

THE RELOCATION OF THE SAYISI DENE OF TADOULE LAKE

Prepared for

The Minister of Supply and Services and
The Royal Commission On Aboriginal Peoples

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This working paper attempts to provide a historical and analytical account of the relocation of the Sayisi Dene of Manitoba during the 1950s. A map of "within living memory" land use and relocation sites is attached (Figure 1).

The cumulative social, economic and cultural effects of the relocation were examined using historical documents, public and church archives, as well as oral history interviews. A model for subsistence systems (Usher 1992) was referred to in order to understand the relationship between resource use and kinship organization and effects of change on subsistence economies. The means of production was also considered as a factor for socio-cultural adaptation. Anthropological terms are highlighted and a glossary of terms is located in Appendix A. Documents referred to in the text are located in sequential order in Appendix B.



The Sayisi Dene are called the Caribou Eaters, or Edthen-eldeli-dene, by anthropologists, Chipewyan and Northern Indians by historians. They are classified as big game hunters and as a result much of their seasonal round was in synchrony with the Beverly/Kaminuriak caribou herd. Because of the emphasis on caribou, the Sayisi Dene traditional land extended into the barren grounds. Historically, and within living memory, the people identify the area north of the 60th parallel to North and South Henik Lakes, the sacred Grey Hills and Mountain Lake (Figure 1) as their traditional land.

Their subsistence economy continued uninterrupted until the early 1700s when the Hudson's Bay Company established a trade post at Churchill. The introduction of the gun, and later European disease impacted the economic and social systems. However, the degree of dependency on European trade goods, as experienced by other Native groups, initially did not occur among the Sayisi Dene. The fabric of the socio-cultural

TRADITIONAL LANDS OF THE SAYISI - DENE



CALVING
GROUNDS



Map by: TAS May, 1994

system was held intact by resources and resource harvesters. Kinship obligations created a cohesive bond.

By 1940, the Sayisi Dene appear to have divided into two small groups. The North Knife and Duck Lake Bands, occupied the land between Churchill and Little Duck Lake. Hunting and trapping grounds, especially for the Duck Lake people extended into the Northwest Territories as far as the Henik Lakes. The reason for the two groups is not known, but may be related to the former group's role as Homeguard Chipewyan for Fort Churchill during the height of the fur trade.

Baptismal and other church records for the Sayisi Dene indicated a minimum of 70-80 people at Little Duck Lake during the 1940s and perhaps as many wintering at North Knife Lake. This does not take into account those living at Churchill year round, or at other locations.

The relocation study primarily concerns the Little Duck Lake band, although the subsequent social repercussions affected all Sayisi Dene, including those situated at North Knife Lake and Churchill. While the real reason for the relocation from Little Duck Lake to Churchill and North River in 1956 may never be known, there are three possible reasons: 1) provincial conservation policy, as administered by Games Branch,

wanted the Sayisi Dene moved out of the area in order to protect the caribou; 2) the Hudson's Bay Company was losing money at Caribou Post and was planning on closing the post; 3) Indian Affairs wanted to bring the people closer to administrative services. The move, ill-conceived and poorly administered, transported the people from a subsistence economy out on the barren grounds to Churchill in August, 1956, then to North Knife River, 40 miles north-west of Churchill in September, 1956. Rather than build new houses at North Knife River, as originally planned and promised, old cabins were quickly winterized. Those who were able to boat to North Knife River from Little Duck Lake, while having to endure the dangers of the Seal River and Hudson Bay, were fortunate in that they were able to bring their personal and subsistence equipment with them. They were at least able to support themselves for a short time. However, lack of subsistence resources at North Knife Lake forced the Sayisi Dene to look to Churchill for help.

The social impact of the eventual move to Churchill was compounded by the Sayisi Dene "squatters" dilemma at Churchill. Both groups of Sayisi Dene were made homeless. Dene Camp 10, located on the rocky ridge just outside the northern boundary of the town of Churchill was adjacent to the cemetery. This temporary settlement became symbolic of the disorganization of government assistance. The construction of Dene Village about five miles south-east of Churchill ten years later did

not erase the social ills and inequities endured by the people. Family breakdown, social assistance and inertia replaced kinship, subsistence and a demanding, active life. By 1969, Band members could not bear to watch their culture continue to disintegrate before them and so initiated a plan to return to their lands.

The popularity of the "back to the bush" movement resulted in experimental camps at North and South Knife Lakes. These proved successful and as news of the success reached the Sayisi Dene in Churchill, more and more people made the decision to return to the land. Since the carrying capacity of the land around the lakes would not support the growing numbers, a new site was located at Tadoule Lake, where the community now resides.

Eight recommendations address immediate concerns within the community. These were developed through informal interviews and meetings with band members, Chief and Council. There are many more issues that need to be addressed. However, the opinion of "one step at a time" prevails in the community. While a long term plan is needed, a number of short term plans with almost immediate visible results are needed to build the confidence and self-esteem of the community.

There are many conflicting stories about the relocation and the people involved. However, the social injustices suffered by the Sayisi Dene are real.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The People

The Sayisi Dene of Tadoule Lake are members of the Fort Churchill Dene Chipewyan Band. They represent the most easterly group of the Chipewyan and belong to the Northern Athapaskan family. The Sayisi Dene were known historically by different names, for example, Chipewyan (a Cree name possibly referring to the manner in which furs were stretched) and the Northern Indians (early Hudson's Bay Company term). They are also called Caribou-Eaters or Edthen-eldeli-dene by anthropologists.

The Band entered into Treaty with the Dominion of Canada in 1910 under Adhesions to Treaty Five, at Churchill, Northwest Territories. The final northern boundary (60th parallel), defining the Province of Manitoba was not established until the following year. The Sayisi Dene were promised the right to hunt, trap and fish throughout their traditional lands.

1.2 Sayisi Dene Historical Background

1.2.1 Traditional Lands

At the time of European contact on Hudson Bay, the Sayisi Dene, as part of the Chipewyan Northern Athapaskan speakers, occupied a vast tract of land which extended north well into the barren grounds. The Churchill River and associated lakes appear to have formed a natural boundary between the Dene and the Cree. Great Slave Lake represented the westward boundary between the Chipewyan and other Athapaskan speakers across the north and into present-day Alberta (Figure 2). Prior to European contact, Inuit groups occupied the coastal waters of Hudson Bay. Some forays occurred inland, but it was not until the mid-1820s, after the small pox epidemic and depletion of coastal caribou and maritime resources, that the Inuit moved into Sayisi Dene territory (Figure 1).

1.2.2 Archaeological Evidence

Archaeological research in the northern transitional forest/tundra zone of the Northwest Territories and northern Manitoba indicates human occupation circa 6000 B.C. These first occupants, called Paleo-Indians by archaeologists (Gordon, 1976; Wright, 1976) were big game hunters who possibly adapted their bison hunting strategies of the Plains to the caribou of the tundra-transition.

Further research suggests a long term occupation by proto-Athapaskan caribou hunters, whose members belonged to what is archaeologically referred to as the Taltheilei Shale tool tradition (MacNeish, 1951). Human occupation sites based on this tradition were identified along the Upper Thelon River in the McKenzie District of the Northwest Territories (400 B.C.-A.D. 1450) (Noble 1971:111), Grant Lake (655 B.C. - A.D. 1700) (Gordon, 1976; Wright, 1976) and in northern Manitoba (Nash, 1975; Petch, 1988). Taltheilei tools were also recovered from Southern Indian Lake (L. Syms, personal communication, 1993) on the southern edge of the Sayisi Dene traditional lands. Nash (1975) has indicated an occupation date circa A.D. 500 - 1000 for Manitoba Taltheilei sites. Many of the sites are associated with caribou crossings on the *Chah'l Dah* (lookout) side of watercrossings. It is here that the hunters waited for the caribou, and where lithic detritus, mainly quartz stone flakes, are found (Nash, 1970; Kroker, 1984; Petch 1988, 1992 a,b). Native pottery associated with Algonkian speakers such as the proto-Cree (Selkirk tradition), has not been found in the study area, suggesting exclusivity of land use and occupation by the progenitors of the Sayisi Dene.

The seasonal round of the Sayisi Dene was based on hundreds of years of environmental observations. This included caribou hunting, supplemented by the spring, summer and fall fishery, as well as plant gathering. All physical needs were met by country produce. Spring resources, such as fresh eggs and waterfowl offered

an opportunity for varied diet. The spring time also provided an occasion for re-uniting with family members.

The arrival of Europeans and the Hudson's Bay Company initially had little effect on the economic well-being of the Sayisi Dene. The initial social impact came around 1682 with the introduction of the gun to the Cree at York Factory. This placed the Cree at an advantage and the ethnic boundary established by the natural barrier of the Churchill River shifted northwest of the river.

The Hudson's Bay Company established a post at Churchill in 1717 primarily to encourage the "Northern Indians" and coastal Eskimo to trade furs. While this post did not attract the numbers of "Northern Indians" that Governor James Knight had anticipated, two groups of "Northern Indians" did trade at Churchill: the Homeguard Chipewyan (Sayisi Dene) and the Faraway Chipewyan (see McCarthy 1985:74). The role of the homeguard Chipewyan is seen as an adaptive response to the fur trade. These were Sayisi Dene who regularly hunted in the area and were knowledgeable of the local resources. These families provided the inexperienced English/Scots with fresh country produce and survival equipment in the same manner that the homeguard Cree assisted York Factory. In return they received guns, ammunition and metal goods.

The Faraway Chipewyan were those who lived towards Lake Athabaska and Great Slave Lake.

Initially, the Chipewyan acted as middlemen between the Hudson's Bay Company and the Yellowknives, Dogribs, Slavey, Beaver, Hare and other Athapaskan groups (see Esau, 1986). This role required sharp bargaining skills, charisma, multi-lingual abilities and intelligence. In effect, the Sayisi-Dene opened up the north for future trade.

However, it must be realized that as in other parts of the country, the Native people did not accept the fur trade at the same rate (Francis and Morantz, 1983). Historically, the Sayisi-Dene never relied on European trade goods as did the Cree or Ojibway (Petch, 1984), although some clustering around the trade post did occur. This has been interpreted as a sign of dependence. However, it must be emphasized that the post location was often a previously favorite gathering site of the people, and site selection often depended on the knowledge of the Native people concerning local resources, as much as strategy of location. Aside from a few homeguard Chipewyan families, the majority of people continued to follow the caribou, occasionally trading meat and furs for necessities such as guns and ammunition.

Between 1717 and 1769, few Sayisi Dene or other Athapaskans traded at Churchill. At most, the Sayisi Dene who lived within a 300 km radius of Fort Prince of Wales, Churchill would attend the fort annually in the spring to trade. The Faraway Chipewyan, those living near Great Slave Lake and Lake Athabaska, could be expected at Churchill once every two or three years (Rich 1949). Since the trek to Churchill transected, rather than followed, water routes, most travel was accomplished by foot. A visit to Churchill was a concerted effort which could interfere with the seasonal round.

By the end of the 18th century, social, economic and environmental impacts were experienced by the Sayisi Dene. The acquisition of the gun created a balance of power among aboriginal groups. Disease, French/English conflicts and the establishment of Canadian traders near Lake Athabaska caused a restructuring and regrouping of families. Greater pressure was being placed on the native people to harvest more furs. However, the Sayisi Dene maintained exclusivity of land use and occupancy within their traditional lands.

During the 19th century, Chipewyan movement in general appears to have been restricted, or at least controlled, by the North West Company and Hudson's Bay Company in some parts of the country. Some Chipewyan and Cree communities south and west of the Sayisi Dene chose to adapt to a mixed economy and semi-sedentary routine. However, the Sayisi Dene living north and west of Fort Churchill continued to follow the caribou far into the barren grounds.

As early as 1820, the Hudson's Bay Company looked to Nueltin Lake as a site for a small post because it was known to be a favorite gathering point for Chipewyans (HBCA B.42/a/145:10-11). However, this never materialized and the Chipewyan travelled to the post nearest their hunting and gathering areas, Reindeer Lake (Lac Brochet Dene) or Churchill (Fort Churchill Dene). Even so, groups made occasional forays to each other's post, and continued to intermarry. Later, in the early 1900s, in response to fur trade activities of the Revillon Freres, the Hudson's Bay Company was forced to establish small outposts in the Nueltin Lake area. However, members of the Sayisi-Dene, who would later become the Fort Churchill Dene Chipewyan Band, continued to trade mainly with Churchill, because it was nearer their traditional lands to the north.

1.2.3 Signing of Adhesions to Treaty 5, 1910

A.V. Thomas, the journalist accompanying Commissioner Semmens on the Treaty-signing circuit, recorded the Churchill Chipewyan concerns at the signing of Adhesions to Treaty 5.

