who do not believe that Northern indigenous society can adjust to the contemporary high-tech world.

On Northern Canada's other border, *Alaska* is not less stimulating a case for Canadians. There the coming of Statehood in the late 1950s and the long struggle for a land settlement resulting in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1970, has shown that far from settling anything, they simply opened a new era in white-indigenous and indigenous-government relations. That era has been dominated by the search for greater indigenous security in and benefit from the management of lands, resources, and productive environment, and for regional or tribal self-government (Berger 1985).

The North Slope Borough made up of the whole of Northern Alaska has had particular interest for Canadians because of the region's close ties with Inuvialuit in the NWT. In fact, many Inuvialuit families migrated from Alaska earlier in this century. Also, the North Slope Borough founded the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and has been a sparkling contributor to international Inuit work ever since (Brower & Stotts 1984). The many innovations of North Slope leaders in relation to coastal planning and marine management also deserve full attention in Canada (Anjum 1984; Freeman 1989). The story of the North Slope Borough is as dramatic as any Wild West tale with its elements of local aggressiveness, determination, and litigiousness in creating a regional

government which has transformed the life of every Inuk member of the region in a way which belies the famous American aversion to public sector solutions (McBeath & Morehouse 1980; Jull 1986, 29-43).

PART IV — FUTURE DIRECTIONS

THE NORTH TODAY, NORTHERN POLICY TOMORROW

The assumption underlying all Northern policy in Canada, whether of federal government or provinces — and often of Territorial capitals themselves — is that the North will become more like the South. It may be more useful today for policy-makers to turn that on its head: *the North will not only strengthen its uniquely Northern character, but it will export its political culture Southwards into provincial hinterlands!* This is already happening.

Of course, this does not mean that Northern homes will not continue to acquire the material goods typical of the South, or more of the infrastructure associated with the South's settled places. What it *does* mean is that the North is no longer satisfied with a hand-me-down policy mentality, of getting the things of the South second-hand. The North today has its own agenda, its own identity, and its own aspirations. It is the fundamental task of national policy for the North to accommodate Northern indigenous agendas, identity, and aspirations, and do so in a manner which both strengthens Canadian unity and includes all Northerners to the fullest degree in nation-wide opportunities. There is nothing new about such a policy: it was the *de facto* policy of the federal Northern administration until the NWT government was established in 1967 and the transfer of administration took place. What is new is that the relationship today is one of equals. Also, Northern needs have evolved considerably in recent decades.

The world-wide cultural diffusion in our time makes the old linear concept of progress moving North simply meaningless. Many items of world culture are available virtually anywhere. To measure change or something called "progress" in the material terms of typical post-war Northern development is irrelevant. Within the federal Territories the reduction of socio-economic disparities between indigenous and settler has been great, although many problems remain. It will require the best efforts of new indigenous organisations and governments to resolve these matters, no mean task in times of great financial stringency. As for provincial Northlands, there are areas of appalling need.

The new identity of the North comes from three sources. First is the history, culture, and rapidly changing Northern life today of indigenous peoples. Because this *is* indigenous, the first and shaping human imagination in the land, it has an authority and authenticity which no other North American social or political form can equal. This has been belatedly recognised in our Canadian law since *Calder* and in our public policies. In Northern Canada this shaping factor has not been removed by settlement, except in some few scattered boomtowns and service centres. It continues to provide a basis for political structures and public policies quite different from those imported and now passed down among Southern Canadians. This is reflected, albeit imperfectly, in the archetypal Northern constitutional process, i.e., the land claims negotiation.⁶ When in September 1979 the head of the Dene Nation, in company with Canada's other National Indian Brotherhood leaders, met with the new Prime Minister to discuss indigenous roles in constitutional reform, he proposed that Nunavut and Denendeh, i.e., the Western NWT, join the Canadian federation as Inuit and Dene homelands bringing their own unique backgrounds, like the provinces, and having their special character and institutions recognised in the Constitution as part of their federation package. This idea was respectfully received but was later lost in shuffles of personnel, etc. Second comes the regional identity we now understand through the Circumpolar movement. By seeing at last that the Canadian North is not an ugly duckling but a swan, one of a number of far Northern regions which surround the polar basin, we can form a more appropriate appreciation of its needs and character. We see that its history has not been one of mere lumpish backwardness towards gentle Southern improvement and reproof, but the natural response of certain types of society secure in certain values suddenly faced with the total incomprehension and overpowering might of European industrial society. We now know about questions of resource base and ecology, of indigenous social tradition and social organisation, and we ourselves are re-thinking the resource extraction ethic and Northern vision of recent decades as we meet with indigenous peoples to seek new or expanded forms of sustainable development. In Circumpolar context the North is no longer a rather impoverished version of the South, but something "entire and whole and perfect" in itself.

Third come the Northern contributions and transforming imagination of recent settlers or visitors. These are nurses and teachers, artists and journalists, administrators and technicians, researchers and community workers, white advisers to indigenous peoples, small business people, prospectors, pilots, and project coordinators, and the many others who have given their best to the North and made a commitment to it of their work or their years. Their effectiveness has rarely lain in their outside skills, however great these may be, but in their ability to adapt to the needs and conditions they have found in the North in order to exercise previous or newly discovered skills.

The political continuity associated with this new identity rests with the indigenous people and with that small number of outsiders who make a permanent home in the North.

⁶ — The Northern claims processes are apt to be so different in character and contextual politics from the ones now beginning in British Columbia that the same terminology may not in future be appropriate to both.

Some of these will always be cranks and reactionaries who have found diversity and change in the South too difficult, and their legacy in the North will be mixed, to say the least. Until recent times it has been assumed in the Northwest Territories and Yukon that Southern settlers would model Northern society on Southern traditions. The NWT election of 1979 and the Yukon election of 1985 ended those prospects. Coming to power were coalitions of indigenous people and younger whites who accepted the indigenous realities of the region. With this historical dynamic in view, it is interesting to watch the politics of Alaska and of Australia's Northern Territory unfold, and to guess how long it may be before similar transformations occur there.

The Northern Territories have been the scene of the greatest positive transformations to date. Here the Government of Canada, after much trial and error — and much indigenous anger — has come to terms with the indigenous peoples as represented by their various political associations, claims bodies, and other new structures, resulting in a new partnership (e.g. July 1991a). The non-indigenous people can be divided into three main groups: short-term workers who come and go adding little to the North except useful liquor revenues; reactionaries whose political views are sufficiently marginal that senior governments simply ignore them; and "new Northerners" who are competent apolitical helpers or active supporters of indigenous aspirations. The individual prosperity, social and race relations progress, and traditions of vigorous public enterprise and government intervention in the Territories have become a model for other regions. That is what is meant about the North moving South: no longer content with benign neglect, indigenous groups and others in provincial Northlands now have positive models for their own Northern regions, whereas previously the vision of progress lay almost exclusively at the Southern terminus of their local road or air service.

Given the internationalisation of human rights, including indigenous rights, and the imperatives of national social justice — without which national survival is a hollow purpose — Canada must mobilise its resources and will to overcome the often desperate social and economic conditions of the *provincial* North. This should be done through cooperation rather than unilateralism, of course. However, extensive federal powers exist in respect of indigenous peoples, as well as inter-provincial affairs, fisheries and watercourses, etc. Increasing world scrutiny of human rights, and the new, more intrusive standards of monitoring institutions like the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) of which Canada and the USA are members, force us to review traditional policy. That policy has usually been to leave things to the provinces who were, in turn, content to do as little as possible, knowing that isolated indigenous families and villages were unlikely to stir up much inconvenient attention. Of course, Ottawa did initiate various regional programs such as the Western Northlands, Special ARDA, and the Freshwater Fish Marketing programs in the provincial North with an eye to indigenous needs, in addition to the various federal programs of DIAND, CMHC, and others. Today we must consider outcomes, rather than scattered good intentions. Ottawa must consider various forms of assistance to the indigenous North as well as cooperative federal-provincial frameworks to assist indigenous communities.

There may seem to be little point today in trying to imagine a greatly reorganised Canada. But Canada may well be reorganised — in response to Quebec independence moves or a fundamental revision of the national compact designed to prevent that (see Part VI below). Borders could yet be redrawn; anything is possible. Earlier in the century the North of Canada was drawn by arbitrary lines on the map which are now as jealously guarded by provincial resource departments as if they had been directed by God and Moses. Already Nunavut has established a counter-trend, as are BC peoples, Quebec Inuit, Quebec Crees, and various other peoples. It may be desirable to precondition any constitutional revision and development across the Provincial and Territorial North on the definition, political recognition, and public sector support of indigenous ethno-regions.

A STRONG AND UNITED CANADA

Recent national constitutional crises, and regional agendas being urged by some Canadian political leaders, cast a strange light on the frenetic constitutional development of indigenous peoples, in the North and in the South. While Southern Canadians have flailed away at old issues with old arguments — and with stubborn resistance to real innovation, despite endless ingenuity in restating the old — Northerners have been moving ahead.

The North is a test for Southern Canada. Can Canadians, faced again with the original challenges posed by this continent to Europeans — indigenous cultures in possession of the land, new physical environments in which to live and harvest renewable resources, the need to create civil institutions — do more than repeat stale patterns? There are many Canadians whose response to change is to demand sterner adherence to the past morality of minimalism and self-denial. Puritanism, whether masked as political philosophy Left or Right, may heal the self in individual cases, but is hardly a recipe for national renewal and development.

Creation and change in the North are not myths or idle hopes. They are already well advanced in some regions. In them Canadians outside the North may find the sort of creative purpose and national renewal which the country so badly needs. A new socio-political ethic and a new society are being created under our noses. We can continue to ignore or deny them — or we can learn from, and even adopt them. Canada is not dead yet, even if many Southern imaginations have been deadened by repeated cycles of ritual constitutional debate and failure.

A FEDERAL ROLE?

Canada as a whole has a continuing role and a significant "national interest" in the North to be exercised through the national government. The argument from within the North

against an active federal presence has been more often a cry of *laissez-faire* whites wishing freedom to ignore aboriginal rights than a genuine Northerners' dissent. It is the perennial cry of a settler population wishing to take over the lands and resources of indigenous peoples (the very analysis Dr. Johnson made of the American Revolution, interestingly!). A more promising and productive relationship has been pioneered by Northern indigenous peoples negotiating, sparring, and simply working with federal departments and agencies through land claims, environmental disputes, and many other processes.

There is no inherent conflict between Northern popular self-government and an active federal role in the region. Indeed, it is difficult to see how social justice and self-government can be achieved *without* active federal participation in the provision of revenues, expertise, equity between races and regions, brokering of aboriginal rights settlements, etc. Furthermore, a continuing federal role in matters such as ocean management; national and continental defence; policing of Territory *vis-à-vis* illegal movements of overseas persons, goods, contaminants, etc; inter-jurisdictional freshwater management; aviation and shipping; and much else, is essential to the well-being of Northern residents.

Federal Ottawa is capable of Northern vision. Nunavut has triggered the sort of vision at Prime Ministerial level which the North has long needed, and which it will continue to need.

In the course of this transition [to creation of the Nunavut government], we will redraft the map of Canada — indeed of North America. But our collective achievement is far more than a simple exercise in cartography. It is, at its core, an act of nation-building. Step by step, agreement by agreement, we are advancing toward a set of common goals: strengthening the economic, social and political foundations of the North, and enriching an ancient and cherished culture — the Inuit culture. We are forging a new partnership — a real partnership — not only between the Government of Canada and the future government of Nunavut, but between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Canadians. From the new climate of confidence that this settlement will engender in the North, all Canadians will benefit. (Mulroney 1993)

To make this appreciation of Northern realities permanent, and to translate it into public policy, will require the continued work of indigenous organisations and bodies such as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.

The exemplary federal assistance and commitment to the Nunavut project in recent years and in some earlier periods need to be the norm in national Northern policy. There is also a need for financial commitment. Impolitic as it may seem to make this suggestion in recessionary and uncertain times, that commitment is essential. Otherwise we will have Two Nations North-South in the sense coined by Disraeli of rich and poor. Neglect

in the North — or episodic interest — fuelled the indigenous ethno-nationalism of the past, a movement which threatened to spin out of control until more recent federal policies were adopted, policies which are to be applauded. It would be foolish as well as immoral to abandon the North to *laissez-faire* now. The realities and appropriate course have been well stated by Robertson:

Unless new economic prospects emerge, it seems likely that Canada will have to accept the probability that a reasonable standard of living in such extreme Northern areas will, for most people, involve continuing and high subsidies of various kinds.

There would be nothing new about high and continuing subsidy. It has been accepted by implication in the extent of a variety of government programmes developed over the last 30 years to meet Arctic realities. What could be new is the perception that this is not a transitional or unexpected situation. It is simply a fact of life if a growing resident native population is to continue to live in what is today considered to be a decent manner in some of the harshest and most difficult conditions on earth.

Acceptance of that Arctic reality could make it possible to devise methods of support and assistance that would contribute to, rather than undermine, the sense of self-reliance and independence that is vitally important for people in meeting the challenges of the Far North. (Robertson et al. 1988, 21)

Modern Canada was built on timely investment and government financial commitment, e.g., through railway development. The need for commitment is as great today in the North as it was in the West and mid-North in times past, although different styles of development are needed on the contemporary "frontier".

PART V — THE QUEBEC CHALLENGE

QUÉBEC — ALWAYS UNIQUE

The first comprehensive modern indigenous claims settlement was in Quebec in 1975. Quebec had also established a new Northern and indigenous affairs office in which a guiding principle was to break with the DIAND of the early 1960s.⁷ However, despite the tremendous modernisation and professionalism of governments in Quebec from 1960 onwards, placing them ahead of other provinces in many — especially social and cultural

⁷ — Until the early 1960s, the federal Northern administration branch administered the Inuit areas of Quebec.

— policy matters, indigenous affairs was an area of rapid progress in English Canada in the same period. While Quebec reviled the old federal Indian Affairs and Northern Administration Branches, it appeared to be unaware that new philosophies of devolution and indigenous autonomy were taking hold across Canada.