When the Commissioner had finished and the time for asking questions had come, some of the leading Chipewyan expressed concern for their hunting rights. If they gave up their land to the government, would they have the right to hunt as their fathers had done before them? If they were not allowed to hunt they would starve. They had heard about a railway being

built to bring the whiteman to Churchill; how would that affect them? Would they have to live within a reserve which the government would give them? According to Thomas, Semmens's answer to these and many other questions relieved their anxiety and "He assured the Indians that not for many years to come, probably not in the lifetime of any of them, would their hunting rights be interfered with.
(quoted from Tough, 1989:76)

However, poor communications between the Chipewyan and Semmens resulted in miscommunication and misunderstanding.

1.2.4 The Relocation Process Begins

A year later in 1911, the Manitoba/Northwest Territory border was established. Churchill came under the jurisdiction of the Province of Manitoba. The Sayisi Dene were not aware of this arbitrary border, which divided their traditional lands. They continued in their seasonal round in much the same manner as they had previously.

In 1925 a plan to move the Fort Churchill Dene Chipewyan Band (Sayisi Dene) from their lands around Churchill to Reindeer Lake, about 300 km southwest of their traditional lands and Churchill was considered by the Department of Indian Affairs. The Sayisi Dene had not yet been granted a reserve. There are several reasons for wanting to move the Fort Churchill Dene Chipewyan Band: 1) The Sayisi Dene continued to use the resources in both Manitoba and NWT. The arbitrary division, while non-existent in the minds of traditional resource-users, was a political border which neatly delimited the parameters of provincial jurisdiction. Additionally, the subsistence economy was perceived as a drain on resources. Moving the people away from the resources and into an alternate economy was seen as advantageous. 2) The Catholic missionaries at Reindeer Lake had converted the Brochet Dene Band to Catholicism. Since many of their kin belonged to the Fort Churchill Dene Chipewyan

Band, this may have been seen as an easy way to assimilate them all in one area. Certainly, the Department of Indian Affairs knew of this and seemed to go along with the plan until the Anglican Bishop of the Diocese of Keewatin intervened on behalf of his flock, the Fort Churchill Dene Chipewyan Band, and the move never took place (P.A.C. RG.10 Vol. 4093 File 600,138).

The Fort Churchill Dene Chipewyan continued their subsistence and other economic activities in their lands, trading at Churchill when necessary. This independence frustrated post managers. Smith, referring to the "Caribou-Eater Chipewyan, stated that "... the Chipewyan were never dependent on the fur trade as the Cree immediately to the south...In the eighteenth century, Hearne noted almost despairingly, that the caribou provided so much of their (the Chipewyan) needs that only a few furs were needed to provide them with the new necessities of life" (Smith 1976:21). In 1930 however, Caribou Post on Caribou Lake was established by the Hudson's Bay Company, approximately 125 miles northwest of Churchill. This was built "...in an effort to keep the Chipewyans inland and away from the doubtful benefits of civilization in its pioneering stage" (HBCA RG3/73A/1 n.d.). The railway and port terminal were constructed at Churchill by 1929 and caused social impacts to the Sayisi Dene. For example, an influx of white trappers penetrated the Indian trapping grounds, bringing with them steel traps and poison. The Synod of the Diocese of Keewatin was very disturbed at the repercussions this was having on the Native people and recommended to the Provincial government "...that a decided step be taken in reserving certain areas of the country for the maintenance of the Indians only...Carried" (P.A.M. GR1600 Box 32 22.2.1). This does not appear to be implemented, but may represent the beginnings of establishing a registered trap line system. By the mid 1940s, a registered trap line system was established by the Province, once more restricting movement over traditional lands. Trappers were only allowed to trap within an area that was registered and set aside for their exclusive use.

Nearly thirty years after the signing of Treaty Five a reserve was still not established. According to M. Code (personal communication, 1994), band members had made several attempts to establish a permanent community base at several locations. M. Jones (personal communication, 1992) recalled one such settlement in the 1920s at Hubbard Point. "When the people talked about settling down after Treaty, it was suggested that they settle at Hubbard Point..." at the mouth of the Caribou River. An Anglican mission and several cabins were built and the people lived there seasonally in the summer. This was considered to be a good location because it was halfway between the winter lands for Arctic fox trapping and Churchill. However, there was little wood and no shelter from the winds, and so the settlement was gradually abandoned. These attempts appear to be self-initiated, with no support from the Department of Indian Affairs.

Department of Indian Affairs correspondence in 1939 suggested that a reserve be secured at Baralzon Lake (DIAND, OTT F.576/30-52 Vol. 1). There appears to be some confusion as to the name and location of this lake. Nejanilini Lake is called Bah yon zoe in Sayisi Dene (E. Bussidor, personal communication, 1992; M.Code, 1993). A Hudson's Bay Company map (Figure 3) gives some idea as to the confusion and misinterpretation of place names. Firstly, on the map, the names Fishing Duck Lake (Little Duck Lake) and "Baralzon" Lake (Nejanilini Lake) are interchanged. The island, Wasnayou, on the map is Battle Island on Nejanilini (Bah yon zoe) Lake. Baralzon Lake, as per topographic maps (64O,P & 65B), is an actual lake which straddles the Manitoba/Northwest Territory border. The "real" Bah yon zoe Lake is Nejanilini Lake. This is the area that Department of Indian Affairs probably, on the recommendation of Band members, suggested as reserve in 1939. One can only surmise that there was some confusion as to place names. The topographic map with the Euro-Canadian Baralzon Lake place name was assumed to be the lake that the Sayisi Dene requested as reserve. It has been suggested that the move would have been too costly




Figure 3: Map showing the confusion and reversal of names on the Hudson's Bay Company map. Bah yon zoe is Nejanilini Lake. Baralzon Lake is north of Nejanilini Lake. (Courtesy of Hudson's Bay Co. Archives)

(DIAND File 576/30-54, Vol. 1). However, the Department of Indian Affairs may have predicted political ramifications of a reserve straddling a political boundary, the plan was dropped. The problem is that Department of Indian Affairs may have had the wrong lake!

M. Code (1994) stated that Little Duck Lake was chosen by the Band for a settlement location because of the abundance of resources nearby. Even S. Keighley, post manager at Caribou stated that "The Duck Lake area was a much better place than Caribou for the Chipewyan to live and trap... The lake was right on one of the main caribou migration routes, and the natives had terrific fall hunts there" (Keighley 1989:159,165). The Caribou Post was moved to Little Duck Lake in 1941. This site was a favorite meeting place for the Sayisi Dene and, as such, served the purpose of the Hudson's Bay Company. The U.S.A.A.F. had a weather station base at Little Duck Lake. This was taken over by the Canadian Department of Transport. By 1946 the Department of Transport had closed this station and the buildings were purchased by the Hudson's Bay Company with War Assets in 1947 (HBCA RG3/73A/2).

Not all the Sayisi Dene lived at Little Duck Lake. A small group also lived near the estuary of the North Knife River (Diocese of Keewatin Archives). This group of Sayisi-Dene had lived at Caribou Lake in 1930, but gradually returned to the area around Churchill, possibly in an effort to make a transition into white society. Bishop Hives' journal suggests a small population at North Knife, "...ten Chipewyan Indians were confirmed...in a trader's tent" (Diocese of Keewatin Archives, 1941 p.95). These people were probably the last of the homeguard Chipewyan who previously served the Hudson's Bay Company at Churchill. Ties to the Churchill post were still strong. The remains of this settlement (Figure 4), including a small cemetery still exist. This site was visited by Giddings in 1957 and by Nash in 1967 as part of archaeological investigations for Pre-Dorset culture remains. Mr. T. Jawbone, a Sayisi Dene,



Figure 4: One of the remaining log cabins at the North Knife Settlement.
(Courtesy of Nash, 1969)

accompanied both men in the field and located the site. The site was called the Thyazzi Site (Nash 1969).

It appears that during this period no effort was made by the Department of Indian Affairs to bridge the cultural gap. Again the language barrier, incomplete and inaccurate translation and Euro-centricity contributed to a lack of understanding of the real needs of the Sayisi Dene.

The Sayisi-Dene continued to live in these two main settlements until 1956 when the Duck Lake community was relocated to Churchill. The gradual transition to Western society was aborted and the Sayisi Dene were thrown into a situation for which they were not prepared.

1.3 Euro-Canadian History of Churchill

1.3.1 The First Europeans

Early in the 17th century, indirect contact between the Sayisi-Dene and Europeans occurred at the Churchill River estuary region.

In 1619, the Danish explorer, Jens Munk and his crew of 64 men were forced to winter on the western shore of the Churchill River (Kenyon 1981). During that winter Munk was not visited by any Native Indians or Inuit, although tent rings and signs of human habitation were noted. The following spring, Munk and two of his crew, the only survivors, managed to sail back to Denmark.

In 1689, the Hudson's Bay Company attempted to establish a post at Churchill. Henry Kelsey and a Chipewyan boy were also sent up the coast to look for the "Northern Indians" (Chipewyan or Sayisi Dene) and coax them to trade. However,

Kelsey never found the Indians and on his return to Churchill River, discovered the post had been "accidentally" burned down by the men.

The Hudson's Bay Company did not attempt to rebuild at Churchill until 1717. The previous year, servant William Stewart, along with the Chipewyan Slave woman, Thanadelthur, made contact with the Chipewyan far inland, and a tentative truce was drawn between the Cree and Chipewyan, which would allow the latter to trade at Churchill.

James Knight built the first wooden Prince of Wales Fort at the same location that Munk had occupied a century before (Kenney, 1932). Because of animosities between the English and French, a stone Prince of Wales' Fort was built on the west point of the river estuary.

It was from this fort, in 1769-72 that Hearne made his famous trip to the Coppermine River with the Chipewyans (Hearne, 1911). This fort remained operational until 1782, when it was destroyed by the French, under la Perouse. The following year Samuel Hearne re-established a post at the site of the first wooden Prince of Wales' Fort. Renamed Fort Churchill, it operated as a viable post until 1933, when the Hudson's Bay Company moved the store and facilities to the east shore of the river to accommodate the rail and port.

1.3.2 The Second Wave of Europeans

The railway and port were seen as politically valuable, especially with grain specialization on the prairies during the 1930s. Today, while still operational, both are viewed as expensive and unnecessary industries by government.

During the Second World War, the U.S. air force built a massive military operation. A tent city was quickly replaced with a modern townsite with all the amenities of a southern town. The location of the tent camps later was used by Indian Affairs and Department of Northern Affairs as Dene Camp 10 and Eskimo Camp 20.

After the war, the Department of Transport took over the military base, which was then used as a base for Arctic military exercises and equipment trials. Because of the Cold War between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., a defence lab was built in 1947. Additional construction eventually led to the birth of the Churchill Rocket Range. Fort Churchill was abandoned by the U.S.A. in 1964, and turned over to the Canadian Department of Transport and Department of Public Works. This community was later decommissioned (MacIver, 1992). The Rocket Range was also contracted to be decommissioned as per provincial environmental contract. However, in the past seven years, the historical value of the rocket launchers and facilities has been assessed, and federal and provincial consideration for designation as a heritage site is imminent.

Additionally, the Rocket Range site has been leased by Akjuit as a Space Port for the purposes of conducting atmospheric and communications research and providing "state of the art" communications technology. This will inject some much needed life into the community economy and justify the continuation and perhaps upgrading of rail facilities.

No road to Churchill exists and some community members pride themselves in this fact.

This brief historical account is necessary in order to understand the physical environmental and cultural setting in which the Sayisi Dene lived prior to relocation and into which they were relocated. Because the Sayisi Dene had enjoyed extended

independence and selective encounters with Euro-Canadians, many cultural barriers existed. The main one was language. Very few people understood English and even fewer spoke the language. At least two reasons can be given for this. 1) The people were socially isolated from Euro-canadians because of the nature of their subsistence economy. Vogt (1972) has argued that isolation encourages and promotes the retention of traditional cultural attributes. As noted by Heber (1989) this does not explain the persistence of native culture among those living near or within white communities. However, while material culture and technologies change relatively easily, family and kinship ties persist. Core values, language and world view are even more resistant to change. 2) The Sayisi Dene, for the most part, had not been subjected to the residential school system. Only two children were sent to residential school prior to 1956 (J. Clipping, personal communication, 1992). Additionally, there was no need to speak English because traders and trippers (those who visited Indians on the trapline and traded with them on site) spoke Chipewyan or Cree (many Sayisi-Dene were fluent in Cree and also Inuktitut).

2.0 EVENTS LEADING TO RELOCATION

2.1 Post-war economy

The post-war years were not kind to the Sayisi Dene. Falling fur prices and an influx of white trappers encouraged some Sayisi Dene to seek employment in Churchill at the Army base, Port and CN Rail.

The supplies at Caribou post were limited and rising prices made some goods out of reach for many Sayisi Dene. Betsy Anderson recalled living on fish and wildlife for two years "...without whiteman's goods..." (B. Anderson, personal communication, 1992).