Furthermore, while English Canadians had few quibbles over a constitutional ideology of devolving power to indigenous peoples, Quebec, intent on province-building, saw such devolution as a threat, or at least an inappropriate step, at a time when it was expanding its own central powers in Quebec City.

It has been assumed by many people outside Quebec that Québécois sensitivity to cultural identity *vis-à-vis* English-speaking North America would lead that province to more sensitive policies towards its own minorities. This has not always been the case, in the view of Inuit and First Nations, despite many encouraging official reports and statements.

The subject of the triangular relationship between Canada, Quebec, and indigenous peoples is formally outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the novel and new relationships which are emerging in Quebec between indigenous peoples and sub-national government will provide their own lessons, for emulation or avoidance, across Northern Canada. Paradoxical as it may seem, the Government of Canada has a role to play in any scenario involving Quebec — protecting the rights of Inuit, Cree, Naskapi and other peoples as part of its direct constitutional responsibility and securing the best possible arrangements for them in any Quebec future. Nor will all indigenous people in Quebec quietly adopt a "willing suspension of disbelief" in the face of major revision of political institutions, especially if that involves greater control of their lands and lives, in fact or in law, by Quebec City. Indigenous peoples all across Canada feel a preference for federal jurisdiction, it should be added; there is nothing inherently *anti-Quebec* or *anti-French* about it! It is simply a recognition that provincial governments with jurisdiction over land, resources, and most forms of development are in a conflict of interest position *vis-à-vis* the rights of indigenous peoples who also claim and use and occupy that provincial territory.

QUEBEC'S CHALLENGE TO NORTHERN POLICY

The proposed move to sovereign independence by Quebec following the 1994 provincial election has focussed indigenous concerns (*The Globe and Mail*, December 7, 1994, "PQ bill declares independence"; December 9, 1994, "Quebec Inuit ask Ottawa to save them from PQ plan"). Two questions have become critical:

- the Northern boundary of Quebec; and

- the status of Inuit, Cree, and other indigenous Territories if they remain within Quebec.

There may be little prospect of resolving these calmly and with measured tones within Quebec alone, thereby adding a practical role for Ottawa to its clear constitutional and moral roles in respect of indigenous peoples. Of course, practical negotiation is possible within Quebec, as Inuit have shown in working towards new politico-constitutional arrangements with the Quebec government which was defeated in 1994 (Hendrie 1994). All the same, there are enough angry or unhelpful voices on all sides of the debate in Quebec, indigenous and non-indigenous, that calm and practicality may be at a premium.

Establishing and maintaining boundaries between European peoples in the territory of indigenous peoples has been a source of tremendous conflict in the North American past. British-French and British-American conflicts were aggravated and sometimes caused by such matters in the 18th and early 19th centuries (e.g., Allen 1992). The Red River and Northwest Rebellions of the later 19th century involved some similar ethno-jurisdictional issues. Oka gave Canadians and the world a taste of the complexities of three-sided inter-jurisdictional contests, and reminded us that the militarily weakest party may not always be politically weak.

At the same period as British-French contestation in Eastern North America in the 18th century, centred on Quebec, the Crowns of Sweden and Denmark-Norway ended a war with a determination to delineate their Northern boundary.

By the 1751 Treaty a clear, undisputed border was drawn for the first time through the Sami areas of settlement and use. That meant that the relationship with the Sami population had to be settled. (Smith *et al.* 1990, 31)

This resulted in the Lappecodicilen of 1751. The codicil not only established a territorial boundary which remains to this day — and remains peaceful — but it elaborated existing and created new rights of and relations between the indigenous peoples on both sides. Indeed, the boundary was drawn in consultation with the indigenous peoples; that is, their existing land use, livelihoods, social relations, and needs were the starting point of the boundary process. It was rather like the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Jay Treaty of 1794, and a Prairie Indian treaty rolled into one. Like them, too, it has been eroded until recent Sami rights activism and legal and historical scholarship have begun to restore it. What is suggested here is not an agreement modelled in detail on the Lappecodicilen, of course, but its spirit of indigenous accommodation. Such a civilised approach to indigenous self-determination — a controversial word which is used here in its agreed sense, however — should surely guide Canadian (and Quebec) policy. (A full discussion of the Treaty and Lappecodicilen of 1751, and of their implications, is found in a chapter of the Norwegian Sami Rights Committee report of 1984, Smith *et al.* 1990, pp. 31-99.)

It is tempting to view the multi-national cooperation and shared feelings of Northern Scandinavia today as an outgrowth of Sami contact and cooperation. Perhaps it is. It has certainly surprised many outsiders who noted that the three Scandinavian countries whose national territories converge there had quite different and incompatible defence postures. (I.e., Norway in NATO, Sweden neutral, and Finland in a friendship and cooperation treaty with the USSR.) Inuit have brought the governing authorities no less than their own people together in Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and now Siberia, something hitherto unknown, even unthinkable.

The sea no less than the land could affect Canada-Quebec relations significantly in the North, depending on where boundaries were drawn. This would have two dimensions. One is the traditional rights of use and the renewable resource development potential central to lives of Inuit on Quebec and NWT shores of shared seas, and the other is the future development policies of Quebec. To date the marine livelihoods of Inuit have been a main concern of governments in these seas, apart from some limited shipping, much of which involves re-supply of Inuit communities. Obviously the traditional rights of Inuit must be a principal concern of any Canada-Quebec marine border arrangements. An example of such an arrangement is the Torres Strait Treaty of 1978. Its preamble may be worth quoting:

Australia and Papua New Guinea,

DESIRING to set down their agreed position as to their respective sovereignty over certain islands, to establish maritime boundaries and to provide for certain other related matters, in the area between the two countries including the area known as Torres Strait;

RECOGNISING the importance of protecting the traditional way of life and livelihood of Australians who are Torres Strait Islanders and of Papua New Guineans who live in the coastal area of Papua New Guinea in and adjacent to the Torres Strait;

RECOGNISING ALSO the importance of protecting the marine environment and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight for each other's vessels and aircraft in the Torres Strait area;

DESIRING ALSO to cooperate with one another in that area in the conservation, management and sharing of fisheries resources and in regulating the exploration and exploitation of seabed mineral resources;

AS good neighbours and in a spirit of cooperation, friendship and goodwill;

HAVE AGREED as follows... (Babbage 1990, 257)

The Torres Strait Treaty is complex, with areas of joint jurisdiction and different boundaries for different subjects. Some Torres Strait Islanders, i.e., Australian citizens, live on islands now inside the Territorial seas of Papua New Guinea (PNG). The local peoples, both Islanders and Papuans, have mutual rights including freedom of movement across the border, rights which apply to no other PNG or Australian citizens. The Treaty has had teething problems. Most notably the Torres Strait Islanders complain that Australia lacks the political will to get tough with PNG, a country of Melanesian peoples like the Islanders themselves, over the marine environment and the development standards and practices allowed or encouraged by the PNG government. PNG mines emptying wastes into rivers which flow into Torres Strait, not to mention new projects such as an oil terminal, are major issues of concern to the Islanders, despite some reassuring recent Australian government studies. Nonetheless, Torres Strait, by virtue of its sensitive location and politics, has attracted the most forward-looking indigenous marine work in Australia to date (Lawrence & Cansfield-Smith 1991; Mulrennan & Hanssen 1994). It is also seen as a special case in Australian indigenous policy for the same reasons, despite the fact that it is legally an integral part of the State of Queensland, and it has been receiving significant national and state support for its regional political and other aspirations (Jull 1991b, 29-32; Lui 1994; TSRA 1994a; 1994b).

There can be little doubt that *if* Quebec were to claim or take over the present federal and Nunavut seas surrounding the Quebec peninsula on North and West, or some portion of them, the search for revenues and development to finance a new nation-state could lead Quebec City into rapid disagreement with Inuit on environment and development policies. At present Inuit have achieved, with some bumps along the way, a good relationship with federal departments involved in marine issues. Environmental protection and ecologically sustainable development are priorities in that relationship. Inuit would wish to ensure that any new arrangements between Canada and Quebec protected their marine interests.

An interesting question may arise in relation to the Quebec presence in the North. The anecdotal evidence, at least, attributes Quebec's presence and interest in the region to the discovery by the nationalists in the Lesage government of the 1960s that the North was an Anglophone fiefdom. This led to major initiatives, including some of the very projects and commissions which have attempted to confirm Quebec Territorial rights in the North. Previously the Quebec interest in Inuit was limited, to say the least, with the Province going to court to deny responsibility for Inuit, and winning. (That history is recapitulated in Tester & Kulchyski 1994.) If Quebec's recent interest in the Inuit, Crees, and other peoples has been primarily driven by a desire to claim their territories in the North, Canada may be under little or no obligation to accept such a claim in the event of Quebec secession, the more so if removal of those territories from Canada is against the wishes of their indigenous inhabitants.

One would wish to assume that everyone on all sides of these questions is decent and reasonable. In that case, a simple act of self-determination such as a referendum in each

of the indigenous territories affected may decide the future. There are many other possibilities for a more complex solution. New or vestigial indigenous rights across a new boundary as in the Lappecodicilen and Torres Strait Treaty are possible. A special minority rights régime such as that of the Åland Islands between Sweden and Finland could be negotiated with federal assistance, or as with the Danish and German minorities separated by the boundary in Schleswig-Holstein. The world past and present is full of precedents for the accommodation of minority peoples and regions — including some which have been successful — and there is no reason why Canadians could not invent some new ones.

One sort of option was explored by the Norwegian legal scholar, Grahl-Madsen (1986; 1988), for the Sami in the three Scandinavian countries. He envisioned a treaty among the three countries creating a new Sami jurisdictional entity, a trans-boundary Sami region with something like the status of Greenland as a member of the Nordic Council. Already, of course, there are a number of services and institutions shared among the Sami of the three countries.

Even if the Quebec Inuit territory, Nunavik, were to remain in a sovereign independent Quebec, for cultural and linguistic reasons the Quebec Inuit would wish to retain close ties to their Labrador and Nunavut Inuit cousins nearby. Furthermore, secession by Quebec would not leave the rest of Canada unaffected. It is entirely likely that even before such an event, and certainly after, a new Canadian constitutional order would be discussed or implemented. In such discussion the indigenous peoples would be very alert to the protection and recognition of rights they have won in recent times. As participants in constitutional reform discussions, a role they have gained since the end of the 1970s, they would also have their own agendas.

From the viewpoint of indigenous peoples and cultures, the existing boundaries of the Territorial and Provincial North are often arbitrary, eccentric, or cruel. It may be time to consider constitutional and self-government policies aimed at indigenous regions no less than individuals or reserve communities. This has already happened *de facto* and *de jure* in the Northern regions which have negotiated or are negotiating claims settlements, including the Inuit and Cree Territories of Quebec. In British Columbia the various regional treaties are in the offing. In other words, the question of drawing new ethno-regional boundaries for jurisdictional purposes is already happening. Quebec may precipitate the larger question of *either* re-drawing the principal jurisdictional boundaries within Canada *or* violating them creatively to allow more practical arrangements for indigenous peoples. That is, Quebec secession may force all remaining Canadians to re-invent their country and its regions constitutionally, making a more logical or functional carve-up than now exists, or, open the way to cross-border arrangements which enable Inuit or non-indigenous Anglophones to participate in trans-border jurisdictional arrangements. Even as a pure concept, the permeable border makes more sense in today's world, wherever friendly neighbours are not putting up barbed wire between themselves, than the fiction of the dividing wall.

The whole North of Canada would more logically be divided into a patchwork of indigenous self-governing regions. This might be done even if existing Provinces refused to consider any diminution of their hinterlands. The lines on the map mean precious little to indigenous people in Northern areas, more often bringing hardship and denial (because they are subject to neglectful provincial capitals) than any very positive benefits.

Inuit North Labrador, a region terribly neglected, might well join with Nunavik and Nunavut in various shared arrangements. It might make sense to share some school and cultural materials, for instance, the more so as it may take time to staff three Inuit curriculum departments. The Quebec issue may usefully encourage us to consider how many Canadian boundaries, both on the map and in cultural or functional terms, are needlessly punishing indigenous peoples while protecting Northern development get-rich-quick dreams in Southern cities.

PART VI — CONCLUSIONS

To conclude I would repeat the first paragraph of my Preface:

This paper reflects on the course and conflicts of the post-war North in Canada. It describes a synthesis which has been arrived at by trial and error in public policy and the angry reactions of indigenous peoples to policies made by others. The new political *ethos* and the world of new indigenous societies I describe was unforeseen by the policy-makers. None of which is to deny that matters are turning out for the best.

The main outlines of recent federal policy in the Territorial North have been both correct and successful. That is,

- the securing of indigenous rights through negotiation;
- the brokering of cross-cultural equality, accompanied by social, legal, and politico-administrative measures; and
- the support for *de facto* or *de jure* local and regional self-governing authority

have been proven to be not only the right policies for the times, but have attracted interest and admiration abroad. These policies did not leap from the head of Zeus fully-formed like the wise Athena; rather, they often sprang from division, confrontation, and try-and-try-again policy-making cycles. They have been arrived at jointly, in effect, if not always cooperatively, by indigenous peoples and the federal and territorial governments. Of course, there have been many practical problems, but these have been in implementation rather than in the spirit and direction of overall policy principles.

In the Provincial North, Canada as a country has failed. Indigenous conditions are often wretched. The federal government has sometimes played an activist role in respect of indigenous peoples there, a fact often resented by provincial governments, but has more often tried to win provincial support for some cooperative measures. This approach has often failed, as have too many of the measures themselves. Federal officials, ministers, and even prime ministers have often been reduced to wringing their hands in think-pieces and "memos to file" about the state of things in the Provincial North, unable or unwilling to attempt more.

The important changes needed in Canada's Northern policy require a new understanding among Southern Canadians and their governments, as is discussed elsewhere in these pages. A number of specific changes could be immediately useful. These are proposed, as follows.