Rising costs also affected the Hudson's Bay Company, and isolated posts such as Caribou became more difficult to justify. The policy of closing posts and re-opening them elsewhere was one that had been practiced since the first inland post at Cumberland House in 1774. The Hudson's Bay Company had always tried to maintain a monopoly on the fur trade. However, the post-war influx of entrepreneurial whites into northern Manitoba again threatened this monopoly.

2.2 Post-war conservation policy

Post-war wildlife policy focussed on conservation and commodity production rather than subsistence (Clancy 1991:192). This approach formed the base for the development of wildlife management plans. Additionally, provincial regulations were enacted to provide some sort of management of fur-bearing resources. Sayisi Dene resource management meant harvesting an area one year and leaving it fallow the next (F. McIntyre, personal communication, 1994). Of course this meant utilizing a larger area which disturbed provincial authorities who were responsible for establishing and maintaining trapping zones and lines. Irimoto (1981) identified spatial needs for *extensive* caribou hunting and trapping (late November/December) as 1200 km² for

each seasonal camp or a total of 26,857km² for the entire Hatchet Lake Dene Band (Irimoto 1981:87,127). The introduction of the registered trapline in 1946 severely restricted movement of trappers, and can be viewed as counterproductive to the aims of conservation and management. Restriction of mobility meant that the resources had little time to renew themselves. As a result many areas were quickly depleted and it became increasingly difficult to make a living off the land. What the statistics showed was an inflated return due to over-trapping in "fur conservation areas". Experimental fox and mink farms may also have contributed to inflated statistics. Additionally, the cyclical nature of wildlife resources does not seem to have been considered. Many fur-bearing animals are known to peak and diminish due to cyclical disease. An area that may look fur poor on paper may actually be representative of cyclical disease. Forest fires were also of concern because of the devastating effects on resource supply. Northern Manitoba, by its very location and terrain, had a limited richness of furbearing animals, namely marten and fox (Tough 1989).

By 1949, the Game Branch, Manitoba Department of Mines and Natural Resources had turned its attention to the barren grounds caribou and the Branch began to formulate a plan to preserve the animals. One method was to enforce seasonal restrictions on hunting (P.A.M. GR1600 Box 30 15.7.1). Another was to use poison bait on wolves who were seen as the main predators. This program had devastating effects on a number of predatory animals, including scavengers. According to Dr. W. Pruitt, University of Manitoba, the program got out of control as conservation officers handed out strychnine pellets to barren grounds trappers with little information provided as to their use and effects. The pellets which were to be placed on lakes only were used in the uplands (W. Pruitt, personal communication, 1994). N.A. Paterson, in his General Game Patrol Report, February 21, 1953 stated "...travelled thro the bush most of the day...set one wolf bait..." and, "I instructed Samuel [a trapper] how to look after this bait, and he's to bring in the scalps of any wolves that get killed here.", and finally

"Used up the last of my poison on the last bait I set..." (P.A.M. GR1600 Box 30,15.7.1). This indiscriminate use of strychnine was confirmed by David Duck. He stated that during the 1950s he couldn't feed the dogs the meat of trapped animals as they had done in the past because they were sometimes using poison (D. Duck, personal communication, 1992). Dr. Pruitt further stated, "...we almost lost the barren ground grizzly..." through this government program.

The decline in the early 1950s of the barren grounds caribou is seen by Dr. Pruitt as a result of two factors: 1. loss of winter range because of forest fires in the transitional forest; 2. provincial conservation officers perceived the methods of harvesting of caribou by the Sayisi Dene as unnecessary caribou slaughter.

The loss of winter range drastically affected the habitat and numbers of caribou. Lack of food caused a random dispersal of the animals. Their weakened condition, caused by lack of food and environmental stress made them easy targets for predators.

The problem of extensive harvesting can be explained in cultural terms. It was customary for large numbers of animals to be killed at the onset of the cold season. Winter snows would cover the carcasses, acting as a natural freezer. The animals would then be used throughout the winter for dog feed and emergency food. It was a type of reassurance that there would be something to eat in a pinch (Charlie Ellis, personal communication 1992; see also Ross, 1968:50, Irimoto, 1981:104). However, this was viewed as wanton and unnecessary destruction by the uninformed public. The Sayisi Dene were characterized as butchers.

During a telephone interview in 1994 Dr. Pruitt pointed out the people at Duck Lake were situated at perhaps the most reliable caribou crossing. Here they could be assured a supply of animals. The Sayisi Dene continued to hunt in a manner

consistent with abundant resource availability. They were not made aware of the fact that the overall population of caribou may have diminished substantially, and that what they considered to be part of a larger resource, was possibly the remnant of the resource. No attempt was made by government to persuade the Sayisi Dene, in culturally appropriate terms, of the potential loss of their most valued resource - edthen - the caribou. The provincial and federal governments did not conduct any ethnographic (or even vaguely cultural) studies to understand the reasoning behind Sayisi Dene resource harvesting of caribou and land management techniques. Economic and social studies such as the one conducted by Jean Lagasse (1959), lumped all Indians together. This study was commissioned by the Manitoba government (Order-In-Council 1953/56) and focussed on the living conditions of Indians and Metis. This was followed by another study, entitled "The Role of Indian People in Industrial Development in Northern Manitoba 1960-1975" (Jamieson & Hawthorn 1962). This examined the status of Indian people in northern Manitoba. Twelve findings were listed and five main recommendations presented (Jamieson & Hawthorn 1962).

Post-war Canada had to contend with a more complex society and increased growing pains (Weaver 1983). There was a general lack of awareness of the First Nations peoples, who, at this time, were not considered politically active or cohesive. Their silence made them invisible to most Canadians. Additionally, provincial conservations officers were not trained to deal with issues outside wild life management, and even that was most concerned with animal inventories.

In 1961, the joint parliamentary committee recommended an acceleration of Indian integration into Canadian society, but federal and provincial policy created stumbling blocks. It was not until 1966 when the Hawthorn Report was completed that any serious consideration was given to changes in Indian policy regarding the First Nations peoples took place. As Weaver (1992) explains, the Hawthorn Report was the result

of frustration of senior Indian Affairs Branch officials and public demand. This however provided little benefit to the Sayisi Dene who were relocated ten years before and were near the climax of social despair.

Hawthorn (1966) identified the most impoverished Indian bands as those who had lost their mobility, that is, those who had followed a seasonal round of activities. Hawthorn saw this as contributing to the establishment of band communities. The Sayisi Dene enjoyed an independence that was unique. Caribou migration, for the most part, dictated the location of the seasonal round. The relocation of the Sayisi Dene to Churchill moved them from an independent subsistence economy to one of total dependence on government.

As far as Band members are concerned, the approach used was to take the advice of one conservation officer (A.Code, personal communication, 1992), and formulate an opinion of the Sayisi Dene.

3.0 THE RELOCATION

This section focuses on the relocation of the Sayisi Dene living at Little Duck Lake, Manitoba, in 1956. In August, 1956 the Band located here was moved, mainly by plane, to Churchill, Manitoba. After a brief stay in Churchill, the Band was then moved to North Knife River, where another group of the same Band subsisted.

3.1 Plans for relocation

3.1.1 The Bureaucratic Process

Between 1953 and 1956, a series of intergovernmental communications took place that would change the lives of the Sayisi Dene.

A Hudson's Bay Company inter-office memo dated 1953 stated that according to Mr. Gowans, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Ilford, Manitoba "...an appropriation has been authorized by Ottawa to move the Duck Lake Band to the North Knife River..." (HBCA RG 3/73A/4). It is not known what prompted this move. The memo implies that Indian Affairs planned, as early as 1953, to move the Sayisi-Dene out of their traditional lands. However, no reason for the move was given in the correspondence.

It appears that by 1954, some of the Sayisi Dene who had been living around Caribou Lake returned to the North Knife River. M. Code suggested that this is because the North Knife River area was part of that particular groups hunting area. Bishop Hives visited this group by helicopter in 1954. The understanding given to the Bishop was that the people would winter at North Knife and seek summer employment in Churchill (Diocese of Keewatin Archives pp 300-301).

On June 28, 1956, a letter addressed to Colonel Jones, Director, Department of Citizenship and Immigration confirmed the closing of Caribou Post. Mr. Chesshire of the Hudson's Bay Company stated that the reason for closing was due to a decrease

in fur production and the fact that a group of Sayisi Dene had moved to Churchill (North Knife River in actual fact). His interpretation of the situation was that those who had moved to Churchill were more ambitious while those that remained at Caribou "...were mostly a poor lot, some of whom spend the summer at Churchill, returning to Caribou for the winter trapping" (Correspondence filed with Skoog report n.d.). What is more disturbing is the fact that the Sayisi Dene chose to settle at Little Duck Lake with the intention of establishing a reserve. Why the Department of Indian Affairs agreed to undertake a costly move rather than create a reserve at an area already known to the Sayisi Dene, where a variety of resources were available, is difficult to understand. Chesshire, in correspondence with Colonel Jones, alludes to the reasoning behind such an unreasonable move

Our representative has discussed the problem with your Mr. Nield and the latter has been emphatic in stating that your Department would like to move the Indians from Caribou nearer Churchill in an effort to improve their lot. The plan, I believe, would be to build them houses, etc, which is impracticable as long as they remain at Caribou where their situation is poor (DIAND 138/29-2. June 28, 1956)

A number of issues arise from this statement. Mr. Nield was emphatic in completing the move, but there is no record as to who provided background information which would suggest such a drastic measure. The move was seen as the only way to improve the Sayisi-Dene's lot. The Hudson's Bay Company was intent on pulling out of Caribou post for financial reasons, but a free trader was not considered to take over the post. Additionally, when the Hudson's Bay Company had received notice from Mr. Gowans in 1953 of the Department of Indian Affairs intent to remove the Band from Little Duck Lake to North Knife River, they entertained the idea of an outpost at the settlement site. Surely the cost of relocation for the Hudson's Bay Company would

have been similar to the costs incurred at Little Duck Lake. Also, no reason was given as to why it was so impracticable about building houses at Duck Lake, rather than North Knife River. The carrying capacity of the land around North Knife River was never sufficient to support a large number of people year round - the main reason for a seasonal round.

What Chesshire's definition of "improving their lot" was, can only be understood in ethnocentric terms. There was no concern for cultural sensitivity. Based on the knowledge and attitudes of the times, these officials were probably convinced that changes would improve the conditions of the Sayisi Dene.

The task of dealing with the Sayisi Dene was turned over to R.D. Ragan, Acting Superintendent of Indian Affairs, who, in a memo to P. Ficek, Clerk-in-Charge, Nelson River Indian Agency, Ilford, stated that the Hudson's Bay Company was pulling out of Caribou Post. This decision had been arrived at after discussion in Ottawa between Hudson's Bay Company and Department of Indian Affairs officials, but as Ragan pointed out "...there is nothing on our files regarding this" (DIAND 138/29-2, July 12, 1956). Ragan proceeded to state that the move

...creates a terrific problem for this office and we have no alternative but to attempt to move these Indians out of the area...it is going to mean that we will have to move very swiftly on returning [from Little Duck Lake] to be sure that construction [of houses] is completed before winter (Ibid).

Ragan stated that he would meet with the Indians and "...attempt to persuade them to move to a location where they can be looked after" (DIAND 138/29-2, July 12/56). Money had been "earmarked" for housing assistance (\$21,000 in 522-13-491, Nelson

House Agency).

On July 23 and 24, 1956, acting supervisor of Indian Affairs, Ragan, met with the "Duck Lake Band" to pay Treaty and to discuss "their plight" and "intended move". Ragan stated that the Band agreed to move to North River (Lower North Knife River) to join those who were already wintering there. "After a very full discussion it was unanimously and amicably agreed by the Duck Lake Band still at this post that they would move to the mouth of the North River" (DIAND 138/29-2, July 27, 1956). The Sayisi Dene elders, such as Betsy Anderson, who remember this meeting state that they did not believe that it was going to happen (Personal communication Betsy Anderson 1992). Ragan also stated that "A part of their Band live at this point in hovels during the winter and it is the only logical place for those remaining at Caribou to move to". No explanation was given for this statement. If the people already at North River were living in hovels, why would Indian Affairs want to increase the density of population living in these conditions? Being closer to Churchill certainly didn't make sense as the people used to travel back and forth from Caribou to Churchill all winter (HBCA B.399/a/1-4). In summer they usually fished, hunted geese and gathered eggs, berries, etc. around Churchill. If it was going to be easier to administer the delivery of services to North River, this was never discussed and in fact, the people were left to fend for themselves at North River. The move was voluntary only because the people were promised services by Indian Affairs such as good housing, schools and medical services. The families were promised materials necessary to complete construction of log cabins. The Sayisi Dene were to be "...look[ed] after and transport[ed]...by canoe up the coast to the North River from Churchill..." (DIAND 138/29-2).

Another reason is alluded to in Ragan's letter

...it is imperative that we evacuate these
Indians not later than the end of August.

The large caribou trek reaches this area early in September and we feel we must have them evacuated before that time or they will wish to remain for the kill which might upset our plans (DIAND 138/29-2).

The Sayisi Dene, now residing at Tadoule Lake emphatically state that the Provincial Conservation Officer was vocal in sensationalizing their caribou kills rather than instructing them on caribou management. Personal communication between the Conservation Officer and Indian Affairs officers in the Pas and Ilford may have been responsible for the move (A. Code, personal communication, 1992), however, this cannot be verified.

On August 10, 1956, R. Ragan received authority to temporarily "move the Indians and their belongings by air to Churchill" and H. Flett, Post Manager at Caribou was sent a telegram confirming August 17th as the date for the settlement move (DIAND 138/29-2). By August 21, the move was complete (HBCA RG 3/73A/4). A camp had been set up at Churchill until the Sayisi Dene could boat to North Knife and they were supplied with minimal rations. Within one week, the people began their move to the Sayisi Dene settlement at North Knife River where some of the Band members lived. Building supplies were to be canoed to the settlement in order to construct new winter cabins. Since the trappers had no opportunity to collect their equipment from their traplines, traps were supplied for the mink season. Tobaggans which had also been left along the traplines were not recovered or replaced.

Again, the lack of understanding the carrying capacity of the land was grossly underestimated by the Department of Indian Affairs. Why the mink had been earmarked for trapping is not known. The area is only medium rich in mink (Tough 1987:10). It may stem from correspondence from Hudson's Bay Company Head Office, Winnipeg to Colonel Jones, Department of Indian Affairs, which stated that in the

Shethanei Lake area (southwest of North Knife Settlement) "...there was a general increase in the cycle...of mink" (DIAND 138/29-2, June 28, 1956). If the 12 men who were added to the North Knife trappers participated in mink trapping in and around their settlement, the resource would quickly be depleted. The Duck Lake component of the Band was more adept at fox and marten trapping further to the northwest. Furthermore, the trapline zone for the Sayisi Dene was situated, in part, on the west side of the Seal River.

Because of the condition of the canoes left behind at Little Duck Lake, five new canoes were requested by R. Ragan. Permission to buy five new canoes locally (at Churchill) was given (see DIAND 138/29-2 August 7, 1956, August 10, 1956). However, Sayisi Dene Elders state that these canoes were never given to the people. They do not know what happened to them, but again they suspect that they were confiscated along with the house building material (Band meeting, June 24, 1994).

The houses at North Knife River never materialized. Instead, cabins at North Knife River belonging to a Mr. Art Anderson, were repaired using some government building supplies. The rest of the building supplies (45 tons) lay "idle at Churchill". However, as Ragan suggested, the material could be used at North Knife the following year. As far as Ragan was aware "...all the Indians are more or less comfortably housed at the moment.", but he wondered "...whether or not they were able to make a Caribou kill" along the North Knife River during the winter of 1956 (Ibid). They were not! M. Cutlip sums up that first winter. "There was no game there (North Knife River), we were only given macaroni. When winter came we needed caribou for clothing, there was none" (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Tadoule Lake, Interview #2, 1993).

What happened to the building material over the course of the winter is not known. The understanding was that Mr. Robert Hicks was to deliver it to North Knife River, fall

of 1956. When this did not take place, the Sayisi Dene were then charged with, but not informed of, moving the building supplies from Churchill during the summer of 1957. None of the Elders in the community of Tadoule Lake recall ever being approached to move the building supplies from Churchill to North Knife River. It was not discussed how the supplies were to be transported and the building supplies never made it to North Knife River. Correspondence between Tully and Ragan suggested that perhaps "...the material could be picked up by dog team and transported to the new settlement..." (DIAND 138/29-2, March 17, 1957). During the summer the majority of men were not available for transporting the material because they were working in Churchill. The supplies may have stayed in Churchill. No correspondence regarding this could be located. On discussing this matter with the community of Tadoule Lake, Elders also wonder what happened to this building material because it was never given to them. One Elder stated that they were suspicious of this because the whaling buildings and what is now the Beluga Motel in Churchill were built around the same time and no one knew where the building materials came from. The buildings were later "purchased" by John Hicks. The Elders believe that Sayisi Dene supplies were used by Messrs Hicks to further their own cause. They also believe that a percentage of welfare funds earmarked for the Sayisi Dene were used in this project (Band Meeting, June 24, 1994). No documents were found to verify these issues.

Intentions of the Department of Indian Affairs to build houses at Churchill, is confusing, since the settlement was to be located at North Knife River. The first was the cost of building houses under the National Housing Act. Each Sayisi Dene family had to raise \$1000 cash for a down payment and a loan on the remaining \$9000 (DIAND 138/29-2, October 19, 1956), an unrealistic demand considering the Hudson's Bay Company had held the people hostage to an archaic bartering system for over 200 years! Mr. Ragan however did comment on the preferred treatment the "Eskimo" received regarding the acquisition of houses and wondered if a similar arrangement

could be made for the Sayisi Dene (Ibid).

3.1.2 The Housing Problem

Attention was turned to the "Indian Squatters" and the conditions under which they lived (DIAND 138/29-2, May 24, 1957). Early in the year planning for the building project commenced. Manitoba Lands Branch was contacted for purchase of lots in the townsite, the National Harbour's Board was approached regarding water and electricity supply to the Sayisi Dene townsite and a "Welfare teacher" was to be hired.

In the meantime, the National Harbour's Board had decided to build a Petrol Oil and Lubricant Marine Storage Terminal at the exact location of the "squatters" shacks. When the Sayisi Dene were offered \$50 to remove their homes, they refused, and instead requested their homes be moved intact. While this may be seen as an unrealistic demand, it must be remembered that this area had been the site of seasonal encampments since the 1930s (DIAND 138/29-2-2, June 24, 1957). While little cash value may have been attached to the shacks by white construction workers, nevertheless they were valued by the people as home and security.

The National Harbour's Board, after agreeing to move the houses to another parcel of land, rescinded the offer because "...the Indians are only squatters on the property, and have no legal right there..." (Ibid). The parcel of land was required for expansion.

As Tully, Superintendent, Nelson River Indian Agency, expressed "...now is the time for us to acquire land in Churchill where the Indians from North River can pitch their tents in the summer while seeking summer employment and also where the majority of the Indians who live at Churchill 12 months of the year can take up residence and not be called squatters" (Ibid). The concern for the Sayisi Dene was real. Tully stated "I cannot visualize a Crown Corporation being so heartless as to turn men, women and

children out "into the street" with no thought whatsoever being given to future shelter - this is apparently their attitude...(Ibid).

R. Ragan, Regional Supervisor, Winnipeg, attempted to have lots purchased *en bloc* in Churchill in order to build houses for the Sayisi Dene. However, as J. H. Gordon, Superintendent of Welfare pointed out, the Department preferred a "checkerboard" pattern to assist in integration into the community (DIAND 138/29-2 (W), July 11, 1957). It was proposed that the "Indians...purchase lots themselves..." and then through a "Revolving Fund Loan", purchase a house, assigning the land and the house to the Crown. If the terms of the loan were not upheld, the Crown would repossess the land and house and make it available to another "Indian". This created an impossible situation for the Sayisi Dene.

The problem of housing escalated and Department of Indian Affairs officials were confronted with one obstacle after another. The main problem was acquiring land from the Province. Provincial authorities made progress extremely difficult - "...in brief the Indians through no fault of their own, appear to be getting the runaround..."(DIAND 138/29-2 (R.7), July 31, 1957). One point of contention was the treatment, perceived or real, that the "Eskimo" received regarding housing arrangements. The reason the "Eskimo" had arrived at their location was that the Department of National Defence leased land from the National Harbour's Board, and then used the land for an "Eskimo" settlement. The site was formerly the National Defence Construction Camp No. 20. Interestingly, while the National Harbour's Board feared that the "Eskimo" might contaminate the water supply reservoirs, no concern about possible contamination by Petrol Storage tanks was expressed.

The issue of assisting the Sayisi Dene to make the transition into the 20th century was a vital one, and M. Kartushyn was hired to assist the Sayisi Dene. The difficulty

of his task was magnified by the fact that there were two distinct groups of Sayisi-Dene with which to work, each at a different level of transition. Tully, in 1957, described the demography of the Sayisi Dene at Churchill. The first group may be the original North Knife Group, and was composed of "...aproximately 100 souls..." who "...started coming to Churchill each summer over 25 years ago to obtain seasonal employment. Gradually the seasonal employment changed to full time employment..."The second group consists of approximately 90 people and are living in tents one mile north west of the first group, along the shore of the Churchill River. This group consists of the Duck Lake Indians which were moved by our department last September from Duck Lake to North River. They will be returning to North River in September, when the construction boom dies and will no doubt return to Churchill next year when employment picks up again." (DIAND 138/29-2-2, August 13, 1957).

Two problems were therefore present. Firstly, the squatters land situation had to be recitifed. Secondly, the seasonal campers needed an area close to the town so that workers would not have to contend with poor weather conditions and tides, a very realistic issue if a campsite was to be established on the west side of the river. Mr. Tully continued "If it develops that some of the second group are of the type that hold steady jobs, then we will provide them with permanent housing along with the first group." (Ibid).

R. Gyles, Provincial Director of Lands made it clear that the province was unwilling to provide Crown land to the Department of Indian Affairs because of potential townsite expansion. What was suggested was some sort of moveable townsite (DIAND 138/29-2-2, Sept. 17, 1957). By Sept. 19, 1957, M. Kartushyn was expressing extreme concern as to the housing project for the Sayisi Dene. The "squatters" huts had been "pushed down to make room for the tank farm" and the people were still in tents. The people had been promised houses and yet the bureaucrats had not settled anything. Winter

was quickly settling in and Kartushyn was very concerned about the welfare of the young children. By Sept. 25, 1957, the Province made available 300' X 600' of land immediately west of the cemetery! And so, Dene Camp 10 was born.

3.2 Dene Camp 10

3.2.1 Social Destruction Begins

Dene Camp 10, at Churchill, consisted of a series of hastily constructed, poorly insulated shacks on the north-east edge of town (DIAND 578/29-303 Vol.7). They were symbolic of the bandaid approach taken by the Department of Indian Affairs. The site was located on a rocky, windswept, treeless area about .5km from the townsite, which was almost inaccessible except by foot. There was no fresh water source and water was trucked in on an irregular basis (DIAND 578/29-2-303 Vol 7, Jan. 12, 1962). The horror of being located adjacent to a cemetery was psychologically damaging to the people. Sayisi Dene ideology included a fear and respect of the dead. When a person died on the land, they were buried almost immediately with their possessions and the area was not occupied again and no hunting took place. To live beside the dead was to tempt the spirits. It was a psychological stress that persisted until the Sayisi-Dene moved from Camp 10. The ramifications that this experience had on community members are still recounted with terror by the Elders. The North Knife River people refused to move to Camp 10, and those who were fortunate enough to have their equipment and dogteams camped on the west side of the Churchill River at two ancient Sayisi Dene campsites (Downes, 1943). Those who had travelled by plane to Churchill and had to abandon all their personal assets had no choice but to endure Camp 10. The makeshift settlement quickly became overpopulated as people from North Knife River moved into Churchill because of a lack of resources in that area. Improper sanitation posed a serious problem to the people's health. Fire protection was non-existent. Weak measures to provide some protection were totally inadequate. By 1961, the federal government had passed legislation allowing "Indians" the right to

alcohol. All the socially destructive measures were in place and quickly accidental deaths and tragedies began to claim the lives of the Sayisi-Dene.

Walter Hlady was hired in 1958 to conduct an experimental program which would "apply community development principles to the Churchill Band of Chipewyan Indians" (Hlady, 1960:4). Several plans for employment opportunities were added to those already in place, for example, the soldier apprentice plan. Anticipated expansion of the U.S. Strategic Air Command was also considered as an employer and as a means of acculturating the Chipewyan (Sayisi Dene) into white society through integrated housing.

Hlady suggested the difficulty with the Churchill Band "blending" into the local population was that leadership in subsistence-based economies was ad hoc. No one person possessed the authority to make decisions on behalf of the group. Leadership for specific issues depended on the issue and a person who possessed the qualities necessary to deal with them effectively. The solution, as he saw it, was to encourage the development of leadership qualities amongst Band Council members. This sense of leadership acted against the group as intra-band family rivalries grew. In band societies, fission is the usual means of dealing with this social problem. However, this was not possible and Band members were forced to co-exist under strained conditions. The number of separate settlements at the time reflected the degree of loose social organization: Dene Camp 10 at Churchill composed mainly of the Little Duck Lake people moved by plane and squatters, two small settlements on the west shore of the Churchill River which consisted of families from Little Duck Lake and North Knife River who were able to bring their personal canoes and equipment with them and two at North Knife (one of which was abandoned and may represent the 1940s settlement). Since Indian Affairs handled the administration, and no courses in leadership training were offered to any Native people, there was little incentive for the "elected" Chief and

Council to learn these skills.