Federal policy and presence in the North need fundamental review in the specific context of Canada's unity, future, and national priorities. This has never been done, as far as is known, except under the rubric of geo-strategic notions which all but ignored the social, cultural, and political realities and imperatives of the domestic North.⁸ It would be useful for a policy planning exercise to put aside the operating principles and evolved intentions of recent Northern policy for a moment and start with a clean sheet of paper. The starting-point for consideration should be that the Northern 75% of Canada is largely politically unorganised and administratively unmanaged, except in parts of the Territories; that the permanent residents are non-European peoples whose social and economic conditions are often unacceptable by national standards; that some such miserable areas in the Provincial North send many ill-prepared people to Southern cities desperate for a better life, contributing mightily thereby to already critical indigenous urban problems; that the region and its residents' livelihoods suffer the downstream effects of industrial development but few benefits; that where the indigenous peoples have been organised and empowered conditions have dramatically improved; and that most of the socio-political hope found in the region results from some general and some quite local efforts, both voluntary and involuntary, of federal-indigenous partnership. The conjunction of federal power and resources with indigenous will, purpose, and creative energy has produced remarkable things.

Starting from such a basis, one might well arrive at a new policy framework. The several national crises which have befallen Canada in recent years and which loom for it today require us to venture such fresh thinking. The North is a field where Ottawa has almost unlimited scope for good, and where size and scale are such that modest amounts of financial input may yield very large benefits.

It would be unwise for Ottawa to accept too literally the shrieks about exclusivity of jurisdiction by provincial governments. A new constitution negotiated to keep Quebec in Canada, or renew national arrangements after it leaves, could open up many hitherto taboo subjects for discussion, the more so if the existing constitutional order is seen to have failed — or is made a scapegoat for failure. Meanwhile, Ottawa is left to pick up the pieces after regular fiascoes involving indigenous peoples and the environment in the Provincial North — from Davis Inlet on the Atlantic to the Queen Charlottes in the Pacific, and with many hydro-electric power projects in between. It is time for Ottawa to look beyond ritual constitutional denials and seek policies which will achieve social justice and political hope for the peoples of the Provincial North. The provinces *should* be partners; the indigenous peoples *must* be partners.

⁸— A notable exception was a series of publications prepared under the editorship and coordination of Nils Örvik of the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston. Unfortunately this series came to an end at about the time when the great transformations which are the subject and inspiration of this paper became apparent, though not before this author managed to give a couple of seminars on Nunavut at the Centre. Also, the working group chaired by Gordon Robertson in 1987-1988 produced a brief integrated overview with recommendations (Robertson *et al.* 1988).

Support for the new North outlined in this paper is vital. Whereas this new North has emerged to date by good luck and the unforeseen consequences of indigenous politics and government policy, the time has come for more considered and targeted support. What has been wrought by fortune must be maintained by will. The basic principle underlying such policy should be that while the North's resource boomtowns may come and go with changing world economic conditions, indigenous eco-regions as an organising principle for political identity and public service delivery are the key to a stable Northern society.

It must also be noted that while it is fine to admire the transcendent patterns of politics and policy in the new North, the dynamic has been the disadvantage of its indigenous inhabitants. That is, the poverty, discrimination, and despair of the indigenous North has been the driving force. While many changes and new institutions have resulted, there remains a fundamental need for social and infrastructure spending.

A renewed federal Northern affairs capacity. The "Northern affairs" capacity of the Government of Canada has declined sharply and fragmented in the past 25 years. This is unfortunate because it had great achievements as well as personnel of unusual commitment, not only in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and its predecessors. Many individuals and some units in other departments have been no less capable, from National Defence to Coast Guard to Secretary of State. Newer elements have also arisen, notably in the environmental, "citizenship", and communications fields.

In some ways Ottawa's Northern capacity expired before its time, despite the rise of the NWT government which was a direct cause of the federal winding-down. The social ideals animating Northern affairs, born of Depression and War, were well ahead of the fashion for simple material growth which has too often characterised official policies in the North, especially provincial policies. Also, at about the same time as the federal decline, the provinces began in earnest to develop their own Northern policies and programs, usually ignorant of the experience and expertise already existing.

There may be no longer the Canadian governmental capacity required to deal with the opportunities and problems discussed in this paper. Once centred in the Northern Administration Branch and a variety of inter-departmental mechanisms, the Northern expertise of the Government of Canada has been scattered (and much of it lost or retired). The fact remains that Canada has squandered its Northern capacity. Northern Canada may be the great arena of nation-building and national development in coming generations. This is not necessarily a North of vast civil engineering works, but one of new purposes like ecologically sustainable development and renewed societies. The relationships among different peoples and the natural environment are central subjects.

Although the area in question amounts to approximately 75% of Canada, it has only recently begun to be thought of and described in comprehensive terms (e.g., Bone 1992). The view in these pages is that the North not only needs much more attention from government, but needs new types of attention.

A Northern policy and program forum. The growth of new governmental and quasi-governmental bodies such as the indigenous claims corporations across the North is increasing the need for specialist knowledge and experience, albeit as new model consultants rather than old colonial style administrators. A federal-provincial-territorial-indigenous conference on Northern policy and development is long overdue in Canada. Although Canada has been involved in some such conferences at international level, there has not been a domestic gathering of this type, surprisingly (despite the fine National Workshops of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, e.g., CARC 1984).

The main purposes of a first conference would be to assemble a basic inventory of Northern policy vehicles and actors, to encourage a consolidation of effort and personnel, and to consider the needs of indigenous and other Northern and mid-Northern regional authorities for expertise and other resources. For the federal government the conference would have the critical function of providing an initial information base on which to strengthen its Northern affairs capacities for a purposeful new approach to Northern policy, a role which from the outset recognised the roles of provincial, territorial, and indigenous governments or soon-to-be governments in the region. A permanent forum with a secretariat serving regular conference and conducting follow-up work could also be considered.

A reinforced Northern sustainable development capacity. The Government of Canada has several departments with research, coordinating, and operating roles in respect of Northern and indigenous environmental protection and renewable resource development. Through years of alternating dispute, negotiation, and cooperation, federal departments and agencies, territorial government counterparts, and indigenous bodies, including those established through claims processes, have developed a new spirit which is the genuine ecologically sustainable development ethic which Canada and the world say they are seeking. At the same time, world economic and domestic development pressure on Canada's North (which contains the last intact indigenous homelands) is unrelenting. The Government of Canada should consider establishing a small Ministry, or separate branch of an existing ministry, for Aboriginal Sustainable Economy. This would draw on new federal, indigenous, and academic achievements in a field where Canada has become a world leader in research and pilot co-management projects (e.g., Freeman & Carbyn 1988; Inglis 1993; Pinkerton 1989).

A ministry would support sustainable development by indigenous people, research, and liaison with governments to help remove obstacles to environmental protection and productivity. Most importantly, the primary economy of some three-quarters of Canada would have a focal point and an advocate within government similar to the support farmers and fishers have long enjoyed. The Ministry or branch could also provide the secretariat for a federal-provincial-territorial aboriginal sustainable economy council, perhaps subsumed under the inter-governmental forum proposed under the preceding point.