Even simple maintenance tasks were done by the Assistant 2 (M. Kartushyn), as it was considered easier than teaching the people. As Hlady pointed out, the kinship obligations of cooperative support could and should have been transferred from the hunting scene to community development, but how this was to transpire was not intimated.

By the end of the six month pilot project, leadership skills were developing due to the close relationship between the community development officer and the Sayisi Dene involved in the program. However, the momentum was lost with the termination of the project. Although Hlady presented 19 recommendations for community development of the Churchill Band, very few were implemented. The program, while a commendable attempt to induce economic activity, can be viewed as a bandaid solution to a serious problem. A full anthropological study was not conducted at this time, and so it was not possible for temporary community officers to get to the "roots" of Sayisi Dene culture.

At the same time that Dene Camp 10 was developing into a third world situation, the Hudson's Bay Company and Provincial Game Branch were completing a transaction. The Caribou Post buildings at Little Duck Lake were sold to the Game Branch for \$1.00 on August 31, 1960, four years after the Sayisi Dene were evacuated (HBCA RG3/55/139). The Sayisi Dene were not consulted or given the option to buy the buildings at Little Duck Lake. Certainly they would have been able to come up with the \$1.00. No reason for not consulting the Sayisi Dene was found in correspondence reviewed, and not until recently was this transaction known. The offer was simply not made available to the Sayisi Dene.

Provincial Game Branch officials continued to enforce their authority on wildlife

management by asking M. Kartushyn to issue smaller amounts of ammunition to the hunters, so that they, the Sayisi Dene, would be limited in their caribou kill (DIAND 138/29-4, November 8, 1957). No restrictions were placed on other hunters such as Inuit, Cree or non-Indians. The infamous photographs of the caribou kill in the mid-1950's continued to be used as evidence against the Sayisi Dene. This, plus correspondence to the Honorable Alvin Hamilton, Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (DIAND 138/29-2, September 25, 1958), reinforced the federal and provincial government's determination to keep the Sayisi Dene away from Little Duck Lake and their traditional hunting and trapping grounds. Game Branch further discouraged the Sayisi-Dene from contributing income in-kind and country produce to their households by imposing penalties for waterfowl sale and trade (DIAND 138/20-4, July 24, 1961) and caribou utilization (Op.cit. Sept 11, 1962). Furthermore, the sale of hides was equally scrutinized, the majority were to be used for handicrafts. No mention of use for clothing was made. This for a people who six short years before had used caribou skins extensively for clothing. Careful monitoring of caribou utilization was carried out by provincial Natural Resources in order to ensure that caribou meat was not being fed to the dogs. Additionally, many dogs were shot, often indiscriminately by the R.C.M.P. because they were considered a collective nuisance. This robbed the Sayisi Dene of one of their most important assets and means of procuring country food. Dogs were also an asset for another reason. Camp 10 was located along a main polar bear migration path. The bears were greatly, and rightly so, feared and revered by the people, and the dogs provided an early warning system for approaching bears. Naturally, the people needed guns to protect themselves and their children from the bears, or at least be able to frighten the bears away. The people were in constant danger during the "bear season" (July to November), because of the flimsy houses, undisposed garbage, out-door latrines and lack of support from community resources, such as the R.C.M.P. When the issue of guns was brought to the Game Branch and R.C.M.P., they pointed out that Camp 10 was within the townsite

and guns were prohibited. It was also pointed out that polar bears were on the protected list! No concern for the welfare of the people was expressed, although J. Bell, the author of the correspondence commented

All the above is a little confusing to us especially when we are well aware that Eskimos can slaughter these animals at will a little farther up the coast of Hudson Bay (DIAND 578/20-4, Nov. 15, 1966)

By 1961, it was becoming obvious to the Anglican Church and townspeople that many of the children were being badly neglected and malnourished. The Sayisi-Dene had successfully survived for hundreds of years off the resources of the land. Many of the foods that they purchased with their food vouchers were foreign to them. It was not that they did not care about feeding their children, they just lacked the skills necessary to prepare these foods. All nutrition previously came from the caribou, fish and other animals and plants.

A hot lunch program was established in 1961 by the Anglican minister's wife and several concerned local people. This provided at least temporary relief for the young school children, many of whom up until this time scavenged behind the hotels and at the garbage dump for food. One Euro-Canadian resident of Churchill, who belongs to the same age group stated that he heard at the time that some of his school mates went to the garbage dump for food, but he didn't understand it at the time. Today, he is saddened and angry for what happened to people he knew (Anonymous, personal communication, June 1994). Again, the support necessary for transition from one cultural setting to another, was inadequate. While efforts were made to integrate the people into a mixed economy, little was done to socially and culturally understand the Sayisi Dene.

In correspondence to the Director of Nursing, Fisher Branch Hospital, Bishop Hives of the Anglican Church, expressed his frustration at the situation created by government bureaucracy

...Their present condition in Churchill we regard as being a most unhappy plight for a group of Indians who were accustomed to the life of hunting and trapping of the north. Their life has always been a most rigorous one, filled with hardship and the lack of many of the amenities of normal modern life. However, at Churchill, very little has been done to establish them there in the community enterprises and they are a very degenerate group of people with little help in the way of economic subsistence. They are for the most part on the relief list of the Department of Indian Affairs. My own observation is that so much was done for the Eskimo to be brought out of the north, to give them employment at Camp Churchill, whereas the Government under Indian Affairs has established the Chipewyan Band in very inferior quarters and has provided little in the way of employment for these people.

I believe it was a grave error to move them from their trapping grounds simply to make it easier for authorities to give them the relief that obviously they now need".

(Bishop Hives, 1962. Diocese of Keewatin Archive)

The extent of sexual, physical and mental abuse of young girls and women and boys and men at Dene Camp 10 will never be completely known. The terrors of rape and gang rape by military personnel and local white males, the beatings and psychological humiliations have deeply scarred the middle-aged and Elders (Personal interviews 1992,1994. There are some things that they cannot bring themselves to talk about.

While the social atrocities continued to occur at Churchill, very few people outside the local community were aware of the conditions of the Sayisi Dene. The community, with little education, relied on the younger generation to translate government policies into Dene and to correspond with government agencies. In July, 1963, correspondence from Chief John Clipping (written by Peter Throassie) to Mr. Archie Leslie, Regional Director, Indian Affairs indicates that the community was desperately in need of help. A suggestion was made that the people be allowed to live near the river as "...It is easier for the Chipewyan people to fish and hunt if they are near the river. There is much water to drink, to wash clothes and even take baths at the summer time..." (DIAND 138/29-2-2 July 26, 1963). He also stated that if they were near the river, they could watch their people and reduce the number of drownings. Additionally, fishing nets would not be destroyed if they were closer to the river (Ibid). None of the requests were followed up, and the Sayisi Dene continued to live in overcrowded shacks at the edge of society. The community became completely dependent on welfare as opportunities for integration faded.

3.3 Recapping Ten Years of Blundering

3.3.1 The Sequence 1956-1966

A recap of events up to 1966 is necessary in order to emphasize the cumulative effect of federal and provincial bureaucratic activities.

- 1956 - the Sayisi Dene are hastily evacuated to Churchill from Little Duck Lake weeks before the caribou arrive. Most of their material assets are abandoned because of flight weight restrictions. The people are promised new equipment and supplies. The people are placed in a "temporary" makeshift tent village on the exposed northern shore of the Churchill River.
- the Sayisi Dene are canoed on Hudson Bay to North Knife River in early September. The area is subject to violent winds, tides and fall storms. Only a few supplies follow.

- Robert Hicks does not bring much needed building supplies to North Knife River settlement. The supplies and the new canoes mysteriously disappear.
- no caribou at North Knife River - no skins for clothing. Rations of macaroni run low. Only mink traps are provided. Very few trappers have all their gear. Some have dogs, but no toboggans.
- 1957 - "squatters" who had seasonally and permanently worked and lived in Churchill since 1930 are evicted from their area by the National Harbour's Board in favor of a Petrol Storage Tank.
- Regional Indian Affairs officials are baffled and frustrated by the lack of compassion and intergovernmental bureaucracy. The federal government makes no attempt to assert its authority over the provincial government.
- the Province of Manitoba refuses to grant a tract of land for a settlement until the 11th hour. The land is adjacent to the cemetery. A symbolic omen of the future, and a non-verbal statement of the Province's attitude.
- 1959 - Community Development Project initiated with moderate success. A permanent development officer recommended.
- 1960 - the Hudson's Bay Company sells the buildings of Caribou Post to the Provincial Game Branch for \$1.00. The Sayisi Dene were never consulted about their possible interest in purchasing the buildings.
- 1961 - federal legislation makes alcohol available to all "Indians".
- 1962 - the temporary situation of Camp 10 (buildings on skids) is discussed by provincial and federal government officials. No decision can be made for a tract of land because future town planning for Churchill is not settled.
- 1963 - requests from Chief Clipping fall on deaf ears. Nothing is done to "improve their lot".
- 1957-66 - continued restrictions placed on the Sayisi Dene by Game Branch makes it nearly impossible for families to have income in-kind or country produce

to supplement their economic dilemma. The dramatic change in diet has serious affects on the people. The community becomes dependent on welfare.

It was not until September, 1966 that the federal government responded to the desperate situation at Churchill, only because the Assistant Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs, R.F. Battle, had the opportunity to view the situation for himself, "Camp 10 is a disgrace that must be removed immediately" (DIAND 501/29-2, September 21, 1966).

He listed three main reasons: 1) the site "began only as a temporary solution...the Indians were told a permanent community would be established...that promise must be kept; 2) "the community cannot be upgraded where it presently stands - for sound technical and psychological reasons", and 3) "...the rocky terrain is impossible as a home site" (Ibid).

Chief and Council told Mr. Battle that they did not want to live in Churchill - they wanted to be in an area where they could hunt and fish and yet have employment and send their children to school. "The Minister said we would get land and new homes. Now you come here and asked the same questions. Why?" (Ibid).

It appears at this time that Mr. Battle was open to the Band returning to Little Duck Lake. There was a popular "back to the bush" movement occurring across Canada and this might have been an option for the community. One member was asked if he thought anyone wanted to return to Duck Lake. The answer was he thought not (DIAND 578/30-54 Box. 1, September 15, 1966). The Band member was not identified and so it is not possible to understand why this reply was given. It is equally incomprehensible why Mr. Battle would accept the opinion of one person.

3.4 Dene Village

3.4.1 The New Townsite

A new settlement was quickly built seven miles southeast of Churchill, past Akudlik, the "Eskimo" settlement. The site of Dene Village was considered superior to Dene Camp 10, but it was not granted reserve status and still presented economic and social problems. While there was road access to the site, transportation services were non-existent. The area was almost devoid of trees.

Over a period of two years 47 new houses and 19 salvaged from Camp 10 were put in place. Homes were built according to Department of Indian Affairs standards. Water and sewage tanks were to be installed in some of the homes, but this was deleted from the plans. Eventually some homes received both, but not the quality of those originally planned. The new houses were wired for electricity, but not all houses were hooked up.

Dene Village did not solve the deep social and economic problems faced by the people. Vandalism of the new homes occurred frequently - a social statement of the young and old. With little money for furnishings, the rooms of the houses echoed with the sounds of social distress. Ravindra Lal (1969) and later P.I. Dickman (1973) argued that the settlement plan of Camp 10 and Dene Village, and the houses were culturally and socially inappropriate. The spatial distribution of the houses was foreign to the Sayisi Dene who were used to living in extended family units or nearby, but out of sight, of kin. The houses were so large that heating was an expensive problem. Coal which was made available to the Dene for heating their homes was of poor quality. The 1960s "picture window", so inappropriate in a northern setting, was difficult to adjust to. Sayisi Dene were not used to looking out a large window, or having people, even kin, looking in on their privacy. Additionally, the cost of replacing these windows was prohibitive. Alcohol, child and sexual abuse continued at an

alarming rate and community members and Indian Affairs officials watched as the society eroded before them. The cumulative effects of rapid social change caused a series of complicated social problems. The Sayisi Dene continued to be abused on all fronts. The governments continued to pay lip service to their needs, social and economic programs were abruptly ended as community workers were transferred or programs were abandoned or cut, and racial abuse ran rampant in the town. The rapport that community workers built with the Band was continually being destroyed as no program continued long enough for a relationship of trust to be firmly established. Families disintegrated into groups of strangers and Elders passed away humiliated and brokenhearted. What had once been a proud, industrious people was now a hopeless collection of broken people.

Lal (1967) saw the move from Duck Lake to Churchill as being the result of poor decision-making on the part of Indian Affairs. He painted a nostalgic, almost romantic picture of the historic Sayisi Dene based on an incomplete ethnohistoric record. However, his observations of the then-current conditions at Churchill were real: - little or no preparation prior to the move; - little western education or training for the people after the move; - child-like innocence and belief in the strength of a promise and handshake that the government was going to take full care of them.