A minister of state for the North. The federal government faces immediate and major issues of national policy in Northern Canada today, as well as constitutional and sub-constitutional questions within the North. Consideration should be given to interim appointment of a minister of state to negotiate the matters raised in this paper and to develop a national Northern policy, such a minister to be located within the portfolio of the Prime Minister while cooperating fully with the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

A Northern studies institute. The unique cultural and administrative histories of the North, and the relative lack of "requisite variety" in information resources, require establishment of independent social research institutions to facilitate the good functioning of Northern society and government. At least one such institution located in the Inuit cultural area of Nunavut and another in the Dene cultural area of Yukon and Mackenzie Valley would be desirable. Such an institution would provide independent research and commentary on public policy and other policy issues, and might take as its models the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, an independent research and policy monitoring think-tank in Ottawa, and the North Australia Research Unit of the Australian National University in Darwin. The work program and recruitment should be carried out in international and especially Circumpolar context, with formal and informal ties made with institutions and individuals in other "first world" hinterlands from the outset. The core functions of a new institution would be research, the training of indigenous researchers, an active publication program of discussion papers and more substantial monographs, public workshops and seminars in various locations, the hosting of visiting experts and specialists from Southern Canada and abroad, the conducting of consultancies for indigenous organisations or governments or others (provided that their results were publicly available and/or published), and the encouragement of international comparative studies. In time such institutions could fuse with colleges to compose Northern universities. For the time being the two critical needs are for such institutions to be *independent* of vested interests and *responsive* to Northerners, e.g., through management and research advisory boards.

A Northern civics program. An important function to which a Northern studies institute would contribute would be a program of Northern civics. Across the Territorial and Provincial North, both young and more mature indigenous persons are being called upon to be good citizens, politicians, executives, and administrators of fast-growing new local and regional democracies. Special courses and course materials are needed to help them. Some of the special courses for Inuit conducted in Ottawa in the 1980s provide useful experience in this regard. Indigenous broadcasting could also play a role in reaching the scattered Northern public.

The larger task here, of course, is the building of civil society in the many new indigenous homelands emerging across Canada. To date we have been so narrowly focussed on legal and political frameworks that we have neglected other social needs. This has reached the point where backlash and opposition movements are appearing within the indigenous community demanding that more than symbolic issues and the perquisites and dignities of political leadership be addressed, threatening incumbents who fail to get the message.

Territorial administrative reconciliation. The Territory governments have not stood still. Each of them has areas of especially able staff and imaginative programming. The remarkable history of the NWT Legislative Assembly as a parliament operating effectively without parties and on behalf of communities, despite some obvious drawbacks for executive decision-making on major policy items, deserves serious study for the lessons it may yield to others. The Yukon government in recent years has perhaps gone as far as a conventional model can go in demonstrating the responsiveness of Westminster traditions in an indigenous homeland.

In Nunavik (Northern Quebec) the dysfunctional division created by the claims settlement in 1975, especially between local/regional government and specifically claims settlement bodies, has created no end of problems for Quebec Inuit who have been renegotiating structures with Quebec to achieve a more integrated, accountable, and efficient system. What is needed today everywhere in the North is a sorting out of roles on a practical, functional basis. A discredited or dysfunctional governmental model must not be given all the legitimacy of the Canadian constitutional system. A claims structure reluctantly agreed by whites must not be denied the means and political effectuality, checks, and balances to perform its true role.

The indigenous political movement in the North grew out of a need for socio-cultural survival and for control of major determinants of their region's future. Those needs may be greater today than they were in 1950 or 1970. An unworkable and divided Northern administrative system half-heartedly installed by a bemused federal government will not meet those needs, the more so when alongside a new claims-created entity attracts indigenous trust and pursues a specifically indigenous agenda. The indigenous organisations responsible for claims must be supported by the federal government in

achieving with Territorial governments the implementation of new administrations and institutions which fulfill the hopes and plans of the new Northern order. In Nunavut a special Nunavut Implementation Commission is already engaged in work to create the new Territorial government and may provide some useful models for application elsewhere.

WHAT'S THE BIG IDEA?

Canadians are often more comfortable with little things, with increments, than big ideas. This is as true of the North as other issues, as Dosman (1975) has shown in his cruel, but fair, study of Canadian policy-making in respect of Northern pipelines. Today we are comfortable as a people oozing goodness and concern at a local meeting on dyslexia while unable to summon such moral energy or vision in respect of "the French" or "the Indians" or "the Future".

Canada needs big ideas today. A big vision, a reason to believe in itself, a hope for the future. The contemporary North gives it *three* "big ideas".

1. ***A Civil Reconciliation*** of peoples, cultures, ideologies, development philosophies, and laws is producing civil harmony and a renewed respect for shared public purposes in the North.
2. ***The Indigenous North*** has resurfaced after a period of layering-over by the "garrison mentality" and vain hopes of a Victorian mode of mechanical progress, and is now providing both indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians with a workable, flourishing, "made in Canada" model for the greater part of the national territory.
3. ***The International North*** has been newly discovered by the White Man thanks to the urging of indigenous Northerners around the Polar Basin, a coalition of largely powerless peoples striving against old Superpower and diplomatic pretensions to establish a human and humane agenda for a region critical for the world's political and environmental health and to establish a new model of a peaceful international order.

Civil Reconciliation is not a new concept. After all, in the 1763 settlement of the wars of France and England whereby Quebec would be accommodated largely intact in the British Empire, reconciliation was attempted, albeit with mixed outcomes (Neatby 1966). Indeed, that settlement aroused strong opposition in Britain's American Colonies and in Britain itself as being too generous. Despite unparalleled paranoia about Quebec and national unity in policy circles in recent decades, wiser heads have prevailed in respect of the North. The land claims settlements and other significant program and policy developments have shown a pragmatic acceptance by national and, eventually, Northern non-indigenous power-brokers, encouraged by progressive non-indigenous persons, of

indigenous social and cultural needs and aspirations. No less has been the reconciliation of pro- and anti-development sentiment, of varying concepts of environmental protection, of views on the evils of "special status" vs. a philosophy of rights, etc. The government sector has been disproportionately large and strong in the North, and it has been harnessed to Northern needs. In Australia success in the sort of bridging of racial divides we see emerging in Northern Canada is called *reconciliation*, a term which has now become a national policy and purpose there. It should be no less in Canada.

In North Norway, for instance, one may be struck by the strength of civil society and civic commitment in the region, despite a dissident populist regionalism. Policy and public processes are dominant in people's lives, but while everyone vehemently disagrees with one or other major policy, commitment to a social order and to shared purposes remains. For an Anglo-Saxon numbed by decades of anti-government rhetoric and the bruising dismantling of public sector structures under Thatcher and Reagan, and their likes in Canada and Australia, this is a moving experience. Inuit in Nunavut and elsewhere learned how disruptive and all-powerful government could be in their lives, but they have now tamed the beast and have re-directed it with their own youthful energies and creative imaginations. Among them the debates about state and private property and such other standard items of Southern controversy dissolve in pragmatic new constructions. They are more interested in building than in arguing over the tastefulness of this or that building material.

The Indigenous North was something with which early post-war Northern policy would do away, replacing it with "modern" material progress and social assimilation in the North American Continental urban style. The actual outcome was rather different. Now, old indigenous regional imperatives are resurfacing and providing a basis for politics and public administration. We even see the cultural boundaries of indigenous territories replacing imperial lines drawn on our map, corresponding to the general environmental adaptations which those peoples have made in post-Ice Age Canada. [In another paper for the Royal Commission, A THOUSAND YEARS, 2ND ED., on Scandinavian policy and politics in respect of Sami, i.e., "the Lapps", I have discussed the paradoxical emergence of indigenous regional identity in combination with permeable cross-cultural boundaries. I had the Provincial and Territorial North of Canada in mind as I did so and argued for an inclusive approach as in some of Canada's Northern claims settlement regions, e.g., Nunavut.]

The transforming ideal has not been the White Man's. Rather, it has been the indigenous community's aroused energies which have first undone and then redone the political visions and policies which seemed so inevitably triumphant in the 1950s and 1960s. Today nobody living in Nunavut or Arctic Quebec, or in the James Bay Cree territory, is in any doubt that this is an indigenous society with an indigenous future. In some other areas such as parts of the Yukon the negotiation of new identity between indigenous peoples and the settlers is more complex, while North Labrador has had the longest and most remarkable such regional cultural interaction of all (Kleivan 1966). More and

more Canadians and their governments are coming to embrace indigenous reality as the quintessential Canadian identity, a development similar to that occurring in Australia and New Zealand, as well as in regions like Alaska and Northern Scandinavia.

The concept of the "garrison mentality" proposed by the late Toronto professor, Northrop Frye, is the idea that Canadian settlers had brought a foreign and ill-adapted sense of formal purpose to a land where they were not at home.

Small and isolated communities surrounded with a physical or psychological "frontier", separated from one another and from their American and British cultural sources: communities that provide all that their members have in the way of distinctively human values, and that are compelled to feel a great respect for the law and order that holds them together, yet confronted with a huge, unthinking, menacing, and formidable physical setting — such communities are bound to develop what we may provisionally call a garrison mentality. In the earliest maps of the country the only inhabited centres are forts, and that remains true of the cultural maps for a much later time. ...

A garrison is a closely knit and beleaguered society, and its moral and social values are unquestionable. In a perilous enterprise one does not discuss causes or motives: one is either a fighter or a deserter. (Frye 1971, 225-226)

The ignorant outpost of law and order was nowhere more evident than in the North of the early post-war era. Now, thanks to recent indigenous social, cultural, and political assertiveness, that acquisitive but empty purpose has been replaced by a patchwork of Northern cultures and a sense of the immense complexity and inter-connectedness of environmental and social systems. Instead of a formal glaze of European purpose across the North, emerging now are new mixtures of old cultures and post-industrial technologies. While Southern Canadians lament the loss of a Victorian notion of a Canada linked by steel rails and federal development policy, Northern Canadians are creating a new Canada at home with itself right under their noses, a place where legal and political structures are adapted to cultural traditions, social realities, and regional aspirations.

It is also important to recognise that where regional indigenous societies are working out new political relations with senior governments — as in Coastal British Columbia where fisheries management agreements are in effect a rehearsal for full treaty negotiations, and in the North — environmental protection and ecologically sustainable development are central issues of negotiation. Indigenous peoples believe that governments have failed to manage territory and resources responsibly; they are appalled by some of that neglect and are determined to see their productive environments properly managed through the sort of co-management arrangements in the Nunavut claims settlement. Canada (and Quebec under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1975) are, in effect, only able to exercise "territorial integrity" by empowering the traditional inhabitants to exercise it

for them. Indeed, one could argue that the whole process of post-war indigenous political relations with national governments in hinterlands has amounted to the surrender by governments of significant *territorial management* to indigenous peoples in return for indigenous acceptance of governments' *territorial jurisdiction*.

The International North is a region where national governments, sub-national authorities or quasi-governmental entities (e.g., Nunavut in its implementation phase, or Nunavik), and ancient societies of indigenous hunters, fishers, and herders, have now come together in an improbable network to deal with such global problems as the marine environment, military fall-out, under-development, and recognition of historical and customary rights. They also recognise their strong underlying social and cultural similarities, and more ties than scholars have yet been able to explain, e.g., in Circumpolar diffusion of the shaman drum, or the revelations of petroglyphs like those at Alta on the Arctic coast of Norway. Canada, so often finding itself the eager little brother of the serious players in world affairs, has now found itself in a new role as major player themselves by dint of size and commitment in the Arctic. On Inuit urging, in particular, the federal government and others across Canada have joined this new movement for Circumpolar cooperation and understanding.

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In Southern Canada these three large ideas are little recognised outside a few specialist circles, or are glimpsed only in random fragments. Each has a major contribution to make to the renewal of national political and cultural life — a contribution to the saving of Canada not so much from regional secessionists as from the emptiness of those who have failed to convince the secessionists that there are shared Canadian values, goals, or opportunities worth holding onto.

While many of us shudder at the prospects for our country, Northern indigenous peoples — and non-indigenous people of goodwill working with them — are re-inventing Canada. They may not call it that — many of them are not given to much idle reflection — but re-inventing or re-building or renewing Canada from the ground up is what they are doing in fact. The least we can do, all the rest of us, is clear the way for them a little. We should certainly not insist any longer on failed ethno-centric European-derived visions of public administration and political culture which drove them to revolt in the first place. Are we so deep in despair that we are unable to recognise real nation-builders when we meet them?

The most remarkable fact about the North may be that so many indigenous Northerners, despite a past of unsuitable policies or neglect by public authorities, are so eager to build a future within Canada and to adopt its political and social institutions. In Nunavut there are as many Canadian flags as posters of the Montreal *Canadiens* on the bedroom walls of teenagers. While super-national economic unions, national constitutional reform, and

putative regional destinies as new geo-political entities such as Cascadia or Quebec are seriously debated by non-indigenous Canadians, the commitment of indigenous peoples to a renewed Canada should give us pause.

— The End —

APPENDIX A

THE NORTH AS MYTH

The North is the central myth of the people who have settled Canada from Europe. It is the dominant myth of the dominant society in Canada.

When European adventurers, refugees, convicts, dispossessed and displaced poor, speculators, seekers of religious or other freedom, opportunists, dependent family members, hopeful tradesmen or traders, or happy-go-lucky sidekicks came to Canada, they were awed and overwhelmed by the North. What the North seemed for them was a place of fierce and long winters; vistas of snow and ice; the death of the year and of nature in winter; endless forests and tundras; well-armed and elusive indigenous peoples who were able to resist or annihilate their settlement; great distances in unknown territory; a strictly limited potential for European food production on land; and an almost total lack of the human-created infrastructure and amenities of society and civilisation as they knew it. The long winters gave them plenty of time to ruminate on these facts, and the surging growth and continental economy to the South which followed the American Revolution gave them reason to feel second-rate or disadvantaged by reason of their Arctic country. At any rate, the North was a bundle of negative images.