It is not fair to say that all Indian Affairs officials were unsympathetic. It is obvious from inter-office correspondence and program organization that they were not able to deliver the services for a successful transition. Plans of regional and local Indian Affairs officials were frustrated by government bureaucracy, policy, intergovernmental relations and the ongoing debate over land. Additionally, as mentioned above, community workers' positions were project-oriented and short term. What was required was a long term project and long term commitment in order to build a trusting relationship.

By 1968, the federal government had spent over half a million dollars on Dene Village (Skoog n.d.). Half a million dollars at Little Duck Lake could have created a reserve which would have kept the people near their traditional lands.

The hindsight of Indian Affairs was captured in correspondence between R. Connelly and J. Bergevin, A.D.M., May 19, 1971

...There was no way we could predict what would happen. There was obviously little or no preparation of the people prior to the move in terms of orienting them to the expectation the larger society would have of them...It was repeated to me by band members on several occasions, and I must therefore believe them, that they solidly believed that "subsequent to the move, the government was going to take full care of them" (DIAND 578/29-1-2 (A)).

3.5 Experimental Settlements

During the 1960s, the federal government committed itself to settle outstanding land claims (Weaver 1983:37-41) and since the Sayisi Dene had not yet located a reserve, there was added pressure placed on Chief, Council and the Band to make such selections. While the Indian Affairs officer pointed out that land around Churchill should be considered because of potential industrial growth, some Band members were more interested in land that they could use for hunting and trapping (DIAND 578/3-6, January 22, 1968). J.B. Bergevin, Assistant Deputy Minister, Indian and Eskimo Affairs, in correspondence with R.M. Connelly, Regional Director, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, stated that he had "...a committee working on..." land entitlement (DIAND 578/29-1, June 7, 1971). The Elders wanted to return to the bush and the young people wanted to stay in Churchill. It was decided that an experimental community would be established away from Churchill. The initial selection had been

the old Caribou Post at Little Duck Lake. However, North and South Knife Lakes were chosen, possibly because the Caribou Post buildings had been sold to Manitoba Game Branch.

Because of the need for children to remain in school, the Elders, and those without children were chosen to take part in the project. The area was familiar to some of the Elders, whose parents had traded and trapped around North and South Knife Lakes in the early 1900s (A. Solomon, personal communication, 1992).

P. Dickman, Community Development Officer, was instrumental in initiating the project and in September, 1969, he accompanied a team of seven up the South Knife River to the lake (Dickman, 1971). At South Knife Lake bush skills were relearned and spirits were high. The project provided the opportunity for the people to stand back from the situation in Churchill and decide a course for the future. A letter written by R. Connelly summarized his, and other community workers expectations

The people who returned were especially the elders of the band who had not been able to adjust satisfactorily to life in Churchill. It is certain however that the younger families will not want to return to the bush on a permanent basis...(DIAND 501/30-1-303[54]Vol.1)

The reverse occurred as news of the settlement made its way back to Churchill. Soon the communities of North Knife and South Knife Lakes had increased to 16 and 34 people respectively. The hope of a new life acted as a catalyst and soon the communities were larger than the land could support. Additionally, the caribou, an integral part of Sayisi-Dene life was absent and so the search for a location close to the caribou was undertaken. Curiously, Little Duck Lake was not considered, possibly because it represented the beginning of the end for many people (J. Clipping, personal

communication, 1992).

3.6 New Hope and a New Home

Indian Affairs officials were eager to have a land settlement established at South Knife Lake. However, at the last official Band meeting held at South Knife Lake, the Band rejected the surrounding area for a reserve. According to J. Clipping (personal communication, 1992), Indian Affairs officials said "we can't move you anymore...". The following day Band members held their own meeting and decided that they would move themselves. Six men, Thomas Duck, John Solomon, Adam Solomon, John Bee, Jean Baptiste Thorassie and Jim Clipping hitched their dogs and started off towards Tadoule Lake (floating ashes lake). Figure 5 outlines the route taken by the group. The lake was well known for its varied and abundant resources and was a summer encampment for canoe building in the 1910s (C. Thorassie, personal communication, 1992). Indeed, early historic maps drawn for Norton in 1719 and 1760 showed Tadoule Lake as a prominent lake in the seasonal round of the "Northern Indians" (Sayisi-Dene) (Warkentin and Ruggles, 1970) (Figures 6 & 7).

Thirteen days later, the party arrived at Tadoule Lake and set up a small camp. While they were getting settled Department of Indian Affairs officials arrived by plane bringing ammunition and "grub". The following Monday family members began to arrive by plane and a temporary camp was established at the south end of the lake - Summer Camp. The final move was made in the fall to the north side of the lake 40 km from the Seal River. As J. Clipping stated, the feeling amongst the people was one of relief, of being free of Churchill.

Beginning life anew at Tadoule Lake was probably easier for the Elders and middle-aged. The young people however, somewhat adapted to white society, had to struggle during the first few years. As A. Thorassie pointed out, "it was difficult for us teenagers

because we were used to radios and T.V. We had electric guitars, but no electricity - it was rough" (A. Thorassie, 1992).




Figure 5: The route taken by Sayisi Dene from North Knife Lake to Tadoule Lake, Spring, 1973.




Figure 7: Moses Norton's Draught of the Northern Parts of Hudson's Bay.
(Copied from Warkentin & Ruggles, 1970)

4.0 THE COMMUNITY TODAY

4.1 Housing and Utilities

The community is physically located on the edge of an esker with interspersed bedrock. The head of the eroding esker has created a sand isthmus which joins a large island to the mainland. Part of the settlement is located on the island.

The original settlement pattern and distribution of houses may appear haphazard to the outsider. However, the spatial distribution of houses is reflective of kinship patterns. Interestingly, this pattern was also observed at Oxford House in 1987 and explained in much the same manner (A. Hart, personal communication, 1987) as at Tadoule Lake. Housing on the "island" which is more recent, is more in line with standard community planning. This may be interpreted as adaptation to western society and a decrease in the importance of kinship obligations. A rough, but definite road is in place. Since 1987, many of the original log cabins have been removed and replaced elsewhere with small bungalows (Petch, personal observation, 1987,1992,1994). Many of the houses are around 200 square feet. These are the houses of the Elders. Three bedroom houses are of modest design and average 750 square feet. Many of the houses are unfinished. Some lack interior trim, others have plywood subfloor, others are not painted. Many of the Elders homes need repair. Electricity is provided by Manitoba Hydro diesel generators. Formerly, the station was located in the centre of the community and created a constant "white noise". A new station was constructed away from the community adjacent to the airport. This has increased the amperage available to each household to 60 amps. Previously all systems were 12 amps, except government facilities. Households now can have both an electric fridge and stove, plus run other small electrical appliances. However, according to Chief Ernie Bussidor, only 5% of the people have converted. Hydro rates are up and the people cannot afford to convert or pay the increased rates (E. Bussidor, personal communication, 1994). Additionally, most people cannot afford to purchase

refrigerators or electric stoves.

No community sewer or water system is in place. Few homes have flush toilets and holding tanks for waste. Some families have chemical toilets, while others have outdoor latrines. Water is trucked to houses regularly, but the vehicle has been known to breakdown, causing some hardships. Water is heated on the stove. Most of the homes are heated with wood which is cut by household members and hauled home. Skidoos have replaced dogs for hauling, although some community members are considering using dogs again. This is because the price of gasoline is ridiculously high (ca. \$10/gal).

There is no volunteer fire department for the community. A portable pump and equipment is available for forest fires.

There is no regular garbage pickup. Chief Bussidor stated that this is really needed. A community clean-up project is currently underway.

A new band hall was constructed, but it is finished. The washrooms have not been installed. Additionally, the Band is planning an Elder's home, a four-plex with central heating.

The old Band Office is presently being converted into a small motel. Rates will be \$80/night. A small kitchen facility will be available.

Social services have gradually increased since the move in 1973. Unfortunately, so have some of the social problems. Initially the community was "...a quiet, peaceful place. There is no police force and none is needed." (Bruemmer 1977:7). However, the completion of an airstrip in 1987 opened the door to illicit drugs and alcohol. The

Reserve is officially "dry", but Band council members note that the community has a serious drug and alcohol problem.

A nursing station is located at the centre of the community and contract nurses and a visiting doctor and dentist look after the health needs of the people. Med-Evac is available as needed. No traditional healer is present in the community, but several years ago, one did visit the community and provide services for a number of people.

A small school with annex trailers provides education to Grade 8. The Band is in the process of building a new school that will serve a higher level of education. One of the concerns of the community is the present lack of discipline displayed by students who attend school out of town. Few students are graduating from high school or pursuing post-secondary education. Homesickness is one of the main reasons for this (A.Thorassie, personal communication, 1992). Instruction in Dene language and syllabics and traditional activities is part of the curriculum.

The community has remained faithful to the Anglican Church and Reverend Julie Collings regularly visits the community. Mr. Thomas Duck is a lay reader with the Church.

4.2 Recreation Activities

The community is lacking in recreational facilities and organized activities. In the winter, children skate and play scrub hockey and slide. Skidooing is limited because of the exorbitant price of gas (ca \$10/gal). Most people walk to their destinations.

Some traditional activities take place, although several Elders expressed the desire to pass on certain skills and knowledge. In the summer the children swim, fish and hang about. A provincial summer swim program is now non-existent due to provincial

cutbacks. Satellite T.V. figures prominently in the lives of most people and most homes have colored T.V. and VCR's.

Bingo is the centre of adult social life, as it is in most northern communities, and on nights that bingo is scheduled, no other activities occur. Only a death in the community is reason to cancel bingo. One traditional gaming activity that is making a comeback is the handgame (E. Bussidor, personal communication, 1992). This ancient tradition is becoming popular especially with the young men. Chanting, dream songs and drumming are also being relearned as the people become less self-conscious about their identity. The pan-Indian movement has been a positive reinforcement in the re-establishment of self-esteem and ethnic identity.

Two stores and an informal cafe operate in the community. All goods must be flown into the community, which results in exceptionally high prices. A part time taxi service also serves local transportation needs.

Many of the older and some younger women continue to produce a variety of leather and beaded goods. The old handturned Singer sewing machines are still used and are considered the most efficient method of working with leather. M. Jones related a story of her father buying her mother a sewing machine in Churchill and carrying it on his back to Hubbard Point in the 1920s. M. Jones now possesses the sewing machine (M. Jones, personal communication, 1992). The Sayisi Dene women's designs for beading are unique in Manitoba.

Soapstone carving and painting are produced in small quantities. These skills could be further developed. No one in the community makes snow shoes and babiche-making is becoming a lost art.

Greenhouse experimentation under the Manitoba Indian Agricultural Development Corporation was somewhat successful, but shortlived. Vandalism discouraged attempts to produce fresh vegetables for the community.

Some families still go out on the trapline, but the price of gas has been greater than the price of furs making such forays almost profitless. Several people stated that they and their families would go out more often if the price of gas was lower. Re-introducing sled dogs has been considered by several people.

The caribou hunt is still central to community life. Today, community hunts are planned and large aircraft chartered. The meat is then distributed throughout the community. When the caribou pass in front of the village, the pulse of the community quickens.

4.3 The Economic Base

The economic base of the Band is not the same as it was 40 years ago. Forty years ago money was of little value to the community. Any necessities not procured from nature, were obtained from the Hudson's Bay Company post on credit. Furs, country produce and casual labor paid for these goods. Several changes in Hudson's Bay Company accounting procedures, policy and exchange systems between 1820 and 1940 gradually eased the Sayisi Dene towards a monetary system. In the 1920s a set of tokens representing "made beavers", the standard of fur trade, further introduced the Sayisi Dene to the concept of symbolic value. Additionally, those people who worked in Churchill seasonally understood the meaning of money, although its value, or their value in terms of payment, was perhaps less understood. Forty years ago making a living meant providing for one's family through a thorough knowledge of the environment and expertise in hunting and trapping.

Today the community relies mainly on transfer payments to sustain itself economically. There is little opportunity for employment, except when a construction project is underway. Some seasonal employment is available at Nejanilini Lake Lodge about 70km north of Tadoule Lake. Because the community has no road access and is far from potential markets, economic development has little opportunity for growth. A winter road was built in 1993-94 with good results. Fur prices are lower than that of gas, making any traditional activity an expensive endeavor. The Band would like to develop new economic opportunities but not forget, the traditional activities. However, many necessary skills have yet to be mastered. Most of the construction jobs available for the building of the school will be given to "southerners", those with trade papers. The manual labor jobs will be filled by community members.

The Band has tried to diversify. Commercial fishing was considered, but again, distance from market over-ruled the project's viability. The Band also looked to, and continues to consider, developing a fishing lodge, possibly on Shethanei Lake. An established lodge on Munroe Lake was also recently considered. There is a possibility of joint partnership with an American whitewater rafting company. This will be explored in August, 1994. The new motel will also provide some economic diversity for the community. The Band is also looking at the possibility of operating a healing centre and retreat.

4.4 The Long-term Effects of the Relocation

Because of time constraints, it was not possible to accurately determine specific social, cultural and other relocation effects. There are many silent stories of abuse and pain that are endured. One band member described how she had been sexually abused by the same man over a period of years. She described the horror and shame, and the painful attempt to block this from her mind. She described how her parents were killed in an alcohol-related house fire and how she wandered in limbo for many

years. She believes that in order to begin the healing process she must tell her story and many others must follow suit (Anonymous, personal communication, June 1994).

The community now has strong leadership and a will to survive. Many of the community members feel that they were denied the opportunity to be enculturated as Dene. This, coupled with the pain and bitterness of broken promises, has left many community members in a state of limbo. As one male community member stated, "I can't settle into a relationship, I can't stay in one place...I think it goes back to the Churchill days" (Anonymous, October, 1992). Most of the younger generation, that is, those from ages 1-15, do not know the sequence of events that led to the settlement of Tadoule Lake. They do not understand the physical and mental trauma endured by their parents and grandparents.

5.0 ANALYSIS

5.1 Past Methodologies

There are problems with the methodology of past anthropological studies and in the interpretation of cultural change and definition of adaptation. As Koolage summarized "...anthropologists dealing with the Chipewyan since 1930 have characterized them as being deculturated, disorganized and disintegrated..." (Koolage, 1970:19), which "...fail[ed] to elaborate the many ways in which the Chipewyans are adapting to changing socio-cultural conditions in northern Canada" (Koolage 1975:45-46). Heber (1989) added to this the fact that "negative ethnological descriptions were misleading and failed to account for identity change". Additionally, these descriptions did not account for cross-cultural influence of the various Native and Inuit groups during pre- and post-European contact. Inter-Native diffusion of beliefs and values were not considered.

Birket-Smith (1930) spent very little time with the Chipewyan (Sayisi Dene) at Churchill. His focus on Inuit culture and the prestige of the Fifth Thule Expedition have been used to downplay Sayisi Dene culture. Very few have questioned or criticized his work. Birket-Smith's own ethnocentricity and focus on description is noted in his research and definition of deculturation. Vanstone further described this as a process where the abandoned aboriginal culture is not replaced by white culture equivalent (Vanstone 1965:110).

Koolage, as did Hlady and Lal, interpreted the social and cultural situation of the Sayisi Dene at Churchill in terms of disorganization and disintegration. Difficulties with language made it difficult to explore the "cognitive map".

The problem which arises today is that those not trained in anthropological thought rely on these old sources as primary resources. Since virtually no complete

anthropological study of the Sayisi Dene has occurred since Koolage's study in 1966-68, no application of present day theory has analyzed the past and present situation. It may be more accurate to use the term maladaptation rather than deculturation, disintegration and disorganization to describe the way the Sayisi Dene at Churchill tried to come to grips with their situation. However, this term has negative connotations, and behavior may have not been considered maladaptive by the people at the time. Culture shock, similar to that which has been documented among immigrants to Canadian culture, obviously occurred with the Sayisi Dene. Yet no safety net was in place for them, and no period of adjustment was provided.

According to Lal, Hlady and government officials, the Sayisi Dene after the relocation in 1956 were changing and adapting to a crisis situation not in a way that they wanted to adapt, but in a manner in which they were forced to adapt given the social, economic and environmental conditions they were thrown into. The rough and ready frontier mentality of a small northern community, coupled with the adjacent military mentality of Fort Churchill had its effects on the Sayisi Dene. No role-models were available for them to emulate. Previously the only "white" economic exchange occurred at the trading post, and social exchange occurred with the Anglican priest, the Sayisi Dene's general impression of whites as benefactors quickly eroded with the Churchill experience.

Koolage suggested that there was a lack of ethnic identity among the Chipewyan (Sayisi Dene) brought about by numerous social and economic factors. He concluded that by the mid 1960s the Sayisi Dene were adapting in a "marginal manner to the larger society" (Koolage 1970:145). What were described as white social norms were rejected by the Sayisi Dene and replaced with what was viewed by whites as a maladaptive structure.

None of the anthropological studies conducted had the opportunity to examine Sayisi Dene cultural and social adaptation in their natural element - the barren grounds. For example, Koolage mentioned, with surprise, that the hand game was occasionally played. P.G. Downes (1930) noted the hand game in his travels through the barren grounds and at Churchill.

An additional problem in the analysis is that past studies have tended to be "etic" in nature, with little incorporation of "emic" values. Etic analysis is based on direct or indirect observations of human behavior. The perspective of the observer, in this case, the anthropologist, is presented. Emic analysis focuses on the views and beliefs of the people themselves concerning their own behavior. Documentary and historical sources are considered to be emic. One of the drawbacks of emic analysis is that because Sayisi Dene tradition was oral in nature, there was only one opportunity to examine a single historical document written by a Sayisi Dene during the Churchill years (DIAND138//29-2-2, July 26, 1963). All Band Council meeting minutes were taken by the Indian Affairs officer and therefore some bias is expected. Oral history interviews related to Sayisi Dene history were conducted in 1992 (Petch) and memory mapping (biography mapping was carried out by Manitobah Keewatinowi Okimakinak in 1990) (MKO 1993) contributed substantially to the emic record, supporting Sayisi Dene oral history.

6.0 A MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF CHANGE

6.1 Modeling Subsistence Systems

The method used to evaluate and interpret the relocation of the Sayisi Dene and the cultural, social and economic effects the move had are based on a model developed by Peter Usher (1992), for understanding the role of subsistence in northern communities.

Two elements of his model include the material foundation - natural resource base, and the institutional foundation - kinship and individuals. While the first two components are straightforward, Usher suggests that the individual within the culture is what sustains the culture. However, in a subsistence society individual goals are community goals and these are aimed at maintaining system stability. Individual goals are secondary, and usually related to the overall well being of the community. Therefore, in this study of the Sayisi Dene, the individual is considered part of the kinship group. Means of production, or the methods and technologies used for obtaining resources, is seen as an important component of subsistence pattern changes. For example, the introduction of the ski-doo in the 1970s drastically changed trap-line life. The means of production is therefore used as the third variable in the subsistence model for the Sayisi Dene.

In order for a subsistence economy to survive there must be a resource base which includes mammals, fish, birds, trees, plants, rocks and minerals. Caribou were the main sustainers of life for the Sayisi Dene. However, a variety of other animal resources was included in their diet. Spring, summer and fall fisheries supplemented their diet, as did waterfowl, small mammals, ptarmigan, eggs and berries. Trees were used for a variety of purposes including shelter, snowshoes, canoes and sleds. Plants, such as mosses, were used in place of diapers and also for chinking cabins. Lichen was used as a broth thickener and other plants for medicinal purposes. Mineral waters were also used for medicine. A diversity of resources and a flexible daily routine are key elements in the functional success of a subsistence economy.

Kinship figures strongly in subsistence economy as it is the organizing force behind production and distribution. Each nuclear unit is part of a complex system of kinship ties and obligations. As Usher states "...while kinship is biologically produced, it is socially constructed...". All activity takes place within an egalitarian system where tasks and produce are shared. Usher argues that it is the natural resource base and

its products, through harvesting, that perpetuate the obligations of kinship. Loss of the resource causes repercussions in the social system's maintenance.

The means of production, or ways of getting a living in a traditional subsistence society include techniques and technologies for accomplishing the task. Hunting strategies, such as caribou drives, fences, ambushes, and fishing weirs are all part of a learned technology.

In a traditional-subsistence model, system maintenance is a result of the security and sense of well-being that occurs when the flow of resources is maintained:

Collective + Distribution + Mutual = Security + Well Being = System Maintenance
 Production Aid

The present day mixed-subsistence economy, which is representative of northern Native communities, has resulted from numerous outside forces such as federal and provincial policy and law regarding arbitrary boundaries and resource management, technology, cash economy and education. As the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry emphasized, Aboriginal people have "...three main aspects of concern related to natural resources: the infringement by federal and provincial policies and legislation of the exercise of Aboriginal and treaty rights by Aboriginal people; the negative repercussions for them produced by large-scale exploitation of renewable resources; and the ongoing disputes regarding the exact scope of constitutionally protected rights and their practical import for the decision-making process on the management of natural resources (Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, Vol. 1, 1991:184). Response to outside forces has been more influential in inducing change than the maintenance system within the culture. The "traditional" way of life is what the Elders recall as being in place in their youth. The term "tradition" therefore, comes to represent that way of life, or particular cultural maintenance system in place within living memory of the Elders.

The concept of tradition is perpetuated through oral tradition and is a vital component of system maintenance.

Table 1 provides a visual means of tracing the effects of various changes to the three variables - natural resource base, kinship organization and means of production on the subsistence system. It allows for an analysis at various historical points where certain changes are known to have caused major cultural adaptation and social change. These historical points are referred to as "snapshots" as they allow for an analysis of events at a particular time.

What is indicated in the table is that natural resources are vital to the maintenance of social well being. It not only provides nourishment, but also acts as a conduit for kin-related activities. The obligations of kinship function to maintain the equilibrium of the society. However, as the restrictions on resource use and means of production increase, and wage economy (individual-based economy) becomes more prevalent, the kinship system fails to function as a cohesive unit and the system changes, in this case, collapses. Rather than a gradual progression from one "snapshot" to another, the Sayisi Dene were catapulted into 20th century western society and left to adapt as best they could.

TABLE 1: THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING VARIABLES ON A SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY

Natural Resource Base	Kinship Organization	Means of Production	Effects on the Subsistence Economy
Reliable & unrestricted resource base	Traditional	Precontact technology	Maintenance of subsistence system with gradual cultural change
Unreliable & unrestricted resource base	Traditional	Precontact technology	Shifts in the seasonal round with minor adjustments to environmental factors
Reliable & unrestricted resource base	Traditional	Change in Means of Production (e.g. introduction of gun)	Cultural & socio-economic changes in response to external forces
Reliable & unrestricted resource base	Restructured kinship (e.g. small pox epidemic)	As above	Social reorganization and continued cultural & socio-economic change
Unreliable resource base	Restructured but stable kinship	As above	Environmental adaptation and adjustments to subsistence system
Reliable but restricted resource base	As above	As above	Environmental adaptation and adjustments to subsistence system Introduction of mixed economy
Unreliable & restricted resource base	As above	As above	Mixed-subsistence economy. Wage economy. Social assistance
Continued unreliable & restricted resource base	Disintegration of kinship system	Restriction to the means of production	Social dysfunction System destruction Dependence on social assistance

The first two "snapshots" relate to the precontact period. Archaeological evidence for cultural adaptation due to external forces is minimal. Evidence for trade between Taltheilei (Sayisi Dene) and Selkirk (Cree) or Dorset/Thule (possible progenitors of the Inuit) has not been explored. It is difficult, if not impossible to determine if any inter-ethnic relationships, such as trade, existed between groups. Southern Indian Lake artifact analysis presently underway at the Manitoba Museum of Man and Nature may shed some light on the Taltheilei/Selkirk relationship. As mentioned above, no precontact Selkirk pottery has been found to date in the Sayisi Dene study area which would suggest trade or movement into the area.

The introduction of European trade goods, namely the gun via Hudson Bay set the stage for initial socio-economic change for the Sayisi Dene. This had a major impact on inter-Native relationships as well as resource use.

The second event which nearly decimated the Sayisi Dene was disease. According to Hearne, the smallpox epidemic of the 1700s, which swept across the land, might have reduced the Sayisi Dene by 9/10th of the original population. Entire families vanished. Those who survived regrouped and formed new family units.

A certain degree of stabilization occurred after the introduction of the gun and the outbreak of smallpox. Environmental adaptation was minimal as Bands continued their seasonal round as before. However, the number of people required to carry out certain subsistence activities was greatly reduced. This may have been influential in reducing the spatial area of the seasonal round.

Continued interaction and trade with the Hudson's Bay Company did not greatly affect the Sayisi Dene. They continued to follow their seasonal round. Some did look to a mixed economy as a result of their role as Homeguard Chipewyan to the Hudson's

Bay Company at Churchill. Much later, the introduction of registered traplines and government legislations reduced accessibility to some resources, but because the Sayisi Dene were always out on the land, these legislations meant little to them.

As outlined by Weinstein et al (n.d.), the process of adaptation and social change depends, in part, on the "...absorptive capacity of natural or social systems for changes...that...consist of people, who feel pain, loss, and grief, and whose ability to function as whole and healthy members of their societies is crippled by the experiences which give rise to those feelings" (Weinstein et al n.d.:20). In other words, there is a point when the cumulative effects of change for each individual become so great that they cannot function in their community. The case of the Sayisi Dene relocation is a classic example of rapid change of the natural resource base, kinship organization and means of production transforming the social and economic systems.