It is not necessary — and can be misleading — to construct a genealogy for the meaning of the North in Canada from documents and archives. There have been various interesting and enjoyable attempts to do this, e.g. Grant 1989. However, such approaches miss the point. The real power of the North, as of the Sun or the Sea, is that it is an archetypal image deeply imbedded or imprinted in human consciousness — or sub-consciousness. When it is invoked by shamans or poets or film-makers they are drawing on its power, but it is too profound, protean, plutonic, elemental to be "constructed". Indeed, any attempt to harness such powerful spirits as Winter, Sea, or Sun only works as long as the user is true to the nature of the thing. When a Vancouver radio station had a contest in the mid-1970s to "name the whale" born in the local aquarium, and when one caller offered "Spot or Fluffy", we all enjoyed the wit of the suggestion, but recognised that a kitten's name might not suit a whale.

With longer acquaintance of Canada the settlers from Europe and elsewhere found that the at-first feared aspects of the place could have another face. Until a few years ago the

postcards in the shops near Parliament Hill were about 90% non-winter scenes. That has changed. No doubt snow-mobiling, cross-country skiing, and skating on the canal have helped. The long winters gave way to short and indecently lush summers, followed by a fall of brilliant leaves unknown in Europe. The indigenous peoples might save a family or whole community from starvation or scurvy, and opened lucrative trade in furs which provided the settler colonies an economic base for 200 years. It took a long time for artists, including writers, to embrace the North, but they have done it. The success of painters and film-makers for the past 50-70 years — and more recently of poets, essayists, playwrights, novelists, short-story writers, and critics — gives the lie to facile gibes from Europe, e.g., periodic editorials in *The Economist*, that we lack a national idea. The fact that our motto is not "Butcher thy neighbour!" may make us less than full Europeans, but we can probably live with that failing. The North is our identity and our culture; it is a program, a way of life, and a challenge we have not begun to exhaust.

But our embarrassment, or failure, at living with the North, may be our fatal and society-destroying weakness. That is why it is so important to us as a society, surely, to be aware that in recent decades, spurred by the political initiative of indigenous peoples, we have been forced to re-think and re-invent our significant national institutions and ways of doing things across the North. We have begun to learn to live with the North. We have been forced to do it, but we have done it, and with increasing panache. Political and administrative novelties may seem like concessions reluctantly agreed by tired and stale bureaucrats, but they amount to a new social framework and political culture. Despite robust debate, out-and-out racism, high economic stakes, and no end of practical difficulties, vastly differing peoples and points of view have been reconciled in the North. The land claims settlement is the indigenous person's constitution and political reform. It is also the basic element of the new deal in the North.

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Note. The above subject needs more treatment of its own. I return to it in publications now in press.

APPENDIX B

RIGHTS

Following is an excerpt from my submission, *Reconciliation: From Public Relations to Public Policy*, to the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation in Australia in response to their series of Key Issues paper in 1994.

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Reconciliation is not a generalised dawning of community niceness across racial and cultural divides. It is a matter of political and social equality, of power relationships in society. When one culture has brought its laws and recreated the political apparatus of its ancestral society in the lands and islands of other cultures, equality has been destroyed. *Mabo* provided the first formal recognition that the dominant society could even acknowledge that there had been earlier societies to whom rights pertained.

It is not entirely true to say that Australia's continental isolation has made it unknown to others. Among opinion- and decision-making élites overseas, racism is almost as much an emblem of Australia as the kangaroo. That reputation is a dangerous label in a world where racial and cultural tensions are major flash-points and where Australia is already struggling to change stereotypes of its society, especially in the minds of its South Pacific and Asian neighbours.

We hear much about how Australians fought, survived, or died bravely under inhuman conditions in World War II. It would be useful to hear more about the values underlying that war. The Allies were fighting against the racist imperialism of Japan and Germany. Those Allies, including Australia, were not simply content to leave the matter there when they emerged victorious in 1945. To try and prevent a recurrence they created a new world order — a real one, unlike the short-lived rhetorical order evoked by President Bush during the Gulf war. They established the United Nations amid many ideals, statements, and documents against racism and colonial exploitation, and since then they have elaborated new practices through many conventions and actions. We forget amid daily TV scenes of the limitations of UN peace-keepers that often these messy mop-ups are an alternative to all-out war. Even as these human tragedies unfold there are more quiet and unobserved precedents in human rights, including indigenous rights. These are accumulating all the time and with steady progress throughout the 20th century, despite outbursts of genocidal fury in various parts of the world.

The basic need for indigenous reconciliation in Australia today may seem somewhat paradoxical:

IN ORDER TO BECOME A FULL CONTRIBUTING AND EQUAL PART OF THE LIFE OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONTINENT-STATE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES MUST FIRST SECURE MORE CULTURAL AUTONOMY, RECOGNISED RIGHTS, AND SELF-GOVERNING POWERS. UNLESS AND UNTIL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ARE SECURE IN THEIR COLLECTIVE SURVIVAL, THE INTEGRITY OF THEIR LIVING PLACES, THE PROTECTION OF SACRED PLACES AND TRADITIONAL RESOURCES FOR THEIR USE, AND THE MEANS TO MAKE IMPORTANT DECISIONS ABOUT THEIR FUTURE THEMSELVES, THERE CAN BE NO REAL RECONCILIATION.

If governments wish to spend money on goodwill, they can always find somewhere to fund an inter-racial picnic. Goodwill is not the same as reconciliation. Goodwill is a pleasant emotion or state of mind indulged in by persons when they have not too much

else on their minds. Reconciliation must be something which survives many moods, many conditions, and many crises. It is not a privilege for some dark-skinned people some of the time; it is a right of all indigenous peoples all of the time. It is not dependent on the whim or preoccupations of British or other immigrant élites. It is not episodic or discretionary. It is a legal and political order which provides the framework for equality in society.

The trouble with goodwill programs and projects, apart from the fact that they accomplish little except when initiated by indigenous peoples themselves, is that they exhaust the patience and goodwill of the non-indigenous community. If the non-indigenous community is led to believe that spending a little money on parties and party hats will dissolve the injustices of white settlement, they are mistaken. They will quickly complain: "We are spending all this money on indigenous reconciliation and those wretched Aborigines are still not happy! They are never satisfied. Let's at least spend the money on people who are going to be grateful for our hard-earned tax dollars."

If we try too hard *not* to threaten the public, *not* to provoke the dreaded backlash, *not* to risk putting forward the hard issues, we can be sure we will not arrive at real policies or real solutions. We will just go on as before, each new government announcing some nice spending program to pay a few people to be nice to each other in a conference room or at a country fair. Maybe we should instead call forth this dreadful dragon named Backlash. Let's have a look at him (or her). Let's see how big and ferocious and mean this monster really is. Are governments and public as gullible today as when the great WA land rights furore erupted, and is the mining lobby quite as brazen and simplistic? Is the threat really so great, after all? Is it not worth the commitment of political leadership and official ingenuity to free the land from this monster once and for all?

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