7.0 COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community is very concerned with present environmental conditions in the northern transitional forest and barrenlands with respect to caribou habitat. Community members believe that both the federal and provincial governments have little understanding or interest in the well-being of the caribou, let alone the well-being of the community. One community member wrote

The Caribou Management Board (CMB) should actually be classed as Caribou Depletion Board (CDP). As it is seemingly not concerned with managing the caribou range. Right now as I write, there are numerous fires going in every direction. Emergency Measures Offices, Natural Resources and the police have been notified, but it continues to rage out of control. If government cannot make money off of the land it is not considered a priority. Therefore it seems fair to say that CMB is not managing the caribou habitat. It has two main

functions: 1) The harvest data collection agency
2) Border Patrol. Therefore it should be called
Caribou Depletion Patrol (CDP) [not Caribou
Management Board] (Anonymity requested, June, 1994)

This type of statement reflects the frustration of community members who make every effort to adhere to provincial game regulations. It appears that as long as a money-making lodge, merchantable timber, hydro facility or community is not in danger, the forest is allowed to be destroyed. The habitat of the many animals, especially the caribou, and subsistence resource base of the people are not considered a priority. The Sayisi Dene are concerned that this fall when the caribou are back in their wintering grounds, many will starve or fall victim to predators. With habitat destroyed, there is a great chance that the caribou will move further away from the Sayisi Dene. With the high price of gas, many people will have to look to food vouchers to survive the winter.

Another burning issue with the community is the artificial boundary of Nunavut which has ignored the very ancient and traditional land-use of the Sayisi Dene. Why did anthropological and land-use studies ignore, devalue and exclude the Sayisi Dene? Historical documents and within living memory oral history interviews detail Sayisi-Dene land-use. Figure 1 is based on these sources and represents knowledge that is alive and well in the community.

The Elders do not lie. They have told a story of physical and cultural survival in a land that is not kind. As one Elder stated "...life was hard, but it was good...now life is easy, but it is not good" (personal communication E. Anderson, 1994).

Most importantly, the people are very frustrated and angry that after 40 years, no answers to the relocation issue have been given by government and no compensation

or apology has been received. The pain and suffering caused to a self-sufficient, expert, hunting society continues to resurface. The cumulative effects of change that resulted from the relocation to Churchill continue to plague the community. Children are being enculturated into a community which is, itself, the product of maladaptation. How will this next generation view itself? It's history?

What the community wants is answers. Who initiated the move in 1956 is the question on most Elders' minds.

8.0 CONCLUSION

The relocation to Churchill removed the Duck Lake Band away from their subsistence environment. Mobility was restricted because means of winter travel had been left behind at Little Duck Lake. The Sayisi Dene had no money. The credit system which they were accustomed to was no longer available. Most of their means of production were gone. The first winter at North Knife Lake must have been exceptionally difficult for the Duck Lake Band. They were restricted in mobility, living quarters and resource availability. There were insufficient food rations and no caribou for food or clothing. The people were confused as to why they had been moved in the first place. The promise of a better life certainly was not evident to them at North Knife River. Certainly, if it was the intention of Indian Affairs to bring the people closer to medical and educational services, why were they left at North Knife River, which is only accessible by air, boat or skidoo? It appears from correspondence, that once the people were secured at North Knife River, they were literally on their own - no different from their settlement at Little Duck Lake, but without the familiar and reliable resource base.

There is no evidence to suggest that those who worked seasonally at Churchill encouraged the newcomers to try the seasonal wage economy, although they may have

set the example. Additionally, the Canadian government had promised to look after them. Social assistance was available if needed. However, this assistance came in the form of food vouchers, not in the form of badly needed training and easing into white society.

The dilemma of the "squatters" formerly located at the site of the tank farm, and seasonal workers resulted in continued restricted mobility. People were allowed to set up seasonal camps in certain places only. Sayisi Dene and federal regional Indian Affairs official's suggestions for camp and housing locations were rejected by the Province and federal Indian Affairs Welfare office in Winnipeg. This rejection placed the Sayisi Dene on the very outskirts of white society. Housing was temporary, inadequate and overcrowded. Health and safety conditions were appalling and protective measures non-existent. The natural resource base at Churchill was even poorer than North Knife River. By the mid-1960s, social assistance became a form of dependency as country produce intake was restricted by legislation and smaller allowances of ammunition. The military base and frontier mentality of the town did not contribute positively to the Sayisi Dene's attempt to adapt to a foreign culture. A few concerned citizens in the town did try to assist the people, but also became frustrated when forced to deal the the bureaucratic maze of Indian Affairs.

The cumulative effects of adverse change to the availability of the natural resource base, means of production and kinship worked together to cause social dysfunction and maladaptation. Because the Sayisi Dene had minimal contact with government up until 1956, and because social impact assessments were unknown, officials had no idea as to how the people would respond to "externally-imposed" change. The people themselves did not know how they would respond, nor were they instructed or cautioned by Indian Affairs as to what they might expect in Churchill. As a result, neither side was prepared for the social despair that resulted.

Subsistence economies respond to different changes in a variety of ways. Natural environmental changes such as a forest fire or cyclical decline of an animal resource were, and still are to some degree, accommodated through shifts in the direction of the seasonal round. Alternate areas of resource harvesting were usually available. Imposed restrictions to access to the resources however, have a deleterious effect on the maintenance of the overall subsistence system which includes the well-being of the group. While adaptation (sometimes negative) to imposed change does occur, there is a limit or point beyond which the social group is unable to cope or respond to sudden or cumulative change. System breakdown occurs which may result in social dysfunction.

The relocation of the Sayisi Dene caused social despair and system breakdown. The opportunity to adjust gradually to a foreign system was not provided. Additionally, Sayisi Dene world view was not taken seriously. No attempt by government officials to understand or record their environmental knowledge and ecological values was made.

If the community had not pulled out of Churchill when they did, it is doubtful that the Sayisi Dene as a cultural group could have survived. They would have integrated in a marginal manner to the larger society or have been destroyed.

The sadness and frustration of the people is captured in the films *Nu Ho Ni Yeh* (Our Story) (Treeline Productions, 1992), *Take Back the Shadow: Sayisi Dene Address the Royal Commission* (Treeline Productions, 1994) and in the videotapes of the *Aboriginal Justice Inquiry* (1989). People today are still not sure why they were moved and would like answers. The inability for some community members to tie together the series of events of the first few weeks of relocation, suggests a rapid and emotionally confusing move. The air flight, the temporary camp at Churchill, the move to North

Knife River, and gradual drifting back to Churchill are blurred in the memories of many Elders. The promise for a new life turned out to be a costly trick, both for the people and the government. Children were robbed of the opportunity to be enculturated into Sayisi Dene culture. Loss of ethnic identity has greatly affected those who are now in their 30s and 40s. As such, the community of Tadoule Lake struggles to come to terms with its past.

Coupled with the social despair suffered with the Churchill experience, is the fact that part of their traditional lands have been incorporated into the territory of Nunavut. Quite apart from the relocation and Treaty Land Entitlement issues, the boundary of Nunavut has redefined the Manitoba/Northwest Territories boundary in very political terms. The cultural boundary which the Inuit are well aware of, was ignored. The Sayisi Dene believe they were tricked and misinformed about the Memorandum of Understanding between the Inuit and Dene of 1986 (Anonymous, June 1994). The Dene Nation, based in the Northwest Territories, did not recognize the Manitoba Dene as part of their nation in 1986. Little consultation with the community, or support by Indian Affairs was given to the Sayisi Dene. Recent memory mapping, which is a procedure for documenting traditional land use with the aid of maps, conducted by MKO and oral history interviews by Petch, as well as historical documentation (Petch 1993), support the Sayisi Dene claim to lands within Nunavut. Negotiations were carried out with no input from the Band. Again, the Sayisi Dene feel cheated and spurned by the very institution that promised to look after them.

In 1992 the Sayisi Dene were recognized by the Dene Nation. Political boundaries have done much to separate Aboriginal people in the past. However, the community is now able to enjoy some support of a larger body and promote its ethnic identity. However, this recognition may have come too late, as little support was given to the Sayisi Dene in their efforts to voice their claims.

There are three groups who at least share responsibility for the destruction of one of the last successful subsistence cultural groups in Canada: the Federal government, the Provincial government and the Hudson's Bay Company.

The Provincial government Game Branch was paradoxically present and absent in the document research. Conservation officers with their own agendas appear to have created enough of a concern with the scientific and government communities to have caused the relocation. No resource management explanations or training were made available to the people, except when the Conservation officers needed people to poison the wolves. Today, people in the community of Tadoule Lake believe that there is little concern about caribou management or any other kind of resource management, except to make sure that all government-imposed regulations are adhered to (Anonymous, 1994).

The Federal government, namely Indian Affairs, seems to have had a contradictory policy in place. While it appears that the reason for the move was to bring the people closer to government services, they were not incorporated into the town, but left to fend for themselves 40 miles from Churchill in a resource situation which could not support the increase in population. Hasty decisions, poor planning, possibly inadequately trained and overworked community staff, abrupt ending of programs and remote decision-making contributed to setting the stage for cultural maladaptation.

The Hudson's Bay Company manipulated the people and attempted to make trappers out of people who were mainly concerned with caribou and making a living off the land. When production in the area and fur prices were down, the Company's solution was to pull out and move elsewhere. The Hudson's Bay Company even entertained the possibility of an outpost at North Knife River. It is not clear why they would want to incur the expense of setting up a new store, when that at Little Duck

Lake served the needs of the people and was probably as profitable as one at North Knife would be.

It is known that a great deal of communication transpired amongst the three groups. However, this correspondence may have met the same fate as the records of Caribou Post at Little Duck Lake. Documents at Caribou Post were burned on order from head office in Winnipeg (RG3/73/a August 24, 1956). Additionally, the Provincial government was unwilling to set aside lands for the Federal government for the purpose of Reserves. These delays were also instrumental in weakening the fabric of Sayisi-Dene society.

9.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

It is very difficult to make recommendations on behalf of a First Nation people, especially when full anthropological study was not conducted. The following are the result of discussions with a number of people living in the community. Many of the discussions were held informally over a cup of tea, others (10) were taped interviews which were related to traditional land use. Several meetings were held with Chief and Council, and one band meeting (20), in which the results of this study were presented, all contributed to the following recommendations made by the community members.

1. An apology to the Sayisi Dene by the federal and provincial governments for the social injustices caused to them due to the lack of foresight and planning on the part of Indian Affairs.
2. Acknowledgement of traditional lands and cultural values by the federal government.
3. A thorough investigation of the southern boundary of Nunavut. Recognition of the Sayisi-Dene traditional land-use areas within the Southern Keewatin District.
4. A thorough interpretation of Adhesions to Treaty 5.
5. Appropriate infrastructure to assist the community in the ongoing healing process.

Today's young people are the product of the Churchill years. Most are not aware of the trauma suffered by their parents and grandparents. A process must be in place to allow for a community rebirth. Bitterness over the past wrongdoings, plus the emotional and physical scars of social injustices have not allowed the Sayisi Dene to psychologically adapt to or be the deciders of culture change. Conflicting values, traditional versus western, have left many people in a state of cultural limbo. They are not sure where they belong. Many community members want a retreat centre with support staff as one means of overcoming some of the social problems that have their roots in the relocation.

6. Co-management of natural resources and a commitment on the part of federal and provincial governments to provide knowledge and learning opportunities to community members.

7. Financial assistance and planning for those who wish to establish business ventures which require a substantial financial output.

8. Opportunities for employment and training within northern industries such as Manitoba Hydro, Inco, and the various gold-mines. These opportunities should be fashioned after those in the mining industry in northern Saskatchewan (e.g. Cameco, Cigar Lake). Indian Affairs, Employment Canada and the various education agencies should work together with industry to identify future needs and provide trades and skilled labor training for community members.

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APPENDIX A

- Culture Shock** The psychic distress caused by the strain of adjusting to a different culture.
- Deculturation** The process by which an aboriginal cultural trait is abandoned, but not replaced with a White cultural equivalent.
- Disintegration** The breakdown of the social system and cultural values which occurs as a result of deculturation.
- Disorganization** The breakup of the social system which occurs as a result of disintegration.
- Emics** Descriptions or judgements concerning behavior, customs, beliefs, values, etc, held by members of a societal group as culturally appropriate and valid.
- Etics** The techniques and results of making generalizations about cultural events, behavior patterns, artifacts, thought, and ideology that aim to be verifiable objectively and valid cross-culturally.
- Maladaptation** Any factors within a culture's adaptive structures that impede the the culturrrre's ability to adjust to changes in its environment.
- Pre-Dorset** An archaeological culture which has been found in the eastern Canadian Arctic and Greenland. Sites in the Churchill area date to 1500 B.C.
- Selkirk** A Late Woodland-protohistoric culture that is usually associated with the early Cree. The distinctive trait is its fabric-impressed pottery.
- Taltheilei** A Late Pre-contact Period tradition first identified by MacNeish at Taltheilei Narrows, Great Slave Lake. This tradition represents the early Athapaskans of the District of Keewatin.



APPENDIX